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TERRY L. HEYNS

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AMERICAN AND SOVIET
RELATIONS SINCE DÉTENTE

THE FRAMEWORK

TERRY L. HEYNS

1987

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*To my family:
Nancy, Colleen, Sheila, and Terry W. F.,
as well as my parents
Frank and Lee Heyns*

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FOREWORD

The age of *détente* in the middle 1970s brought with it not only a softening of the confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union, but a growth in trade, scientific and academic exchanges, and cultural programs as well. Then in late 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. This chilling event began a series of incidents, capped by the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007. As a consequence, US-Soviet relations returned to a climate reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Nonetheless, the framework of US-Soviet cooperation remains in place. Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Heyns, US Air Force, describes the working-level, people-to-people networks which, though frequently strained by the state of official relations, have endured. Americans buy Soviet metals and ammonia; the Soviets purchase US corn and pressure-sensitive tape; the two nations exchange researchers, orchestras and jazz combos, and dance groups; media coverage continues; diplomats meet daily. Even amid the clangor of confrontational official rhetoric, such working-level communication never stops.

Although the working-level framework itself cannot improve relations, Colonel Heyns points out that such contacts do help manage the tensions inevitable between two powers with such fundamentally different systems and cultures. He also reveals details of the framework that will surprise many readers. His reporting of this

workaday world shared by Soviets and Americans is a worthy complement to more formal studies on arms control, grand strategy, or the KGB. for there are effects—reverberations—in both nations when Americans eat Soviet-processed fish, Soviets drink Pepsi-Cola, and American and Soviet scientists study in one another's labs.



Bradley C. Hosmer
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense University

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INTRODUCTION

This book is about the relationships between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR. In it I *will not* explain the elements of grand strategy between the two superpowers, nor will I address the intrigues of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB, nor will I deal with the asymmetries of the American and Soviet military establishments, the difficulties of arms control, and problems of arms reduction. Of course, all of these topics are important, even vital, but studies into these areas have already been done.

This book is about fish, tractors, exchanges, working-level diplomats, tourists, technology, and the media. It is about the ways Russians and Americans touch each other in day-to-day living. For example, do many Americans know that an ordinary Soviet citizen in Moscow or Leningrad can buy Pepsi-Cola? And do many Americans know that if they purchase Pacific salmon from the corner supermarket, it may have been processed aboard a Soviet factory ship? Such ordinary events in the US-USSR relationship are important, but not well known. Thus, the purpose of this book is to examine aspects of the American-Soviet relationship that are not common knowledge or given high visibility.

By no means do I treat the entire universe of US-Soviet relations; indeed, I have left much unsaid. I mention the KGB and its activities peripherally. Although the reader should not be under any illusions in regard to the intelligence services of the USSR, I do not

emphasize them here because there are many works that discuss the KGB in detail, especially in the area of advanced technology (see my suggested readings). The same rationale is true for examinations of the military establishment of the USSR as well as arms control and the overall foreign policy objectives of both countries.

The information presented here is, therefore, of a different nature or picture. The material in this volume is important to know, however, for the people of both countries are bound together in ways that might be expanded and built upon. Although it is unrealistic to expect that the two countries can reconcile their differences, the United States and the USSR may build upon the relationships I address here and be better able to manage the tensions that inevitably arise out of their diverse political systems. A corporation jointly owned by Soviets and Americans that markets fish caught in American trawlers and processed on board Soviet factory ships is a small but important demonstration of how the two countries can cooperate. Such cooperation exists in the business world: American businessmen sell their products in the USSR, and a Soviet agency in the United States promotes Soviet products on the American market. Also important, American scholars live and work in the USSR, just as Soviet research scientists live and work in the United States. Such arrangements could provide more contacts and open channels of communication between both societies and thus help in managing the tensions between them.

We should be under no illusions, however, about how the Soviet system works. The Soviets have a closed society, a system that is difficult for the average American to visualize. We take our lifestyles and the freedoms we enjoy as givens, and project these onto other societies. Whenever it is appropriate, I will attempt to show the difference. Americans concerned about nuclear war, for example, do not need prior approval from our government to contact Soviet citizens; ordinary Soviet citizens are not allowed contacts with Westerners. Those Soviets who deal with foreigners without the permission of their government do so at their own considerable risk.

The section of this book dealing with the media contrasts the differences in the American and Soviet systems. Americans can see Soviet commentators on the network evening news, beamed into American living rooms directly from Soviet television studios in Moscow. American journalists, however, do not have the same opportunity to appear uncensored on Soviet TV. Information is a

tightly controlled commodity in the USSR that is used to a distinct advantage in dealing not only with Soviet citizens but also with the American public. Because our American system is open to opposing points of view, the Soviet position is frequently presented by Soviet spokesmen on American TV screens and in American newspapers. No such opportunity is available for American spokesmen to appear and explain the US position on TV in the Soviet Union. Americans rarely have the opportunity to speak directly to the Soviet people without prior approval of the Soviet Government.

Tourism is controlled. Americans denied entry into the USSR are being denied entry not by the US Government but by the Soviet Government. Carefully controlling their own citizens, the Soviets generally do not allow their people out of the USSR except with the permission of the government. In truth, there are no real Soviet tourists visiting the United States. Soviet citizens, who visit America only with the permission of their own government, are almost always a part of an official Soviet delegation.

If American peace groups want to discuss the dangers of nuclear war, they do so with Soviet citizens and officials who speak with the approval of the Soviet Government. Such a thing as an independent peace movement in the Soviet Union responding on its own to the overtures of private American citizens simply does not and cannot exist. So, though US citizens who are active in such ventures may have an effect, they need to understand the nature of the Soviets they are dealing with. Americans trying to influence Soviet citizens will probably have a greater impact on their fellow Americans. The Soviets they meet in the "peace movement" are there with the approval of their government.

In short, do not hold any illusions about the relationship of the United States and the USSR. More communication and better understanding cannot alone solve the difficulties the two countries face in dealing with each other. Yet at the same time, the two countries have room to improve the channels of communication between them. Although such channels, by themselves, cannot solve these problems, they improve the atmosphere and lower the level of stress. Improving this diplomatic climate makes other options possible.

As far as the United States is concerned, a pragmatic approach to the USSR that is tempered with what is *possible* to achieve can

best serve American interests. We can take actions ourselves that would protect US interests, and we can take these actions regardless of the Soviet position. We can, for example, encourage more American scholars to enter Soviet studies. Then, too, we could encourage business ventures that do not involve the transfer of strategic technology. In trade agreements, we could balance our need for raw materials and energy with the Soviet Union's need for grain and food. Whatever is decided, however, should be decided on the basis of pragmatic self-interest because such arrangements have the greatest chance to succeed. Successful agreements help both countries manage the enormous differences between them and keep these differences from escalating into open conflict.

This book is organized around some of the lesser known areas in which Americans and Soviets have successfully worked with one another. The first chapter deals with the working-level diplomatic contacts between the two countries. Such daily working contacts are the principal means by which many of the other arrangements discussed in later chapters proceed. Although I do not address the foreign policy objectives of the USSR and the United States, I do examine the structure that allows both countries to consult on a routine basis every day. In chapter two, the essential differences between the Soviet and the US media and journalists are described and examined. The Soviet media are a centrally controlled instrument of the Soviet Government; the US media are privately owned and freely operated. The Soviet journalist's main task is to support the policies of the USSR; the American journalist often sees himself or herself as an adversary of the US Government and as the spokesman of *higher principle*. Although American journalists are frequently critics of the Government of the USSR, more important, they are critics of the American Government as well.

Chapter three deals with trade, an area in which the United States and the USSR have achieved significant cooperation in the past. Because there is still room for more cooperation, mention is made of a number of trade proposals which can benefit both countries. Closely related to trade relationships is the problem of technology transfer. Real concerns exist regarding American high technology that might be used by the USSR for military purposes. Because of this concern, in chapter four I examine advanced technology. The dangers involved in the Soviet acquisition of advanced technology through increased trade relations are real and cannot be

dismissed. I suggest policies that would provide for American access to Soviet advances in technology and would protect US technology as well.

In chapter five, I investigate the academic, scientific, and research exchange programs of the United States and the USSR. In this area, both countries conduct joint research on health, the environment, and agriculture. Scholars from each country also are exchanged to work in specialized fields, establishing relationships that may prove useful in the future. Chapter six turns to exchanges involving ordinary Soviet and American citizens, such as athletics, tourism, and people-to-people contacts. I also suggest possibilities for an exchange of military personnel between the United States and the USSR. In chapter seven I examine how this working framework established in the USSR and the United States has survived the strains and stresses that characterize relations between the two nations. This framework, so important to both countries, helps each manage the tensions which arise out of their diverse histories, ideologies, and cultures.

Burke, Virginia
Manhattan, Kansas

AMERICAN AND SOVIET
RELATIONS SINCE DÉTENTE

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BROADLY SPEAKING, Soviet policy regarding the United States is best described as adversarial. From the Soviet perspective, the United States is a chief enemy and the leader of the world capitalist system. This perspective is rooted in Lenin's analysis first offered in his work, *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism*.¹ In this work, Lenin places the class struggle of Karl Marx on a worldwide setting. According to Lenin, the industrial countries have been able to forestall the revolution at home by exploiting the people of what we now call the Third World.

THE ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP

The Soviet Union views itself as the leading nation in the fight against the imperialist powers led by the United States. The Soviet State with its nuclear arsenal and formidable military power prevents the capitalist side from destroying the USSR and from thwarting the world revolution. Indeed, the correlation of forces is now said to have shifted in the favor of the Socialist camp, which is led, of course, by the Soviet Union. Hence, the USSR views the United States within the context of Lenin's analysis. This perspective is difficult for Americans to credit but is still as true today as it was in Lenin's time.

G. A. Arbatov, of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, has updated Lenin's doctrine of imperialism with the concept of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence does not eliminate struggle and competition. Although peaceful coexistence might reject competition in terms of a nuclear war as too horrible, the struggle between the two social systems is still essential. As Arbatov reasons,

such a form of struggle between the two social systems inevitably presupposes ideological struggle. Insofar as capitalism and socialism will compete with each other for the support of peoples, the struggle of ideas is inevitable.²

This view of an ideological struggle frequently governs Soviet behavior in ways difficult for Americans to understand. The Soviets see Americans as their opponents and will try to prove the superiority of the Soviet system by taking great pains to point out what is wrong with the American capitalist system and the "evils" it spreads around the world. They will portray the United States as hostile and threatening to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people.³ Although American and Soviet diplomats might be worlds apart when it comes to political and ideological matters, they may not be so far apart in terms of practical arrangements. This state of affairs leads us to the idea of peaceful coexistence.

Americans poorly understand peaceful coexistence and its consequences. They sometimes wonder why agreement in one area, say a grain sale or an arms limitation treaty, does not mean that there can't be agreements in other areas such as arms control. They ask, wouldn't all be well if we could "communicate" with the Soviets and explain our position with more understanding of their point of view? Others have even suggested that the United States should be in the business of "educating" the Soviets so they will behave correctly. Such opinions overlook the Soviets' self-image and their unique historical and ideological heritage.

The Soviets have their own agenda, based on their heritage. Peaceful coexistence means that even though the United States and the USSR might cooperate, especially in avoiding a nuclear war, the basic struggle between the two countries will go on. So, to the Soviets cooperation in specific areas such as a grain sale is not necessarily linked with lessened tensions in other areas. Sensitive

communication and education can only go so far in such a relationship, especially if the other side will not play by the traditional rules of compromise and fair play so ingrained in American history and tradition.

Even while divergent attitudes do exist in the US-USSR relationship, the Soviets still observe certain rules in the extant day-to-day working framework. Soviet diplomacy has emphasized such rules, perhaps because these rules also confer legitimacy and privileges, as well as rights and duties.

PRIVILEGES AND RECIPROCITY

International law and custom govern the activities of the embassies and the members of their diplomatic staffs, providing certain guarantees to diplomats. Although much of this area is not common knowledge, for most of us, the concept of *diplomatic immunity*, one of the oldest concepts in international law, immediately comes to mind. In an early recorded incident in ancient Greece and Persia, Persian emissaries were killed at the order of a Greek commander. The Persians refused to reciprocate in kind, viewing such behavior as being outside the bounds of civilized nations. To the Persians, the Greek emissaries were entitled to diplomatic immunity by the nature of their position. The rules and customs surrounding diplomacy continued to evolve right into our own time.

In our contemporary diplomatic world, the concepts of *inviolability* and *extraterritoriality* are important, even if ill-defined. To guarantee inviolability, the host nation must provide protection to the ambassador and his staff, as well as to their families, to secure their well-being. Inviolability also ensures that the ambassador and his staff must be able to fulfill all duties and conduct all activities of their diplomatic roles. Extraterritoriality provides for special considerations: exemption from criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction; complete freedom to communicate with the home state; the immunity of residences and garages; and the immunity of offices.⁴ The Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washington and San Francisco enjoy these privileges and protections, just as do the US missions in Moscow and Leningrad.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic representatives in the United States are not located or restricted to any single building or group of

residences. In Washington, DC, Soviet facilities are at a number of places, and a new Embassy is being readied on Tunlaw Road. The Soviet Embassy has long been at 1125 16th Street, NW, just a few blocks from the White House. Now rather famous, the Embassy's photograph appears frequently in local and national publications. The building, easy to spot, has many kinds of antennas sprouting from the roof. Although this structure is the focal point of Soviet diplomatic activity, it is not the only location of Soviet diplomatic personnel, by any means. Elements of the official Soviet diplomatic community are at several Washington, DC, locations:

Counselor (Commercial) and the
Trade Representative of the USSR
2001 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20008

Counselor (Information), First
Secretary (Public Cultural
Exchanges), Attachés (Maritime),
(Agricultural Affairs), and
(Irrigation Affairs)

3875 Tunlaw Road
Washington, DC 20007

Attaché (Fisheries Affairs)
1609 Decatur Street, NW
Washington, DC 20011


Maritime Attaché
1555 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Counselor and Consul General
1825 Phelps Place, NW
Washington, DC 20008

Office of the Military, Air, and
Naval Attachés
2552 Belmont Road, NW
Washington, DC 20008

Offices of the Agricultural Counselor,
Information Counselor, and
Irrigation Counselor
1706 18th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009

The Soviets also maintain a compound for their diplomats on Tunlaw Road, complete with living quarters, a commissary, school facilities for children, and recreation amenities. When completely finished, the Tunlaw Road compound also will house a number of official offices.⁵ Some Soviet diplomats of higher rank live in other areas as well. Under the commonly accepted provisions of international law, the United States must respect all of these official locations and provide them with protection, services, and other needs. Nothing may impede Soviet diplomatic personnel from carrying out their functions.



MAP 1. Soviets in Washington: (1) the new Embassy, (2) Military, Air, and Naval Attachés, (3) Counselor (Commercial) and the Trade Representative of the USSR, (4) Counselor and Consul General, (5) Agricultural Counselor, Information Counselor, and Irrigation Counselor, (6) old Embassy, (7) TASS.

Probably the most noticeable diplomatic protection offered comes from the police forces of the District of Columbia and the Executive Protection Service. Police keep unruly people away from the Embassy, preventing interference with access to the building. Even so, some demonstrations do take place at the Soviet Embassy

Below: In Washington, DC, the old Soviet Embassy. Opposite, clockwise from the top: Diplomatic offices of the Trade Representation of the USSR; Agricultural, Information, and Irrigation Counselors; and the Soviet Maritime Attaché. Aero-flot once shared the L Street location of the Maritime Attaché. Photographs by the author.





and are reported by the press, but many are not a problem because they are small or because the demonstrators' cause is obscure or ordinary. Although demonstrators have the right to assemble as guaranteed by US Federal and constitutional law, they also must honor the international rules and customs conferring inviolability. Terrorists, of course, present the more serious threats to diplomats and their families. The offices of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, had been the target of bombings both in New York and in Washington. The Soviet diplomatic compound in Brooklyn, New York, has also been a bomb target. Protection and follow-up investigations in these serious matters are the responsibilities of US authorities and are taken quite seriously by the US Department of State.

The US Foreign Service officers assigned to the Soviet desk deal with these major matters but must also oversee more mundane matters involving free access. Soviet diplomats have the right to travel to and from their residences and offices and the right to conduct business with various host country individuals, government offices, and commercial concerns. Some access matters, however, just cannot be controlled, such as traffic in the Washington area. Although the Soviets have diplomatic plates on their vehicles, they have to navigate to and from their offices, just like all other drivers in the metropolitan area. Delay and inconvenience caused by traffic jams are not covered by international law.

The District of Columbia traffic department and police force take a dim view of diplomats illegally parking in areas that block traffic; their answer sometimes is to tow the car but not to impose a fine. In this way, the District maintains the niceties of diplomatic immunity yet discourages diplomats from abusing their privilege and status. In some cases police merely tow the vehicle out of a traffic lane to a side street where it may still be illegally parked, though not impede the flow of traffic. In other cases, matters may be more clouded, such as when private property is involved. One time, when a Soviet diplomat parked his car on a privately owned

Opposite, from the top: In northwest Washington, DC, offices of the Soviet Counselor and Consul General and the Military, Air, and Naval Attachés. Photographs by the author.



lot without paying, the owner of the parking lot called a private towing company (not a police tow truck) and had the car removed. Because the entire affair did not involve any government agencies, the Soviets had to pay the towing fee.

Not all Soviet personnel assigned to the United States have full diplomatic immunity. By mutual agreement, the Soviets have 320 accredited diplomatic personnel here at any one time, a number that does not include their families, who may accompany them. This number 320 also does not include the 319 Soviets assigned to the United Nations Soviet diplomatic mission or the 302 Soviets who work at the UN in New York. These numbers are current now but could change; for example, in 1985 the United States requested that the number of Soviets assigned to the UN missions be reduced by 125.

Embassy personnel enjoy full immunity; consular personnel enjoy only those immunities consistent with their function. For both groups, diplomatic immunity will not protect illegal behavior. A host country can declare a diplomat *persona non grata*, an event which means that person must leave the country and return home. A number of Soviet and American attachés have been expelled from the hosting country. One example, two Soviets, Anatoly Y. Skripko and Lt. Col. Yuri P. Leonov, were expelled from the United States.⁶ The US State Department expelled the two after the Soviets ordered the expulsion of David Augustenborg from Leningrad.⁷ Mr. Augustenborg was Vice Consul at the American consulate at the time. In a separate incident in 1983, the Soviets declared two other Americans *personae non gratae*.

This apparent "tit for tat" behavior brings up another principle governing Soviet-US relations—*reciprocity*. Extended to all persons assigned to the embassy, whether or not they are on the diplomatic list, reciprocity ensures treatment equal to that the counterparts receive in each host nation. The effects of reciprocity can range from the mundane, such as recreational facilities, to the very serious, such as travel restrictions. For example, both the Soviet Union and the United States are building new embassy facilities. Work on the Soviet Embassy on Tunlaw Road in Washington, DC, moved much faster than work on the new US Embassy in Moscow, causing the United States to carefully monitor construction work on the Soviet Embassy in Washington to ensure that work progressed on the US

facility in Moscow. The rules of conduct call for the use of each country's own crews during the final stages of construction to avoid, or at least minimize, the risk of listening devices being put into the walls during some phase of construction. In Moscow, Soviet workmen suddenly stopped work at one point, complaining about conditions imposed on them by the Americans. In the United States, American contractors report that the Soviets are constantly looking over their shoulders, even to the point of getting in the way. In the arrangement between the two countries, each chancery will be occupied at the same time. This pact explains why the new Soviet Embassy on Tunlaw Road has not been fully occupied as of this writing, even though a number of Soviet offices already operate from the compound.

Reciprocity colored a 1982 incident involving the use of recreational facilities in Glen Cove, New York. Mayor Alan Parente banned the Russians from using the city's recreational facilities



On Tunlaw Road in Washington, DC, the new Soviet Embassy compound. Photographed by Bill Snead. Copyrighted. Reprinted with permission of the Washington Post.

because he felt that the 36-acre Soviet compound was a spy center aimed at Long Island's defense industry. The Glen Cove City Council backed the mayor but for a different reason. The council felt the Soviets were not paying taxes; because no taxes were paid, a recreational fee was in order. The Soviets claimed protection under extra-territoriality. Glen Cove, however, steadfastly refused to issue recreation facility beach and tennis passes to the Soviets. On 5 August 1982, the Soviets informed the US Embassy in Moscow that until Glen Cove lifted its prohibition on the use of its recreational facilities, US diplomats and their families would be banned from using the diplomatic beach on the river at Nikolnaya Gora. In addition, the Soviet Government also raised rental fees for other recreational facilities used by US Embassy personnel and their families in Moscow. On the surface, a dispute like the Glen Cove one over recreational facilities seems ridiculous, but in fact, it can become very serious. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., head of the State Department Office of Soviet Union Affairs, expressed fears at the time:

A series of greater and greater *reciprocal* retaliations could be instituted by both sides, a course which would not be in the foreign policy interests of the United States [emphasis added].⁸

I deliberately emphasize Simons' choice of the word *reciprocal*. The relations of the United States and the USSR involved not only governments but also individual diplomats and their families. For the US diplomats and their families, recreational facilities in Moscow are limited; this directly affects individual morale and well-being. Arthur A. Hartman, then US Ambassador to Moscow, expressed his concern about staff morale. Ambassador Hartman also noted that Glen Cove's action caused a deterioration in US-USSR relations.⁹ The matter became so serious that the US Justice Department, on behalf of the State Department, took Glen Cove into court. In the New York District Court, Judge Joseph McLaughlin ruled that the Soviet diplomats must be allowed into Glen Cove's recreational facilities. Mayor Parente insisted, however, that the ruling apply only to the eight individuals actually living at the Glen Cove mansion and not to Soviets living in other parts of the United States.

The Soviets living in the United States have alternatives for recreation. United States Embassy personnel living in Moscow do not. Indeed, one Soviet Embassy official stated, "Every individual is free to decide how to spend the weekend. I myself am going to

Ocean City [Maryland]."¹⁰ Unfortunately, for Americans in Moscow, who do not have such alternatives, the Glen Cove case pointed out the complexity of reciprocal relations between the United States and the USSR. The refinements of reciprocity range far beyond limited recreational facilities. A whole range of issues can cloud reciprocal relations between the two countries, for example, the travel of diplomats in each country, procedures followed by diplomats to locate a home, tourism, and commerce and business—to name only a few.



MAP 2. The Moscow central area. Courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Daily living in the capital of each nation means unique challenges for the diplomats and their families. Ordinary requirements of living present difficulties even though both Americans and Soviets have small commissaries available to supply items that are taken for granted at home. Americans being assigned to Moscow are told to bring huge quantities of toilet paper, toothpaste, hygienic items, and other toiletries, for example. The commissary frequently runs out of such items. For both Americans and Soviets, obtaining familiar food packaged and cut in an accustomed way is virtually impossible in the hosting country. The commissaries stock only limited quantities.


Most Americans assigned to Moscow and Leningrad try to send their dry cleaning to Finland. The dry cleaning process in the Soviet Union is facetiously said to consist of dipping clothing in a barrel of kerosene, swishing it around, and then letting it dry beside a dusty road. On the other hand, the Soviets assigned to the United States complain about American fast foods that seem to have all the taste removed in processing, to say nothing about the vitamins and minerals needed for good nutrition. American television also is on the list of Soviet complaints, but I am told that the diplomats and their families watch TV a lot anyway—the Soviet Embassy was said to have an antenna on the roof which receives a movie broadcast channel in the Washington, DC, area. Of more serious concern, the Soviets complain of crime. Most Soviet diplomats and their families live in Washington and New York, areas where there is a legitimate concern about crime and personal safety.

For both Soviets and Americans, there are apparent difficulties involved in foreign assignments. Perhaps Americans who have not traveled extensively overseas are not aware of such difficulties, but they owe a certain debt to their fellow citizens in the foreign and military services, who do endure considerable hardships and risk while assigned overseas, serving their country and making a considerable sacrifice while carrying out their official duties and functions.

DOBRYNIN'S DIPLOMATIC LONGEVITY

Soviet diplomats in the United States also have functions and obligations that fall within the standard procedural discourse and conduct of diplomacy, procedures that have evolved out of customary practices which provide for the orderly arrangement of the business of international relations. The person carrying out these duties

and functions can make a significant contribution to the way in which such duties are accomplished. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, for example, was more than the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Before returning to Moscow in February 1986 to be Gorbachev's principal foreign policy adviser, Dobrynin had become the dean of the diplomatic corps in Washington, DC, making him first in the order of precedence at diplomatic functions. Mr. Dobrynin had been



Architect's rendering of the new US Embassy under construction on Konyushkovskaya Street in Moscow. Courtesy of the US Department of State.

the Soviet Ambassador since March 1962, unique in diplomatic representation as tenure in Washington, DC, longer than that of any other ambassador accredited to the United States.¹¹ While Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Dobrynin dealt with six US Presidents and six US Secretaries of State. The same cannot be said about the US Ambassadors to Moscow. The United States has had six ambassadors to the USSR during Mr. Dobrynin's tenure.

Mr. Dobrynin is an expert on US affairs, having been here since the early 1950s, and a very skillful and able representative of his country. The former Ambassador has received the highest marks from the many US officials that have dealt with him. His reputation was certainly a factor in his dealings with the United States and probably helped his own country in the conduct of US-USSR relations. Although not a formalized aspect in any tangible sense, the USSR enjoyed some positive effect in its dealings with the United States because Mr. Dobrynin had done such a superb job of speaking for his country for so many years. This personal expertise and experience helped bring about more US-Soviet contact than might otherwise have taken place.*

OUR SOCIETAL DIFFERENCES

An important part of the considerations that affect the way in which diplomatic duties are carried out relates to the society and culture of the host country. The cultural and governmental systems of the United States and the USSR could not be further apart, and volumes have been written on the differences between these two nations. How do such differences affect the representatives of the USSR in the United States? For one thing, Soviet citizens in the United States are protected by the laws of the United States and the US Constitution. The US courts have extended the protection of the Constitution to foreign nationals. In other words, for anyone residing in the US, there is no requirement to be a US citizen to enjoy

*Mr. Andrei Gromyko was in the diplomatic service of the USSR through the tenure of 14 US Secretaries of State and 9 US Presidents. Mr. Gorbachev elevated Mr. Gromyko from the post of Foreign Minister of the USSR to that of President of the Supreme Soviet in July 1985. This post is largely ceremonial. Mr. Gromyko also serves as President of the USSR.

protections of the US Constitution. In the United States, the Federal, State, and local Governments in the US system of government are all limited in their exercise of power. For example, in the case of the Glen Cove dispute over recreational facilities, previously discussed, the Federal Government could not solve the problem of access just by ordering city officials to admit Soviet diplomats to city recreational facilities. Likewise, the Federal Government could not arbitrarily arrest a foreign national for whatever reason without first following defined legal procedures. Our system of laws becomes important in discussions of the Soviet use of the media and the right of freedom of speech in the United States.

In addition to the legal and constitutional protections of the US governmental system, Soviet representatives also enjoy advantages which arise out of US political and cultural traditions. Americans are open, willing to entertain minority views and willing to listen to dissenting opinions. In fact, Americans are constantly bombarded with opinions that differ greatly from the opinion of the US Government. American society, a plural society, has open competition for influence and power that also provides Soviet diplomats with direct avenues to the American people and American public opinion.

At the US Embassy in Moscow, American diplomats and staff cannot go directly to the Soviet people. The USSR is a closed society. There is another important aspect to this; because access to the Soviet people is limited, the work of Americans in Moscow is difficult. Assuredly, the United States would have more to lose than the Soviets if worsening relations between the two countries began to result in more stringent travel restrictions and reduced diplomatic staffs. Although the Soviets could easily have access to our country and American society by other means, the United States would find it difficult, if not impossible, to establish alternative points of contact in the Soviet Union.

In sum, the day-to-day workings of diplomacy do generate more contact between the Soviet Union and the United States than one might think. Although full diplomatic protection and privilege extend to those assigned to the Embassy, those assigned to the consulate have varying degrees of protection, usually worked out bilaterally, and Soviet citizens in the United States, such as those on an exchange program, do not have diplomatic protections. Along with the concept of reciprocity governing the behavior of Soviet diplomats in the United States for both mundane and weighty matters,

the influence of custom also affects the actions of Soviet diplomats. Certain advantages can be traced to the personal prestige the Soviet Ambassador has earned from his dealings with US officials. Because of the influence of the US Constitution and the fact that US society is plural and open, this country provides a unique set of conditions for the Soviets in getting their message directly to the American people, an advantage not available to US diplomats in the Soviet Union.

OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY

The Soviet Embassy has two broad functions, representational and consular. The Ambassador, assisted by his staff, represents the government of the USSR to the government of the United States. Any contact between the United States and the USSR ultimately goes through the Soviet Embassy. The same is true for our Embassy in Moscow. This is not to say that the embassies are the only points of contact between the two countries. During the Cuban missile crisis, all kinds of contacts were used by both governments.¹² At times, the American and Soviet journalists met discreetly, and their meetings in New York City proved to be a source of vital information for both sides. Indeed, over the years, Soviet and American officials meet in a number of bilateral, multilateral, and international forums to discuss a wide range of issues and concerns. Private individuals and groups also participate in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. But the Soviet Embassy certainly serves as the main focus of communication with Washington in the diplomatic realm, just as the American Embassy does with Moscow.

As a representational function, negotiation is very important to any embassy. Sometimes the United States and USSR negotiate using special delegations, such as with arms reduction, grain sales, and other economic relations. In these cases, the Soviet Embassy may not be the main point of contact, since the negotiating teams of the two countries work directly with each other. However, because the Embassy may become involved at a later time, the Embassy staff keeps the Ambassador informed of developments in each particular area, a very demanding task because ongoing negotiations in one area may have far-reaching effects and consequences in other areas. Precisely because of such effects, the Embassy may also be

left behind when events take on a life of their own. For instance, Ambassador Dobrynin's credibility was not damaged during the Cuban missile crisis for one reason; President Kennedy believed that Moscow kept the Soviet representative in the dark. Whether this was done by design, oversight, or neglect cannot be documented. In any event, Dobrynin's denial that there were missiles in Cuba when, in fact, the US President had photographic evidence to the contrary did not affect Dobrynin's position with the President or the United States.

Besides negotiation, observation is an embassy function. The most well-known diplomatic observers are the military attachés. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have representatives of their armed forces on their Embassy staffs. Soviet military attachés have sometimes been invited to US military exercises, and they have attended a number of official military events. Soviet attachés file travel notes with the Defense Department to obtain permission to visit certain areas of the United States. Such visits are carefully monitored and approved, partly because of the issue of reciprocity mentioned earlier. United States attachés also request to visit certain areas of the Soviet Union, but entire areas of the USSR are closed to foreigners. (Andrei Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb and now one of the more famous Soviet dissidents, had been exiled until December 1986 to the city of Gorki, which is located in one of the areas closed to all foreigners.) As demanded in the interest of reciprocity, the United States has declared sections of its territory closed to Soviet visitors.

Both countries carefully monitor the travel of diplomatic personnel and military attachés. However, it is not only the military attachés who engage in legitimate observation; other Soviet and American diplomats do so as well. Each respective Embassy also has cultural attachés, a medical attaché, and others. These attachés and other members of the staff engage in observation. They make reports listing official contacts, interpret various conditions and situations, and make assessments. Much of this activity takes place on the cocktail and dinner party circuit. In addition, in the United States the Soviets have access to the halls and galleries of the US Congress. It is such access that generates periodic complaints of "Soviet spies" in the chambers of the Congress. Occasionally a Soviet diplomat will openly walk into a congressional or Executive Office and ask for specific documents, which may or may not be classified.

Brazen information gathering attempts are rare but do draw attention to Soviet activities. These overt attempts also interfere with the carefully arranged and cultivated private contacts going on in both capitals, especially in Washington. To exchange information, many Soviet diplomats meet privately with Americans in and out of the Government. Such meetings are conducted openly with no suggestion of espionage. Both the Soviet and his American acquaintance know these meetings are only for the exchange of views on issues, and both parties are careful to keep such engagements above board. Meetings take place over lunch, at official functions, or during social engagements such as cocktail parties or receptions. Reliably, the Soviets are quick to accept invitations to cocktail parties and other social gatherings at which they can explain their country's position or policy. Such events usually are not reported by the media. In 1985, in an interesting exception, however, the media did report that the Soviets attended a social event held in the Georgetown home of a member of the US Congress. The subject under discussion was the "Star Wars" proposals involving missile defense, and the Soviets were there to gather updated information and express their objections to this proposal.¹³ Observation, no matter where it takes place, is very important and can be critical to the task of keeping the home government informed.

Another function the embassies perform is taking care of their fellow countrymen. For the Soviet Union, this role that has traditionally been termed as "protecting" is especially sensitive and can range from helping a visiting Soviet scholar get what he needs for his stay on an exchange program at an American university to dealing with American officials when a Soviet citizen tries to defect. In the first instance, matters can be considered almost routine and ordinary. In the latter, very serious repercussions can occur along the whole range of US-USSR relations, as was the case with Andrei V. Berezhkov, the 16-year-old son of a Soviet diplomat. This case was especially complicated because of the boy's age and the publication of a copy of his letter indicating he wanted to remain in the United States and not to return home with his family.¹⁴ Officials here had to handle the affair delicately. Convinced that the young man's feelings were genuinely expressed in the letter, US officials sought a meeting in an atmosphere free of coercion. Complicating things further, the family enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Overseas, US consular officers in Moscow and Leningrad are concerned with the many American tourists who visit the USSR.

Occasionally a US citizen will get into difficulties with black marketeers, alcohol, or drugs, matters taken very seriously in the Soviet Union. The US consulate does what it can to keep in contact with individuals involved in such difficulties, but official action is strictly limited. In such areas, protection often crosses the line between diplomatic-representational functions and consular functions.

Consular functions arose out of the conduct of commerce and trade between peoples and states. Although in one sense, consular functions are older than diplomatic functions, at the same time, consuls do not have the immunities and privileges extended to diplomats. The ordinary US citizen is most likely to come in contact with consular representatives of the USSR because of visas and travel documentation. Other consular tasks include the promotion of commerce and industrial relationships, settlement of disputes involving ships, and advice and help to its own citizens, such as interventions in disputes with local authorities and jurisdictions.¹⁵

The USSR has a consulate general in San Francisco; the United States in Leningrad. There have been proposals to open new consulates in Kiev and Chicago; these proposals are being pursued as of this writing.

The relationships between the Embassy, the governmental agencies, and the Foreign Ministries can be seen in figure 1, which shows lines of communication between agencies. However, the diagram itself is simplified and emphasizes the working lines of communication, not the political. Nothing on paper can possibly capture the complexity of state-to-state relations.

Even matters such as poultry come to the attention of the embassies, and many messages and responses to messages take place along the lines suggested in the diagram. The attachés in the trade and agricultural offices, for instance, may address issues of poultry purchases that might have originated in areas where the avian flu has been detected. The Soviet Union (as well as Canada, Mexico, Italy, and France) once barred the shipment of all US poultry or birds raised in US states where the flu had been reported.¹⁶ Each office will be involved with a myriad of details in its own area of competence.

THE USSR AND INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

The Soviet mission at the United Nations is not a part of the Soviet mission or delegation to the United States. The Soviets who work at the UN and its specialized agencies headquartered in New York are international civil servants. There are more than 300 Soviet citizens assigned to the United States as a part of the Soviet mission or as international civil servants. In March of 1986, the Reagan administration demanded that the Soviets reduce their staff at the UN to 188 people by 1987. This action caused a "flap" with the Soviets, who obviously gain advantages from these people in the UN.




FIGURE 1. The general lines of communication between the United States and the USSR, not the political or decision-making lines. The main diplomatic line of communication is between the Department of State and the Soviet Embassy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy. Other points of contact are shown. Various departments and ministries are also involved in the communication process between the two countries.

The status of these international civil servants rests upon special agreements between the UN and the Government of the United States.¹⁷ Soviets working in the UN Secretariat do not have immunity. Only with the establishment of the League of Nations had the question of international civil servants arisen in the conduct of international relations. So far, the type of immunity granted a foreign national depends on official function. There is already a court case involving a Soviet at the UN who entered the United States as representative of the USSR. His immunity extended only to those official acts performed by him in accord with his duties and obligations.¹⁸

The status of those who work in the UN Secretariat is a controversial one and one embroiled in politics. In one colorful debate between the United States and USSR, a Soviet delegate charged that the United States was not fit to play host to the UN's headquarters. Mr. Charles Lichenstein, the US representative, responded that if the members of the UN wanted to move out of New York, the US would not put any impediment in their way; the "members of the US Mission to the UN will be down at dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail into the sunset."¹⁹

Some Soviet citizens who enter the United States are on official business with international organizations. Such Soviet citizens have "right of access." Though the United States might be required to admit them to its territory, it can impose geographical restraints and limit them to only certain areas of the country. These Soviet citizens here on business have opportunities to participate in a number of events and visit a number of forums not open to Soviet Embassy personnel, access that results in increased contracts with US citizens. This set of circumstances provides opportunities used by the Soviets in their own interest. Similar benefits come with the approximately 174 Soviets working in the UN Secretariat who are not bound by the travel restrictions imposed on Soviets assigned to the UN diplomatic mission.²⁰

This question of Soviet citizens at the UN involves much more than sensitivities, however. The Soviets do gain more listening posts in the United States than they would if the UN and some of its specialized agencies were located elsewhere. The United States rarely sends its representatives into the Soviet Union for meetings of UN agencies and has not recently done so. The Soviets have offered to host the UN at a facility on the banks of the Moscow River that

now houses the headquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECOM). When asked to comment on the suggestion that the United States would not object to moving the UN from New York, President Reagan suggested that Mr. Lichenstein, quoted earlier, was expressing the feeling of a large number of American citizens. The President went on to say that if UN members would go to Moscow for six months, they would be able to see the contrast in the differences between the systems in the United States and the USSR.²¹ Such a move would, of course, grant Americans the same kinds of opportunities in the USSR that the Soviets have long enjoyed in the United States.

As long as Soviet citizens are stationed at the UN, they may have opportunities for travel and greater opportunities to meet Americans than American diplomats do in the USSR. The Soviets exploit this advantage. In cases where a Soviet attaché on the Embassy staff would be denied permission to travel to a certain area, a member of the Soviet delegation to the UN might ask to visit that region, under the guise of his official UN function. Such is also the case with Soviets who are assigned to the UN Secretariat. They might try to travel as aides, assistants, and even official representatives of the UN itself to a wide variety of areas and functions. The Department of State is careful to monitor such requests from Soviets at the UN.

A far greater number of Soviets and East European citizens work in such capacities for the UN and its specialized agencies than is generally realized. The United States has been left behind when it comes to personnel in international civil service. Although there are strict rules and prohibitions governing the conduct of such civil servants, they cannot help but see things through their own background and training. Such international staff members can make important inputs to the various studies, reports, positions, and recommendations made by the international agencies they work for. The United States may be losing influence by default regarding this question of international UN civil servants. Some means of encouraging Americans to choose such a career could be explored.


The Soviet Union carefully tracks positions for its citizens to fill in the international bureaucracy on a long-term basis, projecting over a period of 5 to 10 years. The Soviet delegation knows when one Soviet citizen will leave a UN post and has another one ready to



MAP 3. Areas of the USSR that American diplomats may not enter without permission.

take his or her place. Quite often, those Soviets who work for the many international agencies at the UN stay in place for years, gaining tremendous experience and an expertise in the workings of their particular organizations. The key decisionmakers naturally gravitate to staff members who know the past history of the work, are acquainted with the organization's views and needs, and have had long experience in the organization's mission and purpose.

On the other hand, the Americans at the UN have no long-range system, mainly because of budget and personnel cuts. When funding gets tight and when more pressing issues face reduced numbers of people, only important issues work their way through the decisionmaking system. Long-range planning designed to place Americans into more international positions simply is not an item that receives the attention it deserves.²² No adequate working system matches interested and qualified Americans with positions in the international staffs of the many UN agencies; no system screens qualified applicants. Our policy certainly does not match the Soviet policy of placing loyal nationals in the international civil service system. There have even been cases in which Americans in the international civil service, clearly alienated from the United



MAP 4. Areas of the United States that Soviet diplomats may not enter without permission

States, have used their positions to write especially critical reports on American policy. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are two agencies where such reports have appeared. The US official position clearly supports the requirement that international organization staff members be loyal to their organization's mission, but at the same time, there is no value in placing Americans hostile to the US and its political system in such positions.

We can see that *at the working level*, a framework is important to the contact between the United States and the USSR that involves issues on a daily basis and puts people into close contact. Many of these working issues neither make the front pages of the newspapers nor are considered important enough to be included in the evening news. Nonetheless, these working contacts grow especially important when the political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are at low points. Such daily contact keeps channels of communication open, and that is what is important. Although there may be overall and broad ideological perspectives that place

the United States and USSR at odds, the Foreign Service officers of both countries also work with issues requiring practical cooperation. Reciprocity itself imposes pragmatic considerations and restraints, as do the established customs of international law that govern diplomatic duties and privileges.

The international civil servant working for a particular international organization such as the UN or one of its specialized agencies is a relatively recent development. For the Soviets, the UN mission and Secretariat enable the USSR to have increased numbers of its citizens in the United States. In addition, the Soviets plan years in advance for staffing international organizations such as the UN agencies with their own nationals. The United States can do better similarly, encouraging Americans who are qualified to apply and work in this international civil service system as another working-level framework of diplomacy.

2

THE MEDIA CONNECTION

THERE ARE IMPORTANT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION between the United States and the USSR besides formal diplomatic working relations. Connections between the media of the USSR and the people of the United States and, to a lesser extent, between the media of the United States and the Soviet people play a significant role in informing one country about the activities of the other. Media relations affect not only one government's opinion of the other government, but also the perception of the people of the country.

Both the US and the Soviet Embassies have press and information officers who deal with the communications and news establishments in their respective countries. The Soviet Union enjoys a special advantage because Soviet spokesmen have more direct access to the American citizen, while American spokesmen rarely appear on Soviet television. The Soviets do not allow Americans to express a direct and uncensored opinion in the newspapers and journals of the USSR and carry only those opinions useful to the Soviet Government on their radio and television broadcasts. At the same time, Americans have the opportunity to see and hear Soviet spokesmen, whether a press officer in Washington, a Soviet news personality, a commentator in Moscow interviewed via satellite, or a Soviet Embassy official speaking to a congressional committee.

Both countries beam radio programs into each other's territory. The Soviet Union selectively jams such Western broadcasts into the

USSR, while Radio Moscow beams its message into the West free of any interference. These radio programs are part of a propaganda effort by each of the countries involved to win citizens of the other country over to its cause.

Information on the media and on access to the media in both the United States and USSR sheds light on some of the difficulties the United States has in trying to get its message across to the Soviet citizen. The greater concern here is how both the United States and the USSR legitimately work to present their own positions and views; although most of what is classified here as news is really some form of propaganda, it is certainly a significant part of the exchange between the United States and the USSR. A related element of the Soviet news system that is recognized but which I will not examine here is the underground newspapers and news information systems. The underground news media are important ways for Soviet citizens to get information about happenings both in the West and within the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries, but they are less of an exchange than a function of the internal Soviet system.

The media establishments of the two countries are a reflection of the differences between the two societies. The attitudes of the ordinary citizens toward news and information are also a study in contrast. Americans are used to bombardments of news and information. The US system allows almost every kind of expression by every kind of medium. American courts zealously guard First Amendment guarantees. Newspapers in the United States criticize or argue freely with the American Government. If Americans disagree with their newspapers, they write an opinion of their own and expect it to appear in the letters-to-the-editor column.

In the Soviet Union, one can also find many letters of criticism of Government officials, certain factories and their managers, and even of clerks in the traditional service areas, for example, train conductors, airline officials and hostesses, and cab drivers. Soviets frequently complain in letters to their newspapers about excessive drinking or absenteeism from work. The key difference, however, between the American and Soviet letters that get printed is that the Soviet editors carefully manage such criticism to serve the interest of the Communist party. Though genuine, these letters of criticism are carefully selected to support particular official programs and points of view. Although US newspapers may have biased political

leanings, it is due to the beliefs of their owners and editors, not the US Government. Information is an instrument of the Soviet Government, which is the key difference between the American and Soviet media.

THE PURPOSEFUL SOVIET MEDIA

Soviet media serve one primary purpose—to support the Soviet regime. The media are an extension of the Government and of the party, and each has its own newspaper. *Izvestia* is an organ of the Soviet Government and *Pravda*, an organ of the Communist party. The situation in the United States is different. The US Government has no official organ to serve as its official spokesman within its borders; United States Federal law prohibits such activity. The US Information Agency (USIA), organized to disseminate information about the United States to other countries, is prohibited from distributing publications or showing films within its borders.¹ Understanding of this prohibition relates back to the Constitution and the founding fathers' fear of despotic government. Americans traditionally have cherished freedom of the press and free expression. In the Soviet Union, the media are a tool used to prepare the Soviet people for the coming of communism. The user of this tool is the Communist party.

The party claims sole access to the historical truths *scientifically* determined by Marxist-Leninist thought. The party operates on the principle of *democratic-centralism*; the Politburo and the First Secretary of the party exercise control. Americans find this concept very difficult to understand because democratic-centralism is not democratic as we understand it. The central part of democratic-centralism is easier to see, as direction and control of the Government are dominated by the central party. Discussion and debate of established policies are rare at anything but the highest levels of the party and Government.²

The media in the USSR play a key role in party processes. Instead of free exchange of editorial opinions, factual accounts of noteworthy occurrences, support or criticism of Government policy, or debate on Government and political issues, the Soviet media offer the official views of the Communist party and of the Government organs charged with carrying out that policy. The purpose of

the media in the Soviet Union is to educate the Soviet people and to prepare them for the tasks assigned to them by the party.

Lenin was quite clear on this point in "The Next Tasks of Soviet Rule," in which he advocates the press as an important organ for educating the Soviet masses, not just for reporting the news.³ Nor did this idea die with Lenin. A Soviet commentator made the same message using different words:

The purpose of information is not that of commercializing news, but of educating the great mass of the workers, and organizing them under the exclusive direction of the party according to clearly defined objectives. . . . Information is one of the instruments of the class war, not one of its reflections. As a result, an objective concern with events prevents information from being used to its true purpose, namely to organize the workers.⁴

This concept of "educating the great mass of workers and organizing them under the exclusive direction of the party" is an important point to remember when examining Soviet radio, TV, newspapers, and magazines.⁵

A noteworthy feature of the Soviet media is its size. The Soviets report that there are 7,985 newspapers with a total circulation of 170 million copies, 4,726 magazines, and 85,000 books and booklets.⁶ Western sources acknowledge 7,000 Soviet newspapers, of which 650 are dailies.⁷ In the words of the Soviet *Year Book* for 1979, "This means that there were more than four periodicals for every Soviet family."⁸ All of these newspapers are for education, not for news.

The radio and television broadcasts of the USSR are also part of the party education campaign. Soviet sources point out that the USSR has 123 television centers and broadcasts to 80 percent of the country's population on eight channels, using land-based relay systems and space satellites. The central radio broadcast system transmits programs on eight stations for a total of 156 hours a day in 68 languages of the USSR and in 70 foreign languages. The USSR also has exchanges with other countries through both Intervision and Eurovision.⁹ Most of the important radio and TV programs originate in Moscow, with television fare heavily laded with the correct ideological line, no matter what the program content. About 25 percent of Soviet TV purports to be news or commentary, but all of it supports Soviet policy. One of the most popular shows is called

"Time" (Vremia). Americans have seen excerpts from this program on major US networks. Outwardly "Time" appears to follow the standard Western newscasts format, but in fact, as Sovietologist Vadim Medish, points out,

Everything shown and said on this broadcast represents the official Soviet position of the Soviet leadership; the program is watched with great attention by millions of viewers throughout the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Soviet TV is the most effective means of government-to-people communication in the USSR. Even remote outposts in the wilds of Siberia now have direct access to Moscow broadcasts, through the space satellite system. To most Western viewers, Soviet TV probably seems dull, since the Soviet TV system is so tightly controlled. Soviet censors allow no sex or violence. Even entertainment shows have an ideological lesson. One currently popular show, however, offers a bit more excitement for the Soviet viewer. This show is a James Bond type of adventure in reverse. The heroes are KGB agents who are trying to save a Latin American country from the clutches of the CIA. The show offers a unique blend of proper ideological lessons and action, yielding a program that is a hit with Soviet viewers. Some of the more popular shows are exported abroad and are available for purchase.

Westerners can pick up Moscow TV with new satellite dish antenna systems and special equipment that is now becoming less expensive and more readily available in the United States. (These systems are especially useful to US university departments of Soviet studies. Students and faculty can tune in directly to Moscow stations.) Although such systems have yet to make a global impact, that day is not far off. Certainly a TV system that can tune in the world presents Moscow a two-edged sword. Though such systems allow Soviet TV to be received by more people, they increase the chances that Soviet citizens will have access to Western programs, as is already the case with radio. Radio Free Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America do reach Soviet citizens. In spite of the jamming, large numbers of Soviets listen to these and other Western broadcasts, especially the BBC. Soviet citizens living on the borders of the USSR also receive foreign TV broadcasts. In Estonia, for example, local viewers can receive Finnish TV. The Estonian language is related to Finnish, so the Estonians who receive Finnish TV broadcasts have an alternative to Soviet TV programming.¹¹ This causes problems for Soviet authorities, who are always wary of nationalism in the border regions.

The Soviet journalists and media in the United States. The Soviet media have a role outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Embassy Press and Information Section acts as an agent of propaganda, trying to keep the Soviets' point of view before the American media and the American public. The open and free US system accommodates Soviet spokesmen. For example, Vladimir Posner, a commentator for Radio Moscow, has been a guest on the Phil Donahue show. The morning news shows of three American TV networks also have had Soviet spokesmen. American information officers in the USSR have no such easy access to the Soviet media although, occasionally, US officials are given an opportunity to appear on Soviet TV. American networks, on the other hand, can interview Soviet Embassy officials and Soviet commentators almost for the asking. A US journalist can even get a direct link to a Soviet spokesman in Moscow. For example, the US intervention in Grenada provided a vivid case-in-point. Sam Donaldson, ABC correspondent, and "Good Morning America" co-host David Hartman interviewed Radio Moscow commentator Joe Adamov live from Moscow.¹² Adamov is an effective speaker for the Soviets. His English is very good, and unlike a number of the older Soviet commentators, he freely uses a number of American slang and idiomatic expressions. Even his name, Joe Adamov, has been Americanized. On network TV, Mr. Adamov roundly condemned US intervention in Grenada. Although every American has the opportunity to see such an interview, the Soviet public only rarely can see US officials and reporters on Soviet TV. The Soviets have seen nothing similar to NBC's "Today" broadcast that came direct from Moscow for two weeks and interviewed scores of Soviet officials on a wide variety of subjects. Officials of the United States have no opportunity to talk freely and directly to the Soviet people.

In a rare exception to common practice, Kenneth Dam of the US Department of State appeared on Soviet TV, but only after considerable negotiation between US and Soviet representatives. Appearing on the Soviet TV show, "International Panorama," Mr. Dam (taped earlier at the US State Department) answered questions put by correspondent Alexander Druzhinin. Mr. Dam's answers were uncensored. After Mr. Dam's appearance, however, the Soviets showed an opposing view by US Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque, USN (Ret.), a strong opponent of the American administration. "Panorama" host Alexander Bovin then pointed out to

Soviet viewers how La Rocque had accurately seized on the weak points in Dam's analysis. The appearance on Soviet television of these two Americans was the first since that of US President Richard Nixon in 1974.¹³ President Ronald Reagan appeared on Soviet television following the first summit meeting in November 1985 but has not been on again since then.

Soviet authorities carefully and effectively control what the Soviet public sees, also using advantages in controlling information that come from the differences between the US and Soviet systems, the Soviet concept of a journalist, and the central apparatus of control of the Soviet media.

Soviet journalism. John S. Resheteer reminds us that the profession of journalism in the Soviet Union is "under direct Communist Party control in that much of its membership is in the Party and subject to its discipline."¹⁴ Soviet journalists are carefully trained for their profession, about 50 percent being graduates of Moscow State University's department of journalism.¹⁵ Using the system of *nomenklatura*, only those journalists approved by the party may hold positions of supervisory authority or political sensitivity.¹⁶

A number of different ministries, including the Ministries of Communication, Radio Industry, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Trade, manage the media. Committees of Cinematography, Foreign Economic Relations, Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, the Book Trade, and Television and Radio Broadcasting also are involved with the media at the state level in the Soviet Union. Other ministries could become peripherally involved, especially when issues fall into their particular area of competence and responsibility. A special administrative agency, the Chief Administration on Matters of the Press and Literature, has final approval over anything printed, broadcast, spoken, or published in the USSR. "GLAVIT" (its Russian acronym) ensures that only approved material reaches the people.¹⁷

Thus, the whole system controlling the Soviet media is centralized at the top. There is no counterpart in the United States, where the US public is accustomed to a wide variety of sources of news and information. No official regulatory agencies exist in the United States to ensure the current administration's line is carefully broadcast. Indeed, US journalists and the public tend to question

any official "party line." The US Government has no control over American journalists. This is a basic American freedom, built into the First Amendment to the Constitution, and key to our democracy.

The practical effect of control and the requirement for ideological and political reliability directly affect a Soviet journalist's role. According to Medish, "The functions and responsibilities of Soviet journalists are comparable to those of public relations officers in a private corporation or of copy writers working for an advertising firm."¹⁸ Certainly, the Soviet journalist still has to obtain information, report the news, and investigate events. In this sense, a TASS (Soviet news agency) correspondent or *Izvestia* reporter operates like his American counterpart. The Soviet correspondent's duties go much further, however; the Soviet journalist must shape what he gathers to fit the official party line and the official position of the USSR, "teaching" the members of the Soviet state and "educating" them. The foreign correspondent must also further the interests of the Soviet Union by expressing and defending the Soviet position. In this sense, the Soviet correspondent is at the forefront of the informational struggle, especially while stationed in the United States.

Even with a role far different from American journalists and an orientation at odds with the give and take of a free press, the Soviet correspondent enjoys many of the same rights and privileges extended to all correspondents while in the United States. The Soviet correspondent can attend any press conferences, has special access to important events, and freely files his stories back to Moscow through his own press agency. The Soviet journalist can serve as an "expert" or a commentator on an issue in US-Soviet relations.

Soviet correspondents do face certain difficulties in covering the United States. Because reciprocal agreements dictate that American correspondents cannot visit certain areas of the USSR and must face other restrictions, Soviet correspondents are similarly restricted. Soviet correspondents, however, have an easier time getting around such restrictions than a US correspondent has in Moscow.¹⁹ Soviet correspondents regularly attend Presidential and congressional press conferences as well as other press conferences of US agencies, both governmental and private. The US congressional gallery is open to Soviet correspondents, just as it is to any other visitor to the US Capitol Building. Soviet correspondents live

where they like in the New York and Washington areas. Any restrictions on living arrangements are imposed by their own superiors, rather than any agency of the United States. All Soviet correspondents register through their parent organization; the largest and most well known is TASS.

The Soviet news agency TASS. The best-known official agency directly tied to the USSR Council of Ministers is known as TASS or the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskovo Soyouza). TASS freely exchanges information with many American and international news agencies. Like other foreign agents in the United States, TASS must file a statement to that effect. Theodore Kruglak points out that TASS "is classified as a foreign agency by the US Department of Justice and is required under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 to file a semiannual report concerning its activities in the United States."²⁰ Each such report summarizes and describes TASS activities and its ties to US news services. An excerpt from one of the semiannual reports filed by TASS and maintained by the US Justice Department follows:

TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF THE USSR (TASS) MOSCOW, USSR: Gathering and transmitting American and United Nations news to the USSR. Our news sources include: the dispatches of American news agencies with which we have contractual relations (the Associated Press and the United Press International); the newspapers published in New York, Washington, and various other cities of the United States and Latin America; magazines and other periodicals; press releases and reports issued by governmental and private agencies and institutions.

In addition, our correspondents directly cover important press conferences, public meetings and other developments when circumstances and our resources permit. For instance, TASS correspondents cover the meetings of the United Nations Security Council and other United Nations bodies; our correspondents in Washington cover White House and State Department press conferences and important congressional debates, etc. On the basis of these sources we write our daily news reports. After the reports are written and edited, they are transmitted through the Associated Press. Our area of coverage includes Latin America as well as the United States, and our reports on Latin America are based on the dispatches of the American news agencies and on Latin American newspapers and periodicals.

We also transmit a commercial service, giving prices of grains, bristles, furs, and other commodities, export and import figures and other commercial and economic news. All our news is transmitted to our home office in Moscow for distribution to TASS clients.

We do not distribute in the United States the news which we gather, except for supplying copies of our messages to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and to the Delegation of the USSR to the United Nations. We supply the Associated Press and the United Press International with a TASS news file transmitted from Moscow headquarters to our office over the Associated Press channel. We sell the service to the New York Times, the Daily World, the United Nations, Draper press, the Armenian Digest, the Armenian Post, the Armenian Asbarez Publishing Company, the NorGyank Armenian Weekly, the Massis Armenian Weekly, and the Ukrainian Life and Word.

We received payments from the following organizations for delivery of the TASS service to their bureaus in Moscow: New York Times, ABC, CBS, and the Christian Science Monitor. We also received payments from Gostelradio, Moscow for a joint AP/TASS service. We received payments from the Associated Press, the United Press International, and Sovfoto for photographs purchased from TASS, Moscow. In addition, we received a payment from the National Enquirer for a story prepared by the TASS Minsk office at the request of the Enquirer.²¹

TASS collects news about the United States, the UN, and other matters of interest and transmits that information back to the USSR. TASS also exchanges information with other news agencies.²² In addition the news agency operates the World Press Service that provides stories and news gathered by TASS correspondents around the world and in Washington and New York. According to Mr. Kruglak, within the USSR, TASS has "the exclusive right to distribute foreign news or news collected by the national agencies within the USSR."²³ TASS is clearly an instrument of the Soviet State and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and therefore has a special mission and function. It does not just report the news but works to educate the citizen and defend the Soviet Union against slander from outside sources. For this reason, the TASS World Service rarely reports raw data. Anything reported to Moscow is screened, reviewed, and *edited* before Moscow sends it back out over the wire. As a result according to Kruglak,

The TASS picture of the world . . . is that of the "good guys against the bad guys" with the communist and neutralist countries as the heroes of the piece. The image of the USSR emerging from the TASS World Service is not only that of a supporter of virtue but a leader in cultural, scientific, technological, and economic progress. . . . Cultural, scientific, and technological achievements of the United States represented less than 2 percent of the TASS American news transmissions during the period studied. The proportion of USSR news in these categories transmitted by TASS from Moscow represented 21 percent of the total World Service and—needless to say—it was all laudatory.²⁴

The World Service of TASS reports not only stories filed by its correspondents in the United States but also those by correspondents in the USSR and confusing articles from the Soviet print media. All of this is available to subscribers of the service. When a dispute developed between the United States and its allies regarding the building of the new pipeline through the European part of the Soviet Union into Western Europe, TASS covered it completely with the Soviet point of view clearly expressed. In practice, the service favors (quoting prominently) those who are opposed to the US Government. In covering the pipeline issue, American critics who opposed the administration received top billing along with the positions of the Europeans, who also opposed the American administration.

The Soviet news agency TASS reports also find their way into US publications that often report a *Pravda* or *Izvestia* editorial or commentary on the Soviet position, making TASS a good source for journalists who want the official Soviet opinion on an event or issue. Good journalists always make note of the source to allow the reader to judge its possible biases. For example, when Soviet leaders Andropov and Chernenko dropped out of the public's eye and were not seen for weeks or more, it caused a great deal of speculation in the United States. The news agency TASS provided explanations. A story in the *Chicago Tribune* cited a TASS announcement about Yuri Andropov, stating that, although Andropov would have liked meeting with some Western physicians opposing nuclear war, a cold prevented him from doing so. The *Tribune* story recognized that the propaganda value of the release was to dampen speculation about Andropov's health.²⁵ TASS was remarkably quiet about Andropov's illness. Only after the death of the Soviet leader did TASS run a detailed account of his illness.

Along with other members of the Washington press corps, both domestic and foreign, TASS correspondents receive US Government press releases. TASS's efficiency is demonstrated by their ability to react to these releases. Many times such releases are official speeches of US Government officials. TASS transmits these speeches to Moscow where a Soviet reaction is added. They are then redistributed via the TASS wire service. The process is so efficient that US news media can report the Soviet reaction within 36 to 48 hours after the release of the original speech, as was the case with one Friday evening address by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Affairs Conference of the National Defense University. The following Monday, Washington, DC, papers printed stories of Moscow's reaction to the speech.²⁶ Americans read the Soviet reaction to the speech *before* they read or learned of the speech itself.

Though distributed to the American media, the speeches of US Cabinet officers are rarely printed in full. Sometimes summaries, excerpts, and interpretations are available for US viewers and readers, but not the full text. This situation frequently makes the commentary and criticism of a speech, such as those reported by TASS, more prominent than the speech itself. No similar American criticism of the Soviet leadership's position reaches the Soviet people.

The Soviet news agency TASS picks up all the stories and opinions of the US media critical of the US Government. Americans believe that responsible criticism and divergent points of view are essential to any democracy. TASS, however, uses criticism of the policies of the US Government to reinforce the position and official views of the Soviet Government. For this reason, TASS carries stories that address the economic, social, cultural, and even psychological problems of the United States. The Soviet news agency does not overlook drug and alcohol abuse stories carried in the American media but leaves out reports of improvement or solution of problems. With the same level of interest, TASS covers other American problems such as air pollution, public transportation ills, strikes, civil rights complaints, crime, hazardous waste contamination, unemployment, welfare and human service shortcomings, food shortages, concerns about the draft, budget deficits and corruption of political officials, infectious diseases, highway accidents, and issues in the nuclear power industry.

The Soviets' use of some TASS reports on opposition groups and political leaders in the United States is a bit more sophisticated. Moscow carefully studies these TASS reports, for the Soviets tend to use the major points from legitimate US opposition in their critical commentaries on US policies. Along with Soviet pronouncements on US policy, the Soviet agency distributes commentary incorporating the same points various US groups are making, especially the questions raised by those opposing nuclear weapons, working for disarmament and world peace, or criticizing US foreign or defense policy.

When TASS reports a debate about US policy on a particular issue back to Moscow, Soviet commentators there use the report to write an official commentary and then return it to the United States on the wires of the TASS World News Service. Soviet commentary based on the initial report will then reach the US media where it is again reported and discussed. In this way, the Soviets make use of the basic freedoms of a democratic system, namely, the free and open exchange of ideas and respect for minority and opposition opinions.

Figure 2 illustrates the circular flow of Soviet news, starting with the US media reporting of an event, speech, or commentary critical to the US Government. The news agency TASS picks up the story and sends it back to Moscow where some members of the Soviet elite receive unedited straightforward reporting. Before any general release, TASS carefully rewrites the story, incorporating the Soviet point of view and slanting the story to suit the party's need. Distribution is then made to party members and select Soviet citizens as well as to the Soviet media. The Soviet media may again adapt the story to conform to official guidelines. The story is released on all radio, printed, and TV outlets, including the official press. TASS World Service carries the story which can then be picked up again by the US media. The TASS-reported commentary becomes another story for the US media. The Soviet leadership in this way gets its point of view before the American people.

Novosti. *Novosti* (News) is another Soviet press agency which is active in the United States. Unlike TASS, *Novosti* has a US counterpart. The United States Information Agency has some functions akin to *Novosti*. TASS legitimately claims to have a necessary information gathering and distribution function; *Novosti* has no such function. Since its creation in 1961, *Novosti* has had an overt public

relations function. Anthony Buzek, in *How the Communist Press Works*, points out Novosti's aim:

to disseminate abroad truthful information on the Soviet Union and to acquaint the Soviet public with the life of peoples in foreign countries, and thus to help to develop and strengthen mutual relations, trust, and friendship among the nations.²⁷

Novosti officials tend to emphasize that their agency, known in Russia as APN or Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (Novosti Press Agency), has no ties to the Soviet Government but is a result of the cooperation of a number of public organizations that, in the Soviet Union, are seen as associations of people who come together to promote and share their own common pursuits and concerns.²⁸ Novosti




FIGURE 2. The circular flow of Soviet news.

is comprised of the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries, and the National Union for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.²⁹ Novosti's purposes are not only to supply the Soviet people with information about foreign countries but also to provide foreign countries, such as the United States, with information about the Soviet Union.³⁰ The United States Information Agency has responsibilities somewhat akin to Novosti's second function. The USIA also carries the message of the American people and the US Government abroad, but it does not operate domestically. Novosti helps publish magazines made available by direct subscription or in libraries of the United States. The most famous publication is *Soviet Life*, a publication with high quality color photographs, published under a reciprocal agreement between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreement provides for the publication and circulation of *Soviet Life* in the United States and the magazine *America* in the Soviet Union.³¹ Both publications are "slick" and have many photographs and interesting stories, but there is one real difference. *America* is not freely circulated in the USSR. The Soviets provide for only a very limited circulation. Stacks of *America* are abundant at the US consulates in Moscow and Leningrad, but ordinary Soviet citizens are discouraged from entering either of these two buildings. On the other hand, *Soviet Life* can be found in many libraries in the United States, even small and medium-sized ones.

Any American citizen who so desires is able to read in *Soviet Life* about gigantic construction projects in the USSR, interesting figures in Russian literature, and the latest advances in Soviet medicine and health, and see breathtakingly beautiful scenes of the Siberian wilderness. Unlike TASS dispatches, which can be very boring and tedious to read, Novosti articles are informative and well done. Gone is the overt concern to repeat the Soviet party or Government line. Articles describe construction and development projects carried out by "skilled craftsmen," "dedicated engineers," and "hard working managers," all of whom follow the guidance of the Soviet development plan. Stories about the power industry and the development of alternate sources of energy, the space program of the Soviet Union, and the development of new transportation routes all receive prominence in *Soviet Life*. However, *Soviet Life* is not the only US source of information about the Soviet Union.

Another magazine, *Soviet Union*, an almost exact copy of *Soviet Life*, is circulated in the United States without the aid of any agreement. *Soviet Union*, founded by Maxim Gorky in 1930 as *USSR in Construction*, took its present title in 1950. *Soviet Union* and other Soviet publications are readily available in the United States.³² This allows Novosti and Soviet publishers additional opportunities to educate the American people about the Soviet people and their country. American publications, for example, *Time*, *US News*, and *Newsweek*, are not available to an ordinary Soviet citizen. In fact, the USSR bans public release of all American independent publications and allows access to such magazines only to people who are considered reliable, in key positions in the fields of journalism and intelligence, in the foreign policy apparatus, or in foreign trade.

A US journalist in the Soviet Union must deal with both official restrictions and unofficial restrictions, some characteristic not only of Soviet but also of czarist Russia. These restrictions often necessitate that a US journalist work with Novosti. A foreigner simply cannot wander around at will, photograph and interview local people, and then write and file a story. Many of the educational films made about the USSR are made in connection with or even in cooperation with Novosti. These films have a legitimate purpose and are usually well done. The National Geographic Society has produced some excellent films with Novosti; the most famous is about Soviet Russian life on the Volga River. A number of films about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people made in cooperation with Novosti are designed for the tourist and for the educational market.³³ The daily lives of Soviet students, the vast panorama of Soviet Siberia as seen from the Trans-Siberian Railway, the lives of the workers and citizens of Moscow, and the lives and work of the farmers on collective farms are typical subjects of these films. In addition, international events and meetings inside the USSR are also covered, as well as scientific and cultural topics. The films are very useful in American high school and university classrooms. Unfortunately, like-quality informational films about life in the United States are not available to the Soviet students in the USSR.

Novosti also provides photos to the American media. Other Soviet agencies, such as Fotokhronika TASS, Intourist, Sovfoto, and Aeroflot, also provide photos. Several American publishers and publications use these photos. *Current Science*, *Discover*, and

Science News, for example, all published photos of the surface of Venus released through the American agent of the above Soviet agencies.³⁴ The US agent collects royalties, subtracts a fee, and sends the balance of the money to the particular Soviet agency involved.³⁵

Once purchased, the Soviet-supplied photo is used in accord with existing copyright laws in the United States. The furnishing of a Novosti photo does not guarantee a favorable story or caption, however. A *Business Week* article, "Siberia's Snows Hide an Industrial Wasteland," addressed the question of Soviet environmental pollution and used a Soviet cartoon to demonstrate the point.³⁶ Another story about the nuclear arms race in the *New York Times Magazine* was accompanied by a Sovfoto photograph of a Soviet ICBM in its silo.³⁷ *US News and World Report* also ran a story and photo about Soviet emergency medical service, but the caption noted that there had been a significant decline of the service's quality of care.³⁸ Although Moscow still has an advantage in terms of its relative access to the American people as compared to Washington's access to the Soviet people, the Soviets still must take their chances in the give and take of a free and open society.

THE SOVIET MEDIA AND THE FUTURE

An increasing number of US citizens have antenna-dish equipment that directly pulls in TV signals from the many satellites orbiting the earth. With this equipment, these viewers can literally tune in the world. The Olympics from Moscow were readily available to them, even though the US TV networks did not broadcast the games. The equipment needed to receive these satellite TV signals is becoming cheaper and, at the same time, more efficient. In a few years, viewers will be able to buy such equipment and install it in the attics of their own homes, by-passing the traditional broadcast network. In the United States, this new technology will result in a battle over royalties and program rights. In the USSR, there is also a battle over this new communications technology, but of a far different nature.

What an American citizen listens to in his own home is none of the US Government's business. But the Soviet Government is vitally concerned with the viewing and listening habits of its citizens.

The Soviet Government is already fighting a battle at home to keep its citizens from listening to foreign radio and television broadcasts. Jamming continues, but in some areas of the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic Republics, Soviet citizens can pick up television signals from the West. Finnish TV available in these "fringe" areas of the USSR presents Soviet authorities with special problems. Soviet viewers have alternate sources of news. The Lithuanian Communist party newspaper recently complained that too many Soviet citizens believed that "Washington has a right to be afraid of Moscow's nuclear arsenal," calling for better ideological work to eliminate such views.³⁹ The newspaper cited a young worker as stating that the Americans "were people too, you know, and they have a feeling of fear. They are afraid of our atomic bombs and that's why they are building up their arms."⁴⁰ Such independent points of view are not in keeping with the Soviet Communist party's efforts to educate the people.

An open exchange of views via satellite would not be in keeping with the party line. Occasionally, the Soviets do provide for teleconferences about the danger of nuclear war. A distinguished group of American scientists took part in a 1983 teleconference with a number of Soviet scientists on the question of the effects of a nuclear war between the United States and USSR.

In a hotel conference room . . . with satellite images projected on triple screens, the American audience heard Evgeny Velikhov, vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Scientists, declare through a translator that the nuclear arms stockpile "must be destroyed before it kills the human race."⁴¹

Technology that enables an exchange of views could be of enormous value in keeping a dialogue open between the two countries. Unfortunately the Soviet system carefully screens what its citizens can see and hear.

The Soviets recognize the danger posed by new communication technology. At the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the Soviets have introduced a proposal for a new world information and communication order. The proposal seeks to control the press, as well as to impose limits on the activities of journalists. The US representative, Gregory Newell, stated that the United States opposes such restrictions and efforts to put the press under the government.⁴² The Soviets also see the

dangers involved in new technologies which provide citizens with private access to information. Video discs and cassettes, as well as personal computer technology, all threaten to give citizens access to information not approved by the party or government. In America, battles over video tapes and discs revolve around commercial rights, while in the Soviet Union, it is not a commercial struggle but a struggle over access and distribution.

The Soviets also use new technology for their own purposes. The first time the head of the Soviet military establishment appeared at a televised news conference broadcast internationally, the subject was the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner. The appearance of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Soviet Chief of Staff, was unprecedented, as many Western observers noted. Other observers were a bit more constrained, feeling that it was important to point out that the Soviet Government was holding the televised conference in an attempt to get its own point of view and explanation of the airliner downing across in the most efficient manner possible. If anything was unprecedented, it was not the news conference itself, but the fact that the Soviets had begun to use the Western form of a news conference for their own purposes.

The Soviets have also shown more willingness to sign agreements with US broadcasters. The Cable News Network (CNN) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) have both been in contact with Soviet officials from the State Committee for Television and Radio.⁴³ The Public Broadcasting System (PBS) also signed an agreement providing for satellite carried "dialogues" between the two countries. The result of these agreements between both public and private American broadcast companies will be interesting. Will it result in a Soviet advantage—that is, the Soviet side gaining greater access to American viewers while inputs from the American networks are screened and selected by Soviet authorities before release to Soviet viewers? How will existing broadcast arrangements be affected by ties and links to the Soviet system? Many American news shows are critical of or "investigating" the American Government. How these shows play to a Soviet audience will be interesting. Will Soviet citizens begin to demand more candor from their own bureaucracy? What about Gorbachev's *glasnost* (openness)?

Another aspect is how the newscasters and media figures from the United States will react to the Soviet system. Writing in *TV*

Guide, Steve Mallory described how the Soviet system tries to frustrate efforts of reporters to gain access and get information from officials.⁴⁴ Kevin Klose, *Washington Post* Moscow correspondent from 1977 to 1981, also described some of his experiences in the USSR in his book, *Russia and the Russians*.⁴⁵ Mallory and Klose both describe the difficulties of reporting events from a country which uses all of the techniques available to a totalitarian system, including the threat of physical harm.

In sum, the Soviet Union does have a clear advantage in getting its message across to the American people. This advantage mainly results from the freedom and openness which is so typical of American society. The Soviet Government uses this openness to further its own positions both domestically and internationally.

Communications technology may change the balance between propaganda campaigns. The Soviets are sure to be worried about the additional access to Western news and information provided by satellite dishes and video tapes and recorders. Ironically, the inefficiencies of the Soviet system result in a national standard of living so low that few can afford such luxuries.

New agreements with US networks provide the Soviets with both risk and opportunity. The opportunity and attraction of arrangements with American broadcasters provide the chance to bypass the American Government and go directly to the American public. Vladimir Posner, Joe Adamov, and others have considerable experience in this area. They broadcast on Radio Moscow, but few, if any, Americans tune in. However, Posner and others have access to the American broadcast media. The risk to the Soviets, on the other hand, is still real. Once access to Americans is gained, can Posner and his fellow broadcasters put across their point of view? Opinion polls show that Americans, while they might trust particular media personalities, are not at all overly trustful of the media in general. American lack of sympathy for the media came to a head in the wake of the Grenada operation. Many Americans showed little sympathy with the media when its representatives were barred from the initial military operation. At the same time, Americans were also mistrustful of Government press releases. Soviet journalists will find that Americans will be typically chary. In signing agreements with American networks and news organizations, the Soviets will have to take their chances in a free society. At the same time they will be opening up their society to greater outside influence.⁴⁶

3

COMMERCIAL TRADE

TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION can provide the Soviets and the Americans important channels of both contacts and influence, for trade between the two countries involves more than just governmental and political considerations. The economic life of both countries is directly affected. Trade also affects individual Soviet and American citizens. An American farmer growing wheat and animal feed crops is well informed on grain sales to the Soviet Union. Likewise, the bread and meat available to a Soviet consumer is a direct result of the Soviet harvest and trade with American and international markets making up the shortfall. Grain, however, is only the most visible area of trade between the two countries. Other areas of trade do not receive as much attention but are just as interesting.

Trade and questions of commercial relationships between the two countries are never considered outside the political context. The state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union directly affects the amount of trade and the types of commercial arrangements both countries will accept because trade can be used to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the other country's foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, trade has increased in those periods of cordial relations between the two superpowers, declined when the relationship became contentious.

SOVIET TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES

On the Soviet side, arguments for trade with the United States and the capitalist world are clear and easy to identify. Regarding

trade with the West, the Soviets today look back to their Russian forebears. Peter the Great built upon the start made by his predecessors and became the most famous czar to open a "window" to the West. During the time of his reign, entire sections of Moscow and, later, St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) became foreign zones of residence for many Western traders, artisans, scientists, entrepreneurs, adventurers, and manufacturers Peter invited to Russia and placed in the service of himself and the Russian state.¹ Not the least of their achievements was Peter's Russian Navy, along with precision instruments, optical devices, construction techniques, and light manufacturing machinery. Peter's successors continued to import Western products and Western specialists. Some of the most enduring monuments to Russia's cultural heritage, for example, Saint Basil's Cathedral just off Red Square, owe their origin to French or Italian architects and skilled workmen from France, Italy, Germany, and Holland.

Especially since the time of Peter the Great, controversy over trade with the West has gripped first Imperial Russia and now the Soviet Union—a tension exists between those who feel the country should incorporate the best of Western ideas and scientific discoveries and those who feel the country should remain isolated from the West and rely on traditional values originating from Russian culture. The efforts of the party today to keep out the decadent influence of the West are not just the result of Marxist-Leninist ideology but reach back through the 19th century intellectual struggle between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The Soviets are quite willing to import Western items and technology needed for their own development but are very careful about importing the Western ideas and influence that might go along with this technology.

Another factor in Soviet trade with the United States and the West is the richness of the Soviet Union itself. The Soviets have in their country a vast supply of natural resources such as diamonds, gold, platinum, the world's largest timber reserve, oil, hydroelectric potential, and natural gas, to name only a few of the more important resources. Offsetting this advantage in natural resources are the tremendous distances they must overcome to get these resources to major industrial centers. Furthermore, the very harsh climate makes resource exploitation difficult. Americans generally do not appreciate the vastness of the Soviet Union, a land extending through 11 time zones, from east to west about three times the distance between

New York and San Francisco. From north to south, the Soviet Union ranges from above the Arctic Circle almost to the Indian Ocean.

In addition to vastness, the climate is harsh, especially in mineral-rich Siberia. Away from any moderating bodies of water, the Soviet Union has the dubious distinction of having both the coldest and warmest inhabited place on earth.* With such climatic variation, Soviet agriculture is at the mercy of weather conditions, much more so than American agriculture is. Bad weather and inept management can combine to reduce Soviet harvests significantly. Thus, the need for certain items in foreign trade, the tensions between those who favor imports and those who do not, the natural richness of the land, the extremes of weather, and managerial inefficiency in agriculture must all be kept in mind when trying to understand Soviet trade.

Soviet trade policy seeks to keep Russia as self-sufficient and economically independent as possible. Indeed,

the USSR is determined to avoid dependence on foreign and particularly Western sources of supply so far as possible, while remaining free to use the Western market for tactical and strategic advantage, but without accepting any obligation to participate in the operations, the improvement, or the maintenance of that market. The Soviet Union . . . is seeking so much economic isolation or independence as will insure that it is not forced to subordinate any significant interest to the needs of its commercial interconnections with the world outside, while retaining the liberty to take such advantage of the existence of that world as seems beneficial to it.²

In the United States, on the other hand, multinational corporations are a fact of life. Many commentators in the United States stress the interdependency of the United States and world markets. There are some analysts in the United States who feel that we have gone too far in this direction to the point that vital national defense production is dependent on foreign supplies.

*Some of the coldest temperatures on earth have been recorded near the town of Verkhoyansk north of Lake Baikal. One low temperature recorded was -92.3° F. Temperatures in this same area can reach more than 100° F in summer.

Soviet Russia can control the amount of its foreign trade for a very simple reason: it has no private commercial enterprises or corporations. The Soviet Government runs all major enterprises, ranging from small factories to large manufacturing plants.³ Today as in the past:

The task of Soviet importation is to use foreign goods, and first of all machinery, for the most rapid accomplishment of the plans of socialist construction, for industrialization, and the technical reconstruction of the economy, for the technical-economic independence of the USSR . . . [, and] the basic task of Soviet exportation is to receive foreign exchange for paying costs of imports and to help accumulate foreign exchange reserves in the country.⁴

Anyone who trades with the USSR deals with the Soviet Government, which formulates the plan for Socialist construction. The West has no exact parallel. The Democratic-Socialist countries of Western Europe, of course, have nationalized some of their industry. The Government of France does have a limited economic plan. France and Great Britain have combined their resources to manufacture commercial airliners such as the supersonic Concorde. In the United States, with its mixed economy, the Government has nationalized several private companies, such as the Penn Central Railroad. It has also used huge loans to bail out firms such as Chrysler Corporation and Lockheed. But in the Soviet Union, separation of business and industry from the state does not exist. Negotiations with Soviet plant heads, managers, and industrial leaders amount to negotiations with the Soviet Government.

The Soviet economic plan provides a blueprint and a guide to conducting trade and also creates a horrendous bureaucracy. H. Stephen Gardner discusses the Soviet bureaucracy in *Soviet Foreign Trade*; figure 3 is a chart from this book. A host of offices and bureaus in the Communist party are concerned with foreign trade.⁵ A Government official must deal with the party bureaus in addition to other Government ministries when making decisions. This relationship between the party and Government is not particularly well defined, even in Soviet works dealing with the subject.⁶ Generally speaking, a Government official is concerned with managing and decisionmaking, while a party official is concerned with policy and guidance.

Besides the party, the principal agencies involved in foreign trade are the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee,

the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, the Bank for Foreign Trade, the State Price Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and a number of other agencies called foreign trade organizations (FTOs). These agencies deal with consumer goods, international exhibitions, and cinematography.⁷ Some of the industrial ministries and their subordinate units can deal directly with foreign sources either for export or import, such as those agencies involved in food production or related activity.⁸ Other ministries have to work within the Soviet bureaucracy. In this large bureaucracy, decisions are not always rational and at times result from a parochial view or from a particular agency's own self-interest.⁹ Therefore, while the Soviet Union is by no means a pluralistic society, the economic plan in practice deviates from the economic plan on paper, but there is a framework to guide Soviet officials in focusing on what to do in foreign trade. This plan gives the Soviets an advantage in dealings with other states and with foreign businessmen. The Soviets know what they want and why they want it.

The ultimate decisionmakers in the USSR are the elite of the Communist party on the Politburo. While Westerners know little of the internal workings of this group, the Politburo, under the leadership of the First Secretary of the Communist party, makes decisions and provides policy guidance for the whole country. When it comes to foreign trade, both political and economic objectives are factors because the political objectives, as Gardner points out, "relate to foreign policy, whereas economic objectives are those that relate to the performance of the domestic economy."¹⁰ Both must be considered in analyzing Soviet trade policy.

The United States has what the Soviet Union needs the most: animal feed, grain, manufactured goods, consumer products, managerial expertise, capital, and technology.¹¹ The Soviets also want to import entire factories and assembly lines. Economic reasons motivate such trade: (1) these are the kinds of agreements that provide the foreign capital needed for domestic development because Western banks will lend money; (2) the agreements are self-financing because when arranging for an import item, the Soviets get financial backing at the same time; (3) the foreign partner knows he will be paid partly in products from the plants, so he will put in solid equipment and know-how; and (4) the Soviets can help their




FIGURE 3. Soviet Communist party bureaucracy. H. Stephen Gardher, *Soviet Foreign Trade: The Decision Process* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1983). Copyrighted. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

own balance of payments problem.¹² In this manner, the Soviet leadership ensures the domestic economy develops along the lines outlined in the economic plan and is insulated from international market forces.

Soviet economic independence is of paramount concern.¹³ For example, from the Soviet point of view, it makes more sense for the USSR to negotiate for construction and operation of an automobile factory than to negotiate for a certain number of imported automobiles. The Soviets will get an entire production system on their own soil and have foreign experts train their plant managers. Additionally, if political relations sour and the foreign plant advisors pull out, the Soviets still have a fully functioning plant producing automobiles, rather than having to face a possible cut-off in auto deliveries by a foreign manufacturer.

AMERICAN TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS

The United States is not as well organized in terms of its trade with the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union is in its trade with the United States. Part of the reason stems from the pluralism of the United States and part from the way our system of government is structured. Like the Soviet Union, the Americans have their own bureaucracy to contend with. The Federal Government executive departments which are involved in foreign trade with the USSR include the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Transportation. Other agencies may become peripherally involved, depending on the issue at hand. For example, the International Trade Commission handles tariff questions and imports from communist countries; the Export-Import Bank of the United States runs programs designed to meet specific exporter needs for broadening export horizons of American industry; and the Federal Maritime Commission regulates carriers and foreign commerce as it takes place in the United States.

In addition to the executive departments and the independent regulatory agencies, the legislative branch of the US Government is also deeply involved in Soviet trade and its resulting political and economic ramifications. Indeed, the interest of Congress in Soviet

imports and exports is reflected in the numerous hearings conducted by both Senate and House committees and subcommittees. Issues that emerge during hearings on Soviet trade range from human rights issues, such as slave labor and emigration of Jews from the USSR, to economic issues, such as profitability and cash flow.

Nowhere is the distinction between economic and political issues involved in US-USSR trade more blurred than in the US Congress. This is partly owing to the nature of the American system of government and to the many "publics" that the Congress responds to. Congressional staffers also must work with all the different agencies and departments of the executive agencies, the US business community and the individual states. Needless to say, there is no *one* overwhelming consensus that emerges from these many voices. As a result, US trade policy toward the Soviet Union does not benefit from a commonly accepted guideline and, as a result, lacks long-range purpose or direction. This *ad hoc* approach is somewhat mitigated by the "rule" that trade between the Americans and the Soviets is in any way a direct reflection of the state of general relations between the two countries. When relations are good, trade between the two countries increases. When relations are bad, trade goes down.

US-USSR TRADE—PROS AND CONS

American businessmen and Government officials are among those who have thought carefully about US-USSR trade, with many differing opinions emerging on this issue.¹⁴ Certain arguments support US trade with the Soviet Union:

1. Trade helps the US-USSR political relationship and helps reduce tension between the two countries;
2. Trade increases the number of contacts between the two countries, thus providing additional channels of communication which might be beneficial in handling the inevitable conflicts that occur and preventing the dangerous escalation of these conflicts;
3. Expanded trade is a factor in reducing overall international tension;
4. Economic ties serve to restrain aggressive Soviet behavior in the world by offering a "carrot," thus reinforcing the Soviets' good behavior;

5. Increased Soviet involvement in international trade helps contribute to responsible Soviet behavior, as well as helping to stabilize the overall world economic situation;
6. Trade with the USSR brings US policy in line with the policies of our European allies;
7. Trade benefits the US economy and adds more American jobs;
8. Trade stabilizes some of our exports, such as grains and other agricultural products, and assists the US economy and especially the US farmer;
9. Trade provides the US with benefits from advanced Soviet technology in areas such as hydroelectric power, gasification, metallurgy, and medicine;
10. Trade allows the US to take advantage of the availability of rare and precious metals which the Soviets export, thus conserving our own supply of metals such as the platinum metals group; and
11. Trade brings some of the sales, which are now going to Japanese and Western European companies, back to US firms.

Strong factors also argue against trading with the Soviets:

1. Trading with the Soviets benefits their economy to the detriment of the United States. The Soviets get the help they need in areas where their economy is weakest and then benefit from our help instead of undergoing the discomforts of their own mistakes;
2. Trade has not been shown to be a reliable inhibitor of Soviet behavior. The Soviets will conduct their affairs the way they please regardless of its affect on US-Soviet trade. When we embargo our wheat, they find others willing to make up the shortfall.
3. Trade enables the Soviets to disrupt the world economic system should they wish to do so. World markets become more dependent on the USSR instead of vice-versa;
4. Trade makes certain markets in the United States dependent on business with the Soviet Union and thereby increases Soviet influence in both the domestic and foreign affairs of the United States;

5. The Soviets get better deals than some of our own allies in trade and this is not appropriate. The United States appears to aid its enemies more than its friends;
6. American businessmen are not tough enough in their dealings with the Soviets and, as a result, the Soviets get much better deals. For example, the Soviets get capital for their development, without really giving up anything in return; and
7. Trade is not a legitimate avenue for the United States to use to express its disapproval of Soviet behavior. The United States cannot use trade as a barometer of relations between the two countries.

As one might expect, the position taken on US-USSR trade ties and agreements does not revolve around economic arguments alone. These perceptions are colored by the particular definition one applies to the Soviet Union and Soviet leadership. Those who see the Soviet State as a threatening power intending to dominate the world generally agree that there should be fewer trade ties with the USSR. Others see Soviet leadership as benign; still others see Soviet society dominated by rulers trying to overcome a severe form of backwardness and insecurity, making trade ties with the Soviet State less objectionable and even to be encouraged because the result will be a more stable world system. The concept that trade with the Soviets provides a linkage binding them to more acceptable (to the United States) behavior is the most important philosophical determinant for the value of increased trade. The problem is to reconcile the divergent views and formulate a consistent US policy. Within the Congress there are, of course, many diverse views. Both the Defense Department and the State Department tend to oppose expanded trade ties, and the Agriculture and Commerce Departments tend to favor expanded trade ties. American businessmen who can see trade with the USSR as beneficial to both countries are in favor of trade and make their position known to the decisionmakers in Washington. Those who feel that the United States should not do anything to "strengthen the enemy" by trading with the USSR also make their views known. But most of all, Soviet behavior itself influences the American position on trade. Because of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Poland, US-USSR trade is at a low ebb. This has not always been the case, however.

OLD US-USSR TRADE TIES

The question of trade between the two countries really began when the Bolsheviks took power in Russia. The United States sent an expeditionary force into Russia along with its European allies and Japan to protect interests. Once in the country, however, the American commander did not know what to do. President Wilson drafted a memo on his own typewriter stating that the United States did not intend "any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter." President Wilson went on to say the United States would send a group of "merchants, agricultural experts, [and] labor advisers" into the country as well.¹⁵ But the military forces were not given a clear mission. American forces withdrew after considerable opposition by Congress. After the civil war in Russia, the United States withheld diplomatic recognition until 1933 and only increased contacts in the face of a resurgent Nazi Germany. During this period, the Soviets often expressed interest in American agricultural products, machinery, and technology. At the same time, however, they were also concerned with establishing their own self-sufficiency.¹⁶ Stalin's policy called for the building of socialism in one country and making the Soviet Union the fortress of world communism.

World War II saw an increased economic relationship between the United States and USSR under such programs as lend-lease. This program during World War II provided the USSR with 17.4 million tons of supplies worth an estimated \$9.5-\$10 billion. With the end of World War II, Soviet-American relations cooled and the cold war began. As far as trade was concerned, it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that events allowed closer ties. The visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the United States, especially his visit to the Roswell Garst farm in Iowa, led to increasing Soviet-American agriculture ties. Indeed, to this very day, farmers and bankers in Iowa still have contacts with Soviets and also still favor increasing agricultural ties to the USSR. One Iowa banker, remembering the improved ties that resulted from Khrushchev's visit to Coon Rapids, would like another visit by a Soviet leader. The banker carried a letter of invitation to Moscow from the *Des Moines Register*. However, Yuri Andropov, the Soviet leader at the time, replied that he was unable to accept the invitation.¹⁷ Gorbachev has also been invited.

Probably the high point of Soviet-American trade relations was the 1970s. In 1978, agreements concluded after negotiations between the two countries resulted in a trade level 12 times that of 1971. In dollar terms, 1978 trade amounted to about \$2.8 billion.¹⁸ A 1982 Bureau of East-West Trade study makes this point:

The United States, according to Soviet statistics, was the leading Western exporter to the Soviet Union in 1973 and 1976, but in other years has ranked behind the Federal Republic of Germany and sometimes Japan. Over the period of 1972-77, the United States accounted for 17 percent of all industrialized West exports to the USSR but only 7 percent of exports of manufactured goods. . . . US sales to the Soviet Union far outpaced Soviet exports to the United States during 1972-1978. Over this period, US exports have totaled \$10,355 million and imports—\$1,629 million, giving the US a cumulative trade surplus of \$8,726 million.¹⁹

In 1979, US-USSR combined imports and exports amounted to \$4.5 billion. Several of the precursive agreements between the two countries were negotiated during the 1970s:

- (1) a joint US-USSR Commercial Commission to monitor commercial relations between the two countries;
- (2) a trade agreement providing for business offices to be opened in Moscow and New York;
- (3) a lend-lease settlement;
- (4) a maritime agreement opening 40 ports in each country to each other's ships and equal sharing of cargo shipped between the two countries;
- (5) a taxation convention applying to industrial and commercial profits.²⁰

Some potential agreements foundered over political questions. The USSR rejected an expansion of commercial relations because of the failure of Congress to extend most favored nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. The US Congress tied the issue of freer emigration from the USSR to MFN extension. Other 1970s agreements already worked out by US and Soviet negotiators, such as the Joint Commercial Commission, were allowed to stand, however.²¹ By 1975, the Soviets and the Americans were talking about oil and grain. The US need for oil coincided with serious Soviet agriculture problems that led to diminished grain harvests. Grain agreements

were concluded in 1972 and 1975. The United States and the USSR also encouraged the presence of American businessmen in Moscow during the mid-1970s.²² The US Government established a commercial office in the Soviet capital, and US businesses established approximately 30 offices there.²³

The Amtrog Trading Corporation in New York City promotes Soviet exports in the US market.²⁴ The United States commercial office provides the help necessary for Americans to exhibit their wares at trade fairs in Moscow. The Moscow fairs provide US firms with the opportunity to exhibit their merchandise and ordinary Soviets with the opportunity to see US products. Even though Soviet citizens turn out in record numbers for some of these events they, of course, have no chance to purchase any products directly. One of the more famous photos of then Vice President Nixon and Premier Khrushchev, showing them arguing near an exhibit of an American kitchen, was taken at one of these fairs.

However, a period of increased economic cooperation came to an end in 1979 when the Soviet Union sent forces into Afghanistan. The United States responded by restricting trade. In 1980, events in Poland began to attract world attention. Again the United States expressed displeasure by making trade cutbacks. Other political difficulties resulted from Soviet support for Communist regimes and revolutionaries. The question of nuclear missiles was a source of continuing tension between the two countries. On top of these political questions, some Soviet specialists argued that the Soviet Union did not have the leadership to deal with these political difficulties. The declining health of Leonid Brezhnev and his increasing frailty began a leadership vacuum that continued through the illness and death of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. The Gorbachev regime perhaps has yet to establish firm control.

Some also argue that the Soviet Union's downing of KAL flight 007 suggested a lack of firm Kremlin control. Regarding Soviet actions, some Kremlinologists feel the military operated on its own, the political leadership simply unable to assert firm leadership. Others feel that the Soviet air defense forces acted in accordance with standard orders. In any event, the destruction of KAL 007 had yet another chilling effect on US-Soviet relations in all spheres of activity.

Many decisionmakers in the United States see trade as a vehicle for expressing US disapproval of Soviet actions in such cases as Afghanistan, Poland, and KAL 007. But, even on this issue, there is disagreement. For some, reducing trade also means reducing our ability to influence the USSR in the future. By cutting trade ties, one line of communication between the two countries is restricted just when bad relations call for even more contact and communication channels. In any event, the early 1980s saw a sharp decline in trade between the two countries. It remains debatable how future summit meetings will affect trade. Both countries have exchanged delegations and have discussed trade ties.

Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige headed a US delegation which visited Moscow in May 1985. Secretary Baldrige met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev. This meeting took place in accord with an agreement made between the two countries in 1972. The 1972 agreement established a Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission. At this eighth session, both sides discussed prospects for mutually beneficial trade, but the two countries had differences. The Soviets, for example, opposed the idea of tying trade to other aspects of bilateral relations. The US side stated that it wanted to develop a more constructive working relationship with the USSR. The official report of the Commission is contained in appendix A.

Secretary Baldrige also gave an account of the meeting to the Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth. The Secretary stated that in 1984, the Soviet Union was the 17th largest market. Mr. Baldrige went on to say that while US exports to the Soviets are less than 2 percent of our total exports worldwide, they contribute significantly to individual companies and industries in profits and jobs, particularly to our agricultural industry. Our imports from the Soviet Union are small, only about \$500 million in 1986, with the result being a large surplus in our favor. Our \$2.7 billion surplus with the USSR in 1985, in fact, was the second largest surplus we had with any country.²⁵ Indeed several steps were taken by both countries to improve the trade climate. The US lifted a fur skin embargo, a business facilitation committee was reconstituted, and American and Soviet maritime officials are discussing a new maritime agreement.²⁶ The US-USSR trade climate may be improving. However, this climate is still subject to the volatile political relations between the two countries.

American businessmen argue that trade with Russia is important for good relations and for the opportunity to make a profit that would otherwise go to other countries. For these businessmen, US-USSR trade could improve the American domestic economy itself. Others, however, feel that the only ones who gain in such a trade relationship are the Soviets. In fact, by trading with the Soviet Union, the United States helps not only to preserve a regime that employs slave labor, but also to bring about the downfall of our own democratic system of government. Usually lost in such discussions are the products, items, and goods which are involved in US-USSR trade.

WHAT THE US AND USSR TRADE

Because the USSR is rich in natural resources and the United States is rich in agricultural products, especially grains, the United States and USSR seem destined to trade grains and raw materials. To a certain extent, this has happened, but as export-import reports show, a wide variety of other items are traded also. As measured in total dollars, the bulk of US exports to the Soviet Union has been wheat, corn, and soybeans. Corn and wheat account for 60 percent of total US shipments to the USSR.

The leading exports (as measured in dollars) of the Soviet Union to the United States have been anhydrous ammonia, precious metals, such as the platinum group, gold, silver, and chemicals. In 1979, gold imported from the Soviet Union accounted for more than one-half of the total value of imports from the USSR.²⁷

Tables 1 through 5 provide a breakdown by products and year. Keep the total trade picture of the United States in mind, however, for the USSR accounts for only .001 percent (one tenth of one percent) of the US GNP.²⁸ Yet another factor to consider is the trade surplus that the United States has enjoyed with the USSR. For example, over the last 10 years the United States exported \$4-\$7 billion in goods while importing only \$1 billion in Soviet products.²⁹ In addition, the impact of US-USSR trade on the average US citizen and the average Soviet citizen is small when measured only in economic terms. American farmers and those in agribusiness keep track of Soviet harvests. Soviet citizens have a vague idea of what American consumer goods might mean to them if available. The citizens of both countries, however, seem to become most aware of

trade only when relations deteriorate. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties, both countries have attempted to work out a more stable trading relationship.

In trade there have been both successes and failures. One potential arrangement between the USSR and the United States involved the Kama River Truck Plant. Because the Soviets prefer to import a functioning factory rather than finished products, their effort to improve production of transport vehicles meant acquiring a truck factory, not just trucks. Their truck interest dated back to the 1930s when Amtrog investigated business ties with the Ford Motor Company. Also during the Vietnam war, Ford officials held discussions with the Soviets; however, Ford came under sharp criticism from members of Congress, who expressed their fear that increasing the production of trucks in the USSR would enable the Soviets to provide more vehicles to the North Vietnamese, thus aiding the effort to get war materials into South Vietnam to fight US forces. As a result, there was limited US participation in the Kama River Truck plant operation.

Energy resources also generate contact between American businessmen and the Soviet Union. Occidental Petroleum, Gulf Oil, and El Paso Liquid National Gas discussed energy resources with the Soviets. The result was the Yakutia project, which was to include two phases: (1) exploration and confirmation of about 35 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves and (2) development of the gas field, facilities, tankers, regasification plants in the United States, and delivery of the gas.³⁰ However, nothing substantial ever came out of these initial discussions, although US companies did begin to supply the Soviets with equipment for oil and gas production.

This question of US firms supplying oil exploration and drilling equipment became even more complicated when it became entangled with the pipeline the Soviets were building to supply Western Europe with Soviet natural gas. American equipment makers and firms were essentially shut out of the Soviet market by an embargo placed on such equipment by President Reagan, in response to the situation in Poland. Other reasons for US opposition to the pipeline stemmed from the use of slave labor to construct it, and the United States feared dependency on the increased supply of gas would expose the Western European allies to a cut-off of Soviet

TABLE 1.
US-USSR Trade: 1975-86
(Millions of Dollars)

	US exports ¹			US imports for Consumption ²			US-USSR trade turnover
	Total	Agri-cultural	Non-agri-cultural	Total	Agri-cultural	Non-agri-cultural	
1975	1,833	1,133	700	254	7	247	2,087
1976	2,306	1,487	819	221	8	213	2,527
1977	1,623	1,037	586	234	11	223	1,857
1978	2,249	1,687	562	530	13	517	2,779
1979	3,604	2,855	749	873	15	858	4,477
1980	1,510	1,047	463	462	10	452	1,973
1981	2,339	1,665	674	387	12	375	2,726
1982	2,589	1,855	734	248	11	237	2,837
1983	2,002	1,457	545	367	11	356	2,369
1984	3,283	2,817	466	602	11	591	3,885
1985	2,421	1,864	558	441	9	432	2,863
1986 (approximates)	2,300	1,500	800	500	10	490	2,800

Source: US Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce

1. Free alongside ship (FAS)

2. Value on a cost, insurance, and freight basis (CIF) for years 1975-77; general imports; customs value for 1975-79

3. Gold bullion (nonmonetary) was not included in trade statistics until 1978.

TABLE 2.
US-USSR Trade: 1971-81
(Millions of Dollars)

	Food and live animals	Beverage and tobacco	Crude materials	Mineral fuels	Oils and fats	Chemicals	Manufactured goods	Machinery and transport	Miscellaneous manufactures	Other	Total
U.S. exports ¹											
1971	16	1	27	?	?	38	10	63	7	?	162
1972	365	1	71	None	2	21	10	62	9	1	542
1973	842	?	78	?	6	17	35	204	9	4	1,195
1974	287	1	25	1	None	28	27	225	13	1	607
1975	1,113	1	29	3	14	44	52	574	26	2	1,833
1976	1,359	1	141	9	?	37	116	605	36	1	2,306
1977	876	1	181	17	?	40	89	374	44	1	1,623
1978	1,442	3	286	31	19	30	57	283	98	1	2,249
1979	2,283	2	564	23	73	134	48	363	110	1	3,604
1980	972	3	56	26	28	31	25	269	99	1	1,510
1981	1,600	?	59	63	56	180	32	301	46	1	2,339
U.S. imports ¹											
1971	?	?	16	1	?	1	35	?	3	1	57
1972	1	?	18	7	?	1	64	?	3	1	96
1973	?	1	12	77	?	2	123	?	4	1	220
1974	1	1	19	106	?	12	204	2	4	1	350
1975	?	1	41	96	?	6	97	5	5	1	254
1976	1	2	49	54	?	6	85	4	16	2	221

1977	1	5	47	64	2	6	92	3	18	6	234
1978	2	5	50	44	2	37	103	3	9	287	540
1979	1	9	33	16	2	68	160	4	32	550	873
1980	2	9	15	17	2	149	139	3	29	90	453
1981	3	6	18	112	2	94	88	2	3	23	347

Source: US Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce

1. Free alongside ship (FAS).

2. Less than \$500,000.

3. Customs value (CV).

TABLE 3.
Top 10 Imports-Exports for 1985
(Millions of Dollars)

	<i>Top 10 commodities</i>	<i>Value</i>
<i>US exports to the USSR</i>	Corn	1,502
	Wheat	159
	Fertilizers	152
	Phosphoric acid	110
	Almonds	66
	Pressure sensitive tape	60
	Cotton	56
	Tallow	31
	Soybean oil	27
	Petroleum coke	<u>22</u>
Total exports above		2,185
Total exports		2,422
<i>US imports from the USSR</i>	Ammonia	131
	Urea	61
	Light fuel oils	33
	Palladium	28
	Leaded gasoline	27
	Naphthas	25
	Heavy fuel oils	21
	Vodka	12
	Rhodium	11
	Crabs	<u>10</u>
Total imports above		359
Total imports		441

Source: USSR Division, International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce

TABLE 4.
Top 10 US Exports to the USSR: 1978-81
(Millions of Dollars)

	<i>Top 10 commodities</i>	<i>Value</i>
1978	Corn	1,053
	Wheat	326
	Soybeans	200
	Pressure sensitive tape	37
	Tractor parts	30
	Oil/gas drill mach. parts	28
	Molybdenum ore	26
	Tracklaying tractors (344 + h.p.)	26
	Temperature instruments	25
	Prefab. buildings	20
	Total	2,249
1979	Corn	1,042
	Wheat	812
	Soybeans	489
	Phosphoric acid	93
	Tallow	58
	Pressure sensitive tape	50
	Molybdenum ore	41
	Barley	31
	Oil/gas drill mach. parts	28
	Tracklaying tractor parts	28
Total	3,604	
1980	Corn	602
	Wheat	336
	Tracklaying tractors (344 + h.p.)	51
	Soybeans	45
	Pressure sensitive tape	42
	Tracklaying tractor parts	39
	Tallow	28
	Petroleum coke	20
	Phosphoric acid	17
	Almonds	17
Total	1,510	

TABLE 4.
Top 10 US Exports to the USSR: 1978-81—Continued
(Millions of Dollars)

	<i>Top 10 commodities</i>	<i>Value</i>
1981	Corn	782
	Wheat	773
	Phosphoric acid	166
	Tracklaying tractors (344 + h.p.)	57
	Tracklaying tractor parts	49
	Tallow	49
	Tractor parts	35
	Petroleum coke	33
	Copper ore	25
	Pipe handlers	24
Total		2,339

Source: US Department of Commerce

TABLE 5.
Top 10 US Imports from the USSR: 1978-81
(Millions of Dollars)

	<i>Top 10 commodities</i>	<i>Value</i>
1978	Gold bullion	286
	Fuel oil (light)	40
	Aluminum waste	30
	Palladium	28
	Ammonia	27
	Nickel	24
	Diamonds	12
	Sable fur skins	8
	Rhodium	8
	Chrome ore	7
Total		540
1979	Gold bullion	548
	Palladium	62
	Ammonia	56
	Nickel	25
	*Metal coins	25
	Platinum group metals	16
	Chrome ore	11
	Rhodium	10
	Gasoline	9
	Aluminum waste	9
Total		873

TABLE 5.
Top 10 US Imports from the USSR: 1978-81—Continued
(Millions of Dollars)

	<i>Top 10 commodities</i>	<i>Value</i>
1980	Ammonia	95
	Gold bullion	86
	Palladium	55
	Uranium fluorides	35
	Nickel	35
	Metal coins	18
	Palladium bars	12
	Naphtha	10
	Uranium compounds	9
	Platinum bars	7
Total	453	
1981	Fuel oil (light)	81
	Ammonia	78
	Palladium	31
	Nickel	26
	Naphtha	22
	Gold bullion	21
	Uranium fluorides	11
	Fuel oil (heavy)	9
	Sable fur skins	8
	Platinum group metals	6
Total	347	

Source: US Department of Commerce

gas and make Europe more susceptible to Soviet influence. Western Europeans feel that although the Soviets would be Europe's number one gas supplier, gas is always available from other sources quickly. From the European standpoint, US fears were groundless.

The Soviets constructed the pipeline with help from European firms and with their own resources. Understandably, this new pipeline constructed without US equipment is a source of Soviet pride. However, the United States did allow companies such as Armco, Dresser, and Halliburton, and others to compete to supply the Soviets with \$100 million of oil drilling equipment.³¹ In January 1987, the United States ended nine years of control on oil and gas

equipment sold to the USSR. The United States is also taking more time to consult with its Western European allies on the issue of trade with the USSR, in such councils as NATO, bilateral discussions, and COCOM, a body that is directly involved in reviewing trade between the Soviet Union and the allies.³²

The Soviets are also interested in agricultural machinery, items that are imported in order to improve the USSR's agricultural production. Although the Soviet people are not starving (indeed, their diet has improved steadily since World War II), the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy still plagues the Soviet leadership. With no stable and reliable food supply, the Soviet Union may remain a grain importer for the foreseeable future for two reasons. One is the Soviet system itself. The Soviet centralized management cannot manage the agricultural sector to attain maximum, or at times even minimum efficiency. Troubles extend to shortages of harvesting equipment, transportation of harvested crops, storage space, and overall planning. Whether or not improvements are possible within the present structure of the Soviet system is an unanswered question. Problems continually recur, year after year. The second reason, however, is something beyond Soviet control, and that is the weather.³³ Almost all of the Soviet Union is above the latitude of Duluth, Minnesota, giving the country a marginal capability in terms of agricultural production. Therefore, Soviet trade representatives actively search for equipment and methods to help increase crop yield. Irrigation equipment, tractors and tractor parts, and other types of agricultural machinery are all of interest, and as far as grain itself is concerned, the Soviets are an active part of the American market.


At about the same time that the United States denied the Soviets American equipment for the gas pipeline, the United States approved a grain sale to the Soviet Union. Of course, such sales involve more than just bilateral factors. American farmers compete with Canadian, Australian, and Argentine farmers on the international market. During the period of sanctions declared by the Carter administration in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American farmers were not allowed to sell their grain to the Soviets. However, it soon became apparent that other countries were happily making up the Soviet's shortfalls. This situation soon changed. Under considerable pressure, Washington came up with a grain agreement designed to stabilize American grain sales. The Soviets would

have the grain they wanted and the American farmers would have guaranteed sales. In September 1983, after the successful conclusion of a five-year agreement between the United States and USSR, Soviet purchases of American grain increased. As of December 1983, 6.4 million tons of American grain, including 3.6 million tons of corn and almost 2.8 million tons of wheat, plus 400,000 tons of US soybeans have been involved.³⁴ In the wake of a poor harvest, the Soviets continued to import grain in 1984. Some estimates of what they will spend on the US grain market run over \$3.5 billion. Estimates indicate that US grain may constitute about one-third of the total Soviet grain importation. Before the embargo imposed by President Carter, the United States supplied about three-quarters of the Soviet import.³⁵

In 1984, the United States had a profit of \$2.8 billion in trade with the USSR due to grain sales. An enormous amount of this grain goes not to the human population, but to the animal population of the Soviet Union. This grain and the feed products produced from it feed the animals that produce the meat for the Soviet table. Following the accident at Chernobyl, grain futures in the United States went up. This was a result of speculation that radioactive fallout would contaminate the richest area of Soviet farm land.

Farmers in the United States do not only sell grain to the Soviets; they can also purchase a tractor made in the USSR if they so desire. Soviet-made tractors can be purchased from Belarus Machinery, Inc. This company is an American corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tractoro Export, a Soviet company that sells tractors in approximately 84 countries, including the United States. Belarus Machinery, Inc. is headquartered in New York and has sales and parts offices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. There is also a distribution center in New Orleans, Louisiana. Belarus' operations also extend into Canada where there are four parts depots. The Belarus tractors come in a wide variety of sizes and models. Indeed company officials feel that they can offer a basic tractor at 20 to 30 percent below comparable models on the US market. With dealer outlets in 22 states, service and parts are also available.

According to 1983 literature from Belarus Machinery, Inc., there are very few tractors made in the United States. Tractors are made in Japan, Italy, West Germany, Romania, Canada, Great Britain, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The tractors or the



Belarus Machinery, Inc., a Soviet-owned business, sells tractors in the United States, including the four-wheel drive, 235-horsepower model shown.

parts are shipped to the United States and mated with American-made attachments and accessories. Belarus Machinery employs American citizens and pays US taxes. As for the tractors themselves, Belarus sales personnel say they supply tractors in horsepower ranges not usually available from other manufacturers and provide a tractor with excellent fuel economy and a very sturdy and durable machine at a very good price. Opinion on the Belarus tractors among agricultural machinery experts is divided; some say the Belarus is like the tractor of 20 years ago. However, others say tractors made 20 years ago really "worked," because there were not so many "frills" or advanced electronic devices constantly in need of repair. The Belarus Machinery company is an example of a Soviet-owned business operating in the United States.

The Marine Resources Company is a joint business venture of the United States and USSR. Incorporated in 1976, it is jointly owned by Bellingham Cold Storage of Bellingham, Washington, and Sovrybflot, an entity of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries. The company has its headquarters in Seattle, Washington, and has a Soviet citizen in residence there at the headquarters. An office is also located in the Soviet Pacific port city of Nakhodka. The company combines three elements: the capacity of the US fisherman to catch fish, the capability of the Soviet fishing fleet to process and package the catch at sea, and the marketing capability of a US corporation.

The US fishing boats catch the fish and take them to a large Soviet processing ship that cleans, freezes, and packages the catch. The packaged fish product then goes out to the market and the Marine Resources Company shares the profit. The company's product line is distributed worldwide and, of course, in the USSR and the United States. The product includes Alaska pollock, Pacific whiting, Pacific cod, mackerel, salmon, herring, and king crab.³⁶

The Marine Resources Company is one example of an agreement that works. It is well organized (small fishing trawlers catching fish and delivering the catch to a large factory ship) and has historical precedents. The Americans and the Russians, in fact, signed an agreement in navigation, fishing, and trading relating to the Pacific Ocean at St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) in 1824. This agreement has never been rescinded, although article 3 was rendered obsolete by the Alaska cession treaty and article 4 expired on 17 April 1834.³⁷ Thus, there has long been Russian and Soviet contact with Americans in this region. The two countries have aided each other's fishing crews on a number of occasions—such as the evacuation of sick and injured crewmen to onshore facilities for emergency medical care. This cooperation in the Pacific may be extended to the Atlantic fishing areas off the eastern shore of the United States.

Just as a Soviet company such as Belarus operates in the United States, American companies can operate in the Soviet Union. Indeed, one souvenir an American tourist can bring back from a trip to the USSR is a bottle of Soviet-made *Pepski Cola*. The familiar red, white, and blue label is the same, except it is in Russian. Pepsi is part of a business deal involving marketing the soft drink in the Soviet Union and Stolichnaya vodka in the United States. Joseph Finder, in his book *Red Carpet*, devotes a whole chapter to the story of *Pepski-Cola*.³⁸ There are a number of reasons why Pepsi has been imported into the USSR and Finder discusses them in detail. One reason that received considerable attention was the alcoholism rate in the USSR. According to one line of reasoning, Pepsi-Cola is an alternative to vodka. However, as any visitor to the USSR finds, Pepsi is not readily available. Vodka is more available and also cheaper to buy than Pepsi. Pepsi is available to Soviet citizens if they are willing to pay the price and if they live in areas near the bottling plants or near tourist centers. Pepsi, like other consumer items from the West, holds a degree of fascination

for Soviets, but Soviet consumers cannot purchase Pepsi at the State Food Stores. Pepsi is usually only available at restaurants and stores for the privileged elite. Such places are simply not accessible to the average Soviet citizen, except on special occasions.

One evening in Leningrad, I was eating a late dinner with colleagues at a fashionable hotel restaurant. A group of 12 Soviets at the next table was having a great time. When they learned we were Americans, our tentative attempts to cross the language barrier were well received and, as best possible, we struck up a conversation. These Soviets explained that they were eating dinner at this restaurant because it was a reward for overfulfilling their quota at their factory. They were certainly making the most of their evening out. The menu included meat, plenty of fruit (that evening the fruit was oranges), and Pepsi-Cola, along with Georgian wine and vodka.

At the end of the evening, we noticed that the oranges and bottles of Pepsi were being placed into handbags. One Soviet noticed that I was observing this and she volunteered the oranges were for her children. I replied, "of course," and said I also was taking a Pepsi bottle back home to America as a souvenir. She said that she was taking her bottle for the same reason—as a souvenir of the evening. This bottle of Pepsi represented more than just a Western soft drink. To this Soviet worker, it was a symbol of success and a reward for excelling at her job. I will never know what she did with her bottle, but my bottle made it safely back home and is now a bookend in my office, opposite a statue of Lenin.

US-USSR FUTURE TRADE

Even with such successful arrangements as the Marine Resources Company, Belarus Machinery, Inc., and other business arrangements, US-USSR trade is not strictly a commercial venture. The beginnings made in the early 1970s and the arrangements agreed upon in the mid-1970s all ran into the political troubles of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the troubles in Poland, the problem with the gas pipeline in Europe, the downing of the Korean airliner in the Far East, the deployment of Pershing II missiles and SS-20s in Europe, and the general dissatisfaction with the behavior of the USSR as expressed in the halls of the US Congress and by the administration have all contributed to a steep decline in US-USSR relations.



Marine Resources Company, a joint US-Soviet venture, uses US fishing boats and Soviet processing ships to produce a number of products marketed worldwide. Photograph courtesy of Marine Resources Company; copyrighted.

The rhetoric on both sides is clear evidence of decline. As a result of deterioration, many adverse measures have been imposed on US-USSR trade: (a) Aeroflot Soviet airline service was suspended and the New York and Washington offices in the United States closed for a time; (b) The Soviet Purchasing Commission closed; (c) US-Soviet maritime talks were suspended; (d) The list of items requiring export licenses to the USSR expanded; (e) Access to US ports by Soviet ships was restricted; (f) Grain negotiations became more complicated because exchange agreements on science, technology, and energy were suspended or not renewed; and (g) Soviet

visitors to US businesses and industrial plants decreased.³⁹ As a result of these and other measures, Soviet-American business deals have met with increasing difficulty, even though past events demonstrated that business relations with the Soviet Union are indeed possible. The success of the Marine Resources Company is one example of a successful joint US-USSR venture. Many US firms and their leaders have long been involved in business dealings with the USSR.

The Soviets themselves certainly have proven to be sharp businessmen and excellent negotiators. The Soviets know what they want, have an excellent intelligence system, keep track of US business journals, and aim for the best price.⁴⁰ Basically, the two countries are trading food (grains) for resources (chemicals and precious minerals), but there have also been other areas where manufactured items are a part of the trade picture. The amount of trade since the 1970s has been declining, making the amount of trade America carries on with the USSR ever smaller, especially relative to total US world trade. This decrease in commercial activity between the two countries has been the result of the deteriorating political relations starting with Afghanistan and continuing through the situation in Poland, and the destruction of the Korean airliner.

Those who are involved in trade with the USSR in the United States and in the Soviet Union naturally favor expansion of the commercial ties between the two countries. There are a number of arguments to justify such expansion. Those who oppose trade with the USSR also have a number of reasons why trade with the USSR is not in the best interest of the United States. Inevitably, the rationales used on both sides of the issue cross over into political questions. Those favoring trade say economic ties reduce the tension between the two countries and open new avenues of communication that might increase the understanding on both sides. On the other hand, those who oppose trade with the Soviets say the United States provides the means for the Soviet Government to arm itself better. Sometimes opponents of trade with the USSR use this probably apocryphal story of Lenin. Lenin was supposed to have been asked by a peasant how capitalism would be hanged without any rope. Lenin replied, "Don't worry, the capitalists will supply us with the rope." The rope, of course, being the support Western society gives the Soviets by selling them food, feed, and advanced technology.

In sum, trade ties between the two countries still have not recovered the pace of the height of détente. In 1984, US-USSR trade amounted to \$3.9 billion. The United States imported light fuel oil, anhydrous ammonia, palladium, urea, and crabs. The USSR imported yellow corn, wheat, phosphoric acid, cotton, and pressure sensitive tape.⁴¹ The US business community would like to see more trade between the two countries. However, there are serious disagreements over if and how such trade should be increased. One possible outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit is increased trade. Thus, there is sure to be considerable discussion over this issue in Washington.

Probably both sides of the trade issue overstate their cases and have unreasonable expectations of what trade—or the denial of trade—can or cannot achieve. The advocates of increased trade who believe that the relations between the countries will benefit from expanding commercial ties would do well to remember that as the Wehrmacht moved eastward into Soviet Russia in WWII, the German troops passed train loads of goods moving westward out of the Soviet Union bound for Germany. Those who want to cut trade ties with the USSR would do well to remember that the Soviets have plenty of opportunities to obtain what they want from other sources. Trade between the United States and the USSR is not all that large anyway. In addition, trade and commercial transactions open channels of communication between the two countries which might be useful. If any lesson can be drawn from the Cuban missile events, it is that both countries kept lines of communication open throughout the whole confrontation. Admittedly the issue of trade with the USSR is a contentious issue within the American business and Government community, but the issue of technology transfer is even more open to disagreement as we will see in the next chapter.

STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE is a very complicated issue. However, even more complex is the problem of technology flow to the Soviet Union. Without a doubt the Soviets are making a concentrated effort to obtain the latest technological developments from the West. Soviet efforts include obtaining high-tech items even before such items have a clearly defined use or purpose, making full use of the open society in which American business is found. Soviets in the market for high-tech items go right to the source—the American market and the business community—to obtain what they need. Their acquisition of high technology is an ongoing process which takes place in both legal and illegal ways. I limit my discussion to the legal methods open to the USSR, but one should not overlook the many illicit ways the Soviets can get the technology they want. Nowhere is the line between what is legal and what is illegal blurred more than in the acquisition of high technology. Indeed Rear Adm. E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN, has estimated that almost 70 percent of Soviet high-tech acquisition is gained by illegal means.¹ This chapter, however, examines the lawful part of the Soviet effort. The first section will define what *high technology* means. Then we will look at how technology acquisition can affect the US-USSR strategic relationships, as well as the reasons why the Soviets are so interested in advanced technology. Examples of the ways in which the Soviets can legally acquire the technology they need are included. In this chapter, I will also briefly examine some of the policy

considerations behind efforts to restrict the flow of advanced technology and information to the Soviet Bloc.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY

Identifying and defining *high technology* are not as simple as first appears. One reason is that technology changes and advances so rapidly that what is high-tech this week is obsolete the next. Other considerations revolve around the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, the United States may have technology already obsolete or becoming so because of newer research and development. However, the Soviets may not yet have this older equipment or technology, so for the Soviets, the older as well as the newer equipment is high-tech. Thus, neither the old nor the new equipment is considered suitable for shipment to the Soviet Union. (Of course, the Soviets have purchased items later deemed forbidden for sale to them.) At one time, the United States had two extensive lists of items considered to be advanced technology not suitable for sale to the Soviets or their allies. These lists, from the Commerce and Defense Departments, were long and did not agree with each other. Sections of the lists, especially the list of the Commerce Department, were available for public review.²

However, technology is not just hardware but also concepts, research, development, and production, as well as parts and supply. Each of these may be just as important as a piece of equipment. As a result, the whole question of what is forbidden to the Soviets is a complex and difficult one. In spite of all of these problems, the categories of advanced technology that might attract considerable Soviet interest come as no surprise:

Technology for the manufacture and production of microelectronics, computers, critical electronic components, and signal processing systems.

Technology necessary to the development of aircraft, missile, and other tactical weapon delivery systems.

All types of advanced signal and weapon detection, tracking, and monitoring systems.³

Specific items most frequently mentioned as advanced technology include the new generation of computer chips (usually referred to by the acronyms VHSIC and VLSI), advanced computers and related

hardware and software, electro-optical sensors (such as underwater low-light television cameras), radars, lasers and related laser equipment, titanium alloys and their manufacturing processes, industrial robots and robotic development, machine tools (such as precision grinders), and oil exploration and drilling equipment. Table 6 shows in greater detail the sensitive technology areas and that the USSR has enjoyed considerable success in obtaining the items it wants. Dual-use items make up an additional category that provides even more complications than those previously mentioned.

Dual-use items can be used by both the civilian and military sectors of the Soviet Union. The Kama River truck facility, mentioned in a previous chapter, produces truck motors, frames, and so on. Trucks made by this plant can carry the agricultural harvest or military equipment. Engines and power trains made by the truck factory find their way into agricultural tractors for home and export (such as the Belarus line mentioned in chapter 3) as well as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and mobile anti-aircraft weapons. Grinding machines that can produce small high-precision bearings can provide greater accuracy in navigation instruments for a civilian airliner or for an ICBM.

Large drydock facilities for ocean-going ships can provide repair capability for merchant vessels or aircraft carriers. Clearly this area of dual-use technology is a difficult one for the business and defense communities. Issues involving technology are obscure for either the ordinary Soviet or American citizen who does not realize the effort the USSR makes to acquire American and foreign technology. In fact *World Report* observes:

Few Soviet citizens know how greatly they are dependent on the import of Western technology, and this is nothing new. During the Second World War the Russian forces advancing westwards towards Germany were liberally provided by the US with jeeps and heavy vehicles. When, in 1945, they met the Allied armies from the West the Russian troops were astounded to find that the American and British forces had similar vehicles. A ready explanation was at hand: Stalin, in his generosity, had equipped the US and British armies with Russian vehicles.⁴

Technology acquisition for the Soviet Union also involves the world of ideas, research, and theory. Like dual-use technology, theoretical research is difficult to define and to control. Such research involves not only business firms but the academic community as well. A

panel of experts appointed by the National Academy of Sciences addressed this problem, saying:

Scientific communication is traditionally open and international in character. Scientific advance depends on worldwide access to all the prior findings in a field—and, often, in seemingly unrelated fields—and on systematic critical review of findings by the world scientific community. In addition to open international publications, there are many informal types of essential scientific communication, including circulation of republication drafts, discussions at scientific meetings, special seminars and personal communications.⁵

TABLE 6.
Sensitive Technology

<i>Key technology area</i>	<i>Notable success</i>
Computers	Purchases and acquisitions of complete systems designs, concepts, hardware and software, including a wide variety of Western general purpose computers and minicomputers, for military applications
Microelectronics	Complete industrial processes and semiconductor manufacturing equipment capable of meeting all Soviet military requirements, if acquisitions were combined.
Signal Processing	Acquisitions of processing equipment and know-how.
Manufacturing	Acquisitions of automated and precision manufacturing equipment for electronics, materials, and optical and future laser weapons technology; acquisition of information on manufacturing technology related to weapons, ammunition, and aircraft parts including turbine blades, computers, and electronic components, acquisition of machine tools for cutting large gears for ship propulsion systems.
Communications	Acquisitions of low-power, low-noise, high-sensitivity receivers.
Lasers	Acquisitions of optical, pulsed power source, and other laser-related components, including special optical mirrors and mirror technology suitable for future laser weapons.
Guidance and Navigation	Acquisitions of marine and other navigation receivers, advanced inertial-guidance components, including miniature and laser gyros; acquisitions of missile guidance subsystems; acquisitions of precision machinery for ball bearing production for missile and other applications; acquisition of missile test range instrumentation systems and documentation of precision cinetheodolites for collecting data critical to postflight ballistic missile analysis.
Structural Materials	Purchases and acquisitions of Western titanium alloys, welding equipment, and furnaces for producing titanium plate of large size applicable to submarine construction.

TABLE 6.
Sensitive Technology—Continued

<i>Key technology area</i>	<i>Notable success</i>
Propulsion	Missile technology; some ground propulsion technology (diesels, turbines, and rotaries); purchases and acquisitions of advanced jet engine design information.
Acoustical Sensors	Acquisitions of underwater navigation and direction-finding equipment.
Electro-optical Sensors	Acquisition of information on satellite technology, laser rangefinders, and underwater low-light level television cameras and systems for remote operation.
Radars	Acquisitions and exploitations of air defense radars and antenna designs for missile systems.
Process Technology for Microelectronic Wafer Preparation	The Soviets have acquired hundreds of specific pieces of equipment related to wafer preparation, including epitaxial growth furnaces, crystal pullers, rinsers/dryers, slicers, and lapping and polishing units.
Process Technology for Producing Circuit Masks	Many acquisitions in this area include computer-aided design software, pattern generators and compilers, digital plotters, photorepeaters, contact printers, mask comparators, electron-beam generators, and ion milling equipment.
Equipment for Device Fabrication	Many hundreds of acquisitions in this area have provided the Soviets with mask aligners, diffusion furnaces, ion implanters, coaters, etchers, and photochemical process lines.
Assembly and Test Equipment	Hundreds of items of Western equipment, including scribes, bonders, probe testers, and final test equipment have been acquired by the Soviets.

Source: From an address by Dr. Francis Kapper, Director of Far/Mideast and Southern Hemisphere Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. *Signal*, January 1983.

The panel also stated, "the US political system and culture are based on the principle of openness. Democracy demands an informed public, and this includes information on science and technology."⁶ The panel agreed that the Soviets actively acquire research data and concluded that some action should be taken to try to restrict sensitive scientific communication. But the panel also warned that in establishing such restrictions, the process of free and successful research conducted by many university researchers might be hampered. The panel head, Dr. Dale R. Corson, President Emeritus of Cornell University, acknowledged that there have been "damaging transfers through legal sales of products," but there was

a strong consensus that "universities and open scientific communication have been the source of very little of this technology transfer problem."⁷ In the panel's opinion, more could be gained in scientific research by encouraging a free and open atmosphere to foster continued advances in knowledge than by clamping down on security requirements.

However, some in the American Government disagree. Government officials acknowledge that free and open communication is necessary and do not want to "ape the repressive Soviet model, which stifles technological innovation," but they also ask the research scientists to look carefully at voluntary measures aimed at preventing the loss of technology.⁸ This difficult question poses a serious problem for both those in the university research community and those in Government. But no matter how difficult, the question is of extreme importance. The research scientists must see the danger involved in exchanging information with those whose purpose is to destroy the free and democratic system in which such research is rooted. The Government official must balance measures restricting technology with the tradition of free and open scientific inquiry so essential to the advance of knowledge, not a simple feat in areas where advances are made almost daily. Both sides of the question are vital to the interest of the United States. Also vital is the reason why the Soviets desire advanced technology.

WHY THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED

The Soviet Union wants Western technology today for exactly the same reason that Peter the Great wanted Western skill in his own time: to improve the country's capability against outsiders. In Peter's day, the outsiders were the Swedes, the Poles, the Germans, and the Turks. This time, the outsiders are the United States, Western Europe (especially the West Germans), and the Chinese. *But* the need to acquire technology is not limited to foreign affairs; it extends to domestic considerations as well. The present Soviet research and development (R&D) system is not structured to convert theoretical and research advances into practical and workable products. As *World Report* noted,

Unless linked to the armament or to the space programme, the practical application of scientific and technological work is overlooked....
The marketing of products devised, developed or invented in the

abstract is not a consideration, perhaps because the Soviet Union does not have a market-oriented economy. Conversely, the managerial skills needed for a market economy have never been developed, and there is therefore on the managerial side not the aptitude to apply technological progress to industry.⁹

This is one of the main reasons for the Politburo's frustration and concern about production in the USSR and the productivity of the workers. Mikhail Gorbachev continually calls for better workmanship. Unofficial Soviet estimates reveal that 1 in 10 Soviet homes does not have a refrigerator, but Soviet families wanting to buy one can't even if they have the rubles. Furthermore, most Soviet refrigerators are so poorly designed and built that the ordinary Soviet consumer simply won't waste his money buying certain models.¹⁰ In fact, during his regime, Yuri Andropov himself announced that Soviet retail buyers refused to purchase "500,000 television sets, 115,000 radio sets, almost 250,000 photographic cameras, one and one-half million watches and clocks, [and] 160,000 domestic refrigerators."¹¹

The situation of the military is similar to that of the consumers. Military logisticians in the USSR refuse to accept huge numbers of items produced in Soviet armaments factories. The military is free to accept only the best, discarding the inferior products. In terms of production, the best also means those products manufactured with the help of Western advanced technology, managerial skill, and production systems. Thus, the Politburo in the Kremlin is importing Western technology and skill, just as Peter the Great did when he imported thousands of skilled workmen and artisans, along with their methods and products. The Soviets today continue in the same tradition as their Russian predecessors.

The effects of Soviet technology. As a result of Western technology, the Soviets have saved millions of rubles and have avoided committing resources to research and development. Dr. Francis Kapper, former Director of Far/Mid-East and Southern Hemisphere Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Department of Defense, says they have also been able to:

modernize critical sectors of their military industry and reduce engineering risks by following or copying proven Western designs, thereby limiting the rise in their military production costs.

[In this way, they] achieve greater weapons performance than if they had to rely solely on their own technology.

[They can] incorporate countermeasures to Western weapons early in the development of their own weapon programs.¹²

Thus, the Soviets save resources they would otherwise have to devote to technology, narrow the gap with the West, avoid mistakes which would cost them time, and improve their own relative position in the military and consumer areas.¹³

As far as the strategic relationship with the United States is concerned, the Soviets can improve their military and economic position by adopting Western advanced technology in their weaponry and in their own domestic industrial developments.¹⁴ For example, the pipeline project is serving many needs other than trade. By negotiating with the West, the Soviets were able to satisfy their needs in oil and gas technology, machine tools, chemical and petrochemical technology, pollution control, and computers.¹⁵

The gas pipeline is an ongoing project, just as are the Kama River Truck Plant and Volga automotive plant. The Soviets keep production techniques and developments up-to-date with the help of the Western managers who run these production facilities. The Western firms are, of course, paid for their services. This is what the Soviets mean by "mutual cooperation" between themselves and the West.¹⁶ The Soviets are also sincere when they say they would like to encourage more of these contacts with Western and American firms. Although it may be true that such contacts contribute to world peace and understanding, as the Soviets profess, it should not be forgotten that such contacts contribute to the Soviet State and its goals as well. Just because the Soviets desire the most advanced equipment from the West, particularly from the United States, does not mean that they are any less capable.

While it is certainly true they are encumbered by their own system of state planning and are in a real sense held back by their own ideological requirement to ensure "correctness" in what they do, to imply that Soviet science, research, and technology are inferior is a grave mistake. To this day in the United States, there is a persistent feeling that the Soviets are nothing more than peasants and "backward," forever trying to imitate American technological know-how because they can't measure up to American abilities.

The Soviets even use this image of backwardness to their own advantage when dealing with the Americans. In discussions with their American military counterparts, Soviet officers have sometimes explained that they need more tanks, because their own tanks are "inferior" to American equipment. Soviet officers also say that their own equipment is not as well made and is subject to more breakdowns. As a matter of fact, Soviet equipment works, and some is *superior* to Western equipment.

In the civilian sector, many American visitors to the Soviet Union see streetcars looking like the ones used in America in the 1940s and trucks based on the World War II Studebaker designs. Putting naive estimations aside, these streetcars move people very efficiently. The trucks can be repaired with simple hand tools and do not need to be hooked up to a complex computer to troubleshoot the problem for the mechanic. Think how useful it would have been to have had the "old-fashioned" streetcars operating in American cities during the energy crisis of the mid-1970s and how money could be saved in designing an easy-to-repair truck. To explain the problems of Soviet technological development by citing inherent inferiority, lack of ability, or general backwardness is not acceptable and is *wrong*. The Soviet Union can be extremely innovative and capable and has demonstrated its ability in advanced technology in its own right.

Soviet advanced technology reverse flow. John W. Kiser III discussed the question of "reverse-technology flow" from the Soviet Union to the United States.¹⁷ Mr. Kiser points out that Americans tend to view the Soviet Union through a unique perceptual field which emphasizes American values and outlooks. Such a view is risky, because it applies an American "yardstick" to measure efficiency and effectiveness in the USSR. Therefore, what is successful in the Soviet Union is seen as being unsuccessful in terms of US standards. Kiser also points out that the definition of technology is specific to a particular need and industry. What is advanced or suitable in one setting may not be so in another. Just because Americans tend to see Soviet technology as unsuitable to a particular need or setting in an American context does not mean that Soviet technology is backward. In commercial transactions between the Soviets and American companies, a number of Soviet products have been licensed to American companies (table 7). For example, the Soviets have supplied and sold licenses for metallurgy processes, surgical

TABLE 7.
Active Soviet Licenses in the United States

<i>Technology</i>	<i>Sold to</i>	<i>Date (approx.)</i>
Surgical stapling instruments	US Surgical Corp.	1964
	3M	1979
Hydraulic rock crusher	Joy Manufacturing	1969
Pneumatic underground punch "Hole Hog"	Allied Steel & Tractor	1971
Evaporative stove cooling of blast furnaces	Andco Engineering	1972
Aluminum silicon alloy	Ethyl Corporation	1973
Production of hollow ingots by electroslag remelting	Cabot	1973
Flux cored electrodes	Chemetron	1974
Magnetic impact bonding	Maxwell Laboratories	1974
Drug pyroxan for treating central nervous system disorders	American Home Products	1974
Ethnozin for treating cardiac arrest	Dupont	1974
Electromagnetic casting of aluminum	Kaiser Aluminum Reynolds Aluminum Alcoa	1975
Carboxide insect repellent	American Home Products	1975
In situ underground coal gasification	Texas Utilities Services, Inc.	1975
Carminomycin and florafur anti-cancer agents	Lristol Myers	1976
Bulat process for titanium nitriding	Multiarc Vacuum Systems	1979
Flash butt welding of large diameter pipes	J.R. McDermott	1980
Electromagnetic casting of copper alloys	Olin Brass	1980
Cone crusher	Rexnord	1981
Air column separator	Air Productions	1981
Medical preparation riocidin	Ciba Geigy USA	1982
Biodegradable polymer pin for orthopedics	Medco	1982

Source: John W. Kiser, III, "Tapping Soviet Technology," in *Common Sense in US-Soviet Trade*, Margaret Chapman and Carl Marcy, eds. (Washington, DC: American Committee on East-West Accord, 1983), p. 107 (copyrighted; reprinted with permission); and Kiser's "Report on the Potential for Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the United States," prepared for the US Department of State, Office of External Research, 1977.

instruments, and medical drugs. Kiser believes that there could be more such licensing, but the Soviets are not as familiar with the need for marketing or with sales techniques on the open American market. American manufacturers are not able to get the information they need about Soviet products, partly because the Soviets do not effectively supply such information and partly because Americans are not accustomed to dealing with the Soviets.

Table 8 lists patents granted by the US Patent Office for residents of foreign countries, including the Soviet Union. The Soviets

TABLE 8.
US Patents Issued Residents of Foreign Countries

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1985
Hungary	51	64	66	69	106
Czechoslovakia	105	121	110	109	52
German Democratic Republic	0	0	0	1	67
Poland	27	32	35	26	10
Soviet Union	444	454	435	399	172
Italy	900	762	866	810	968
Great Britain	3,242	3,071	3,443	2,831	2,516
Sweden	944	939	1,118	1,005	929
Federal Republic of Germany	6,360	5,780	6,800	5,902	6,574

Source: Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Report—Fiscal Year 1978 and Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1985, US Patent Office.

and their East European allies had more patents in the mid-1970s when trade between the United States and USSR was expanding. In addition to research, the products themselves, and patents, another strategic aspect of the relationship between the two countries deserves attention and this is the supply of precious metals flowing from the USSR to the United States.

The Soviet Union is a US supplier of the platinum metals group (see tables 3 and 5). In the USSR, platinum is mined at Pechenga/Severonikel, Nizhiny Tagil, and Noril'sk/Taslnakh. There are only four other producing sites in the world: one in South Africa, one in Colombia, and two in Canada. The United States has three nonproducing sites. Investors also store platinum bars in Switzerland, but the Credit Suisse in Zurich will not say how much.¹⁸ Platinum and the platinum metals group (palladium, osmium, ruthenium, iridium, and rhodium) are indeed more precious than gold or silver when it comes to the manufacture of high technology. On 2 September 1986, platinum sold for \$663.20 per ounce, its highest level in 5 years, with gold averaging around \$325.¹⁹

In the case of platinum, one might argue that there is a reverse flow from the USSR to the United States. The Soviet Union sells platinum to the United States, which uses the precious metal in the production of high-technology items. By not mining its own platinum deposits, the United States also saves its own supply for the

future (US sites are located near Billings, Montana; Duluth, Minnesota; and Goodnews Bay, Alaska).²⁰ In terms of the strategic picture, however, platinum is the exception to the rule in terms of high-technology flow. On the whole, the USSR receives much more than it gives, for the technology flow is much in favor of the USSR. Certainly the Soviets are making monumental efforts to obtain such technology. Insofar as the Soviets use legal means to obtain this advanced technology, contacts between the two countries become more complex.

LEGAL ROADS OF ACCESS FOR THE USSR

The legal roads open to the USSR are as numerous as the technologies themselves. Name a specific technology, whether computer chips, drilling and machine tools, chemicals, or aerospace industries, and the Soviets have a legal way to get that technology. In some cases, the Soviets only need to read. They can select from the myriad of scientific or high-tech journals, magazines, and reports produced in the United States. To do that, the Soviets have only to visit any public or university library. Phillip Boffey tells of an example:

In 1979 two Soviet Embassy officials went to the public library in a small town in Tennessee and copied pages from an environmental impact statement concerning Government construction of a plant to manufacture military explosives.

A subsequent investigation found, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, that the document contained a wealth of technical data which, when combined with already published material, would allow the Soviet Union to duplicate the entire manufacturing process.²¹

Anyone may obtain US Government publications and documents through the Freedom of Information Act, through the Government Printing Office, and from other US agencies, corporations, and official bodies. Hearings of congressional committees, for example, can be an excellent source of information. Government literature seems to be a ready and open source and the Soviets do not neglect the tremendous amount of privately published material.

In addition to published material, computer information data bases are also coming into prominence. And since public libraries,

university libraries, and research organizations are expanding the use of these data bases, access to a number of them is available through subscription or membership. In fact, the legal access to technology is almost an open road, using numerous routes as resources:

licenses	patents
sales and commercial transactions	publications and textbooks
contract bids	joint ventures
public policy debates	sales information
immigration	visits to the United States
	training and education ²²

Some of these measures used to acquire technology legally are treated elsewhere. But certain routes listed above merit special notice. Just because a particular route may be open and legal does not mean that it is easy.

One of the more difficult routes to acquire technology is licensing. Eugene Skolnikoff warns, "The licensing process is a cumbersome one in the United States, often erratic, and characterized by a conservative bias that grows out of natural bureaucratic pressures."²³ Considerable time must pass before final approval is granted. Patience and persistence are required. The Soviets have both. Another route to technology is through establishing a corporation. There are about 30 corporations in the United States that the Soviets own wholly or in part, and these corporations have access to the US technology market like any other commercial undertaking. No export controls are involved, since transactions take place entirely within the United States. However, many firms and corporations have extremely complicated international connections that can provide the means to move technology out of US territory. Federal and State tax returns can help expose this sort of thing; review of tax returns at least shows how the firm is organized and how its business revenues are reported.

The Soviets can use international and foreign business connections to obtain legally the technology they need. These connections involve businesses in the United States as well as in Japan, Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany. Thus, if a particular item is not available or cannot be obtained from a US firm, the Soviets can easily go to Western Europe or Japan for what they need.²⁴ Table 9 indicates that they frequently do.

TABLE 9.
The Soviet Union's Leading
High-Tech Suppliers: 1981

	<i>Millions of dollars</i>	<i>Percent of industrial world sales</i>
West Germany	501.8	28.9
Japan	355.0	21.1
France	204.7	11.8
Italy	156.3	9.0
Finland	121.8	7.0
Britain	93.6	5.4
Switzerland	80.0	4.6
Sweden	77.3	4.5
US	56.5	3.3
Austria	30.4	1.8
Denmark	17.9	1.0

Source: US Department of Commerce.

Table 9 data are representative of affairs since the mid-1970s. The United States simply does not have the corner on high-tech. Let us stretch this example a little. Why might a Soviet want to buy an American TV? Most "American-made" television sets have Japanese components. The Soviet can go right to Japan. Another way the Soviets get advanced technology is to buy from a non-US company that imports US equipment. Such arrangements through a country in Western Europe, especially a neutral country, provide the Soviets with excellent opportunities to obtain a wide variety of items. American officials are working with the governments of Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden, as well as with the governments of the NATO countries to inhibit this flow of technology, but their task is difficult. Each country has its own set of rules and regulations to govern commercial transactions within its borders. In addition the governments of these countries do not share or agree with American assessments of the dangers of Soviet technology acquisition. Though there has been some progress, obtaining agreements to help stem the flow of technology to the East is a very sensitive task.²⁵

The Soviets also make use of visitors to the United States. Bear in mind that Soviet visitors are always "official" because the Soviet Government approves all travel to the United States. A Soviet citizen cannot just decide to save enough money for a vacation abroad

and takeoff during his vacation period. He must first have permission to leave the Soviet Union and, equally important, have permission to get back into his country. Generally, to get necessary permission, all Soviet visitors to the United States have a function. Student exchanges provide one route. As Major General Doyle Larson observes:

with reference to student exchanges, it is interesting to compare the research projects of 45 Soviet graduate students studying here and a like number of US graduate students studying in the Soviet Union in 1980. The US students, in their 20s, worked almost exclusively on humanistic projects like "Soviet Tort Law" and "Musical Genres in Russian Music."

The average Russian "student" is 33 to 35 years of age, has the rough equivalent of a doctorate and has about eight years of practical experience, almost all of which applies to study and research in the hard sciences or engineering.²⁶

Soviet visitors are not restricted to only exchange students but are also part of trade delegations, commercial representatives, and so forth. Table 10 lists some of the major fields of interest to Soviets and their East European allies. Of course, the Soviets host many scientific symposia, panels, and discussions in the USSR. Thus, Americans from all fields travel to the Soviet Union for these sessions, but foreigners in the USSR are controlled and may be watched.

Immigration is a more recent channel between the United States and the Soviet Union. New York and Chicago in particular have new emigré populations but again the flow is one-way—from East to West. Immigration might be a means by which the United States could acquire a better measure of Soviet technology, but the Soviet citizens who have access to Soviet advanced technology are least likely to obtain their Government's permission to leave their country. Thus, although some emigrants from the USSR can provide some information about Soviet technology, they are few in number. Indeed, most emigrants from the Soviet Union who settle in America are Jews feeling Soviet anti-Semitism. The numbers of visas granted over the years have changed (page 151), but the changes are more an indication of the Soviet Government's willingness to let people out, rather than a reflection of the Soviet peoples' desire to leave.

TABLE 10.
Major Fields of Interest to Soviets and East Europeans

Computers	Architecture	Memories
	Automatic Control	N/C (Numerically Controlled) Units
	CAD (Computer-Aided Design)	Networks
	Cybernetics/Artificial Intelligence	Pattern Recognition
	Data Bases	Programming
	Image Processing Design	Robots
	Image Processing/Retrieval	Software
Materials	Amorphous	Metallurgy
	CAD	N/C Machine Tools
	Composites	Powder Metals
	Cryogenics	Superconductors
	Deformation	Testing/NDT (Non-Destructive)
Semiconductors	CAD	Design
	Circuits	Ion Implantation
	Defects	Production Technology
	Devices	SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Devices
Communications, Navigation, and Control	Antennas	Satellite Communications
	Microwave/Millimeter Waves	Signal Processing
	Radio Wave Propagation	Telecommunications
Vehicular/Transportation	Marine Systems	Shipbuilding
Laser and Optics	Fiber Optics	Optics
	Gas Lasers	Tunable Lasers
Nuclear Physics	Cryogenics	Reactors
	Fusion	Structural Designs
	Materials	Superconductors
	MHD (Magnetohydrodynamics)	
Microbiology	Genetic Engineering	

Source: From an address by Dr. Francis Kapper, former Director of Far/Mideast and Southern Hemisphere Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. *Signal*, January 1983.

There are a wide variety of routes by which technology moves from West to East. One route is usually overlooked—the Soviet merchant fleet that is operating on the high seas.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET

Discussion of the Soviet merchant fleet could be considered as part of our dealing with trade; however, the subject is more relevant in terms of strategic implications. Its significance to the United States remains virtually unknown to American citizens. The Soviet merchant fleet is just as important to American security as the flow of high technology. What most Americans do not know is that their merchant marine is outnumbered 4-to-1 by ships in the Soviet merchant fleet.²⁷ The American fleet is not even in the world's top 10. The Transportation Institute, using figures supplied by the Maritime Administration, ranked the top 10 merchant fleets by country as:

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Greece | 6. Great Britain |
| 2. Panama | 7. China |
| 3. Soviet Union | 8. Italy |
| 4. Liberia | 9. Norway |
| 5. Japan | 10. Spain |

The idea that the Soviet Union is only a land power is now out of date. The sun never sets on Soviet merchant ships, which now operate worldwide.²⁸ Soviet merchant ships also have a dual capability. Like dual technology, Soviet merchant marine ships have civilian and military purposes. The last time most Americans were aware of the Soviet fleet was during the Cuban missile affair when Soviet ships appeared in photos on the front pages of American newspapers. Since that time, Soviet ships have rarely appeared in American newspapers, and by being out of sight, unfortunately, they are out of mind for the American public.

Few Americans, for example, have ever heard of Sovfrakht. Sovfrakht is the headquarters of the Soviet merchant fleet and acts as a scheduler and dispatcher.²⁹ Sovfrakht operates out of the Netherlands and schedules the pick-up and delivery of cargoes on Soviet lines engaged in international shipping.³⁰ Through Sovfrakht, Soviet merchantmen carry cargo on over 70 different international trade routes between virtually all the countries of the world. Soviet vessels are modern, efficient, and sophisticated. The fleet includes over 40 roll-on-roll-off vessels, "floating garages" that vehicles may be driven onto or off ship by a ramp. The Soviets also have

Seabee-type ships of US design built in Finland. These ships transport unit loads and can be off-loaded in 13 hours. These ships increase capacity in merchant service as well as adding to a military sealift capability.³¹

Americans living close to US ports or near networks serving these ports see the evidence of the Soviet commercial sea power. Trailer trains carrying Soviet cargo containers are common in American ports such as New Orleans. The containers, designed to be transported by rail, truck, or ship and painted fire engine red with the letters CCCP on the side, carry goods for the US market from Europe, both the East and West. The Soviet fleet, in fact, has expanded its operations over the years to carry cargo between non-Communist countries. Some ships of the Soviet fleet carry cargo between Western ports and rarely return to the USSR. These Soviet cargo vessels compete with the US merchant fleet. Sovfrakht provides cheap rates and timely service, providing the USSR with foreign exchange. The Atlantic Council summed up the success of the Soviet merchant fleet, saying:

Soviet commercial success to date is impressive. Like other independent operators, they attracted business by offering lower rates and higher freight brokerage (up to four times higher than the conference liner companies) to the freight forwarders who, on behalf of their merchant clients, control much if not most of the liner freight moving in the international sea lanes. They opened overseas shipping subsidiaries for the liner trade and, as much as possible, staffed them with well-paid nationals highly thought of and well established in their trade. The combination has worked very well indeed; it is a textbook example of how to be successful in the shipping business.³²

Soviet merchant fleet managers aim at the US-European market. In fact, in the 1970s, the Soviet fleet obtained 13 percent of the trade between the United States and Northern Europe and 25 percent of the German-US trade alone. The Far East Shipping Company of Vladivostok is the single largest carrier in the Pacific with 23 percent more cargo than its nearest competitor.³³ The US response to this challenge has been characterized by disarray and lack of direction, according to Ernest Frankel:

A major criticism has always been the emphasis the [US] industry is said to place [on] the protection of parochial or vested interests; yet these "interests" are seldom defined. In fact, there is really no proper definition of what constitutes American shipping.³⁴



Above: Two Soviet merchant marine roll-on-roll-off vessels unloading at Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1976. Copyright. Photograph courtesy of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

Though the overall role of the US merchant marine should be paramount, Frankel argues that the "role of the US merchant marine is variously defined as purely business, commercial, strategic, foreign-policy, or military assets. As a result, policymakers have for long vacillated in their policy deliberation."³⁵ Like the US merchant marine, the policy guidance for the fleet is an amalgam of diverse views from the private and government sectors. The Government agencies involved in the merchant marine include the Federal Maritime Commission, the Maritime Administration, the International Trade Administration, and agencies from scattered departments such as Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Transportation, Commerce, and Justice.³⁶ We must also include the congressional committees and subcommittees and the officials of the executive branch, as well as the labor unions that can also exert a powerful influence on maritime affairs. An interesting requirement of US law provides that US-flag shipping be owned by US citizens and the US-owned ships must be manned only by US citizens. The seeming wealth of attention and regulation perhaps mislead; Frankel's final point is particularly disturbing. "Over 95 percent of the US foreign trade tonnage is carried by foreign-flag vessels. In fact less than two percent of bulk cargoes in US foreign trade are shipped in US-flag bottoms."³⁷ In the case of the US merchant fleet, the question for the

United States is not how to "stem the flow," but how to build anew. In other words, the issue here is foreign dependency, as well as high-tech flow.

STEMMING THE HIGH-TECH FLOW

To prevent strategic technology from reaching the Soviet Union through legal transactions, perhaps the most obvious solution would be a ban on certain exports. Advanced technology could be sold to the Soviets, but only after a license is granted. In fact, such a system now exists, but it is difficult to work with. Intergovernmental committees and working groups with representatives from the research, academic, and manufacturing communities are trying to overhaul this system. The United States is also working with its allies to define advanced technology and attempt to set guidelines on sales to Eastern Europe and the USSR, but there are tremendous problems in coordinating the many disparate agencies and private firms, the different interests involved, and the great divergence of views among the American allies. Another difficulty confounding US concern is the pace of technological development itself. The advance of knowledge in the field of theoretical and practical technology is astonishing. The technology in a video-game, for example, can be applied to an actual weapons systems. Never before have so many technological products been invented and then supplanted so quickly by something more advanced and more capable. Can this process of research, invention, and production be regulated, especially in a free and open society? Should this process be regulated? These are very difficult questions.

Within the United States, the Export Administration Act of 1979 deals with the question of "dual-use" technologies and commodities. "Export controls imposed for national security reasons," as Gerhard Mally points out, "cover strategic/militarily critical goods and technologies, irrespective of the mechanism through which these commodities or technical data may be transferred."³⁸ The Department of Commerce is the US agency which has principal jurisdiction and responsibility for licensing dual-use items, but many other US agencies are also involved with technology flow, making carefully considered judgments. Dedicated and able people in the Federal service, both military and civilian, carry out the requirements imposed upon them from all of these diverse agencies, plus the Congress. The process is complex and in some cases contradictory.

To illustrate, one goal of US policy is ensuring that American firms keep their lead in the field of high technology. American technology is sold in direct competition with European, Japanese, and even Soviet firms. Advanced products must be sold on the international market to get capital for continued development, and the US Government actively promotes and assists American firms in doing so. Yet, at the same time, our Government has a legitimate concern that our adversaries will be able to buy and use American technology against us. So it places restrictions on sales and warns about sharing. Where is the middle ground in trying to establish workable solutions to reconcile these two contradictory goals? These questions have to be answered before any clear policy guidance can be issued regarding legal transactions involving the flow of high technology.

In terms of what the United States is trying to accomplish, the goal may simply come down to preventing the Soviet side from getting gratuitous advantages. The United States should not set out to completely stop the flow of Western technology, however; this simply cannot be achieved. Although the flow must be restricted, an all-inclusive list of forbidden items is unworkable. Recent efforts aim at making a list more realistic and manageable.

Other proposals are aimed at a more equitable flow of strategic materials and technology. Certainly the Soviets need hard currency. Americans can make use of some of the advanced technology the Soviets and their allies have developed. We are already getting some of their resources, such as platinum; perhaps we could exchange their (vital) resources for our food. The aim of a more balanced flow can combine with efforts to formulate a more workable list of forbidden technology. While acknowledging that the primary Soviet aim is to be self-sufficient, an attempt can be made to make the strategic exchange between the two countries more evenhanded. Instead of the United States supplying the Soviets with rope, the United States and the Soviet Union can supply each other with rope.

Because the United States still has the lead in many areas, efforts should be made to keep the lead and increase US capability in high technology. Arguably, the best way to keep the Soviets from taking advantage of American high technology is to keep the pace of American development ongoing and strong. Although there certainly must be control of critical items and products that clearly can

be used in the military field, there might be less concern with "dual-use" items and those items which the Soviets obtain from other sources. These other sources include firms in Western Europe and Japan.

The United States is already working through the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), set up by the United States and its allies. COCOM has been in existence since 1950 and meets in Paris. Its members have experience with the flow of advanced technology and strategic resources. Japan is also a member of COCOM. The organization members seek consensus on what items or resources should not be sold to the Soviet Union or its allies. At the same time, the high-tech establishments inside each COCOM country compete with each other for business; hence, COCOM negotiations are inherently contentious. Nonetheless, the members do agree that some control and methods should be used to confront the dangers of Soviet acquisition of advanced technology. After more than 36 years, this is at least a start. Interestingly enough, Gerhard Mally notes that the "United States requested and received more exceptions to COCOM controls than any other Western nation."³⁹ The United States and Europe are still at odds in many forums, however. At the European Parliament at Strasbourg, France complained that the US efforts to stem technology flow are motivated by commercial considerations.⁴⁰

In sum, in strategic dealings with the Soviet Union, the environment of the 1970s when trade and commercial contacts between the United States and Soviet Union started to flourish no longer exists. Although the Soviets are not susceptible to US "influence" in trade matters, they especially want high technology. The Soviets will take advantage of the availability of Western technology and use that technology to their own advantage and for their own ends.⁴¹ This is exactly what Peter the Great did when he built the Russian Navy and what his Soviet successors are doing today. The risks to the United States must be confronted and dealt with but in a practical and realistic way, with reason and compromise among the various elements of the executive branch of Government, the Congress, and the private sector. If a policy is reasonable and workable, it has a greater chance of gaining the cooperation of American allies.⁴² A question as important as technology flow deserves nothing less than a concerted and well-planned effort. Before the flow can be stemmed, the United States has to put its own house in order. Efforts are underway to do so, but a workable solution is still some distance away.

5

SANCTIONED EXCHANGES

THUS FAR, we have addressed trade, technology, and the contacts between Americans and Soviets which arise from diplomatic, commercial, and media transactions. The contact between Soviet and American citizens in a day-to-day setting has not been addressed. Americans and Soviets have little opportunity to meet and talk with one another, much less to actually live and work in each other's country, but there are programs under which such contacts occur, many of them of fairly recent origin.

In this chapter I examine the various exchange programs in place between the United States and the USSR. Like so many aspects of US and Soviet relations, these agreements are the subject of considerable concern. I will examine the purpose of the exchanges, the value of which are still being debated, and then look into the framework of the exchanges, such as the ways in which an American or Soviet scholar or expert can receive permission to live in the United States or USSR for a period of time. I will relate some of the impressions taken home by the participants in exchange programs.

THE PURPOSE OF EXCHANGES

Generally speaking, the purpose of the exchanges is to contribute to mutual understanding. The official purpose of exchanges and

cooperation in various fields, formally worded in an agreement signed at Moscow in April 1972, states that "exchanges and cooperation will contribute to the broadening of mutual understanding between the American and Soviet peoples and to the development of relations between the two countries."¹ In addition to this general purpose of broadening understanding and developing the relations between the two countries, other aspirations are addressed in the introductions to the various treaties governing exchanges. The Scientific and Technical Cooperation Treaty, for example, states that "cooperation carried out in various fields between scientific and technical organizations of the two countries brings mutual benefits and useful practical results."²

The two countries profess to aspire to benefits in terms of mutual understanding, and they both can achieve practical benefits through such cooperation. Indeed, benefits received from such cooperation might even extend beyond the two countries to the world at large. For example, the treaty dealing with cooperation in the area of atomic energy attaches "great importance to the problem of satisfying the rapidly growing energy demands in both countries as well as in other countries of the world."³ The agreements in the areas of space cooperation and agriculture also extend the benefits of cooperation to the world.⁴ Although the broad purposes of exchange and cooperation agreements are found in the beginning of a particular treaty, a number of undercurrents flow beneath the formal language which do not quite surface in the carefully worked out texts.

The ideas of exchanges between the United States and the USSR were first discussed seriously in the mid-1950s, with the earliest actual agreements begun in 1958. Though still the period of the cold war, there were a number of reasons why such agreements were seen as being in the interest of the United States. For some, such agreements provided the opportunity to penetrate the Iron Curtain. The chance to get an American scholar behind that curtain was also the chance to expose those who could not travel West to the concepts of freedom, open inquiry, and unrestricted debate. Likewise, the scholars sent to America from the Soviet Union would be directly exposed to the American system with all of its attendant and obvious "advantages." Indeed, how could anyone who has seen the American system in operation and who has "tasted freedom"

remain unchanged by this exposure? Such persons, this line of reasoning continued, would certainly bring a much different perspective back to the homeland and could not help but make comparisons between the two systems. The assumption behind this line of reasoning was that over a period of time, exposure to the West would help modify the Soviet system and encourage a freer society. Such an optimistic point of view was the subject of debate then and still is today. Many argued at the time that the exchanges could not really change the Soviet system. Further, they argued, the real purposes of such exchanges were not too far removed from the purposes stated in the official agreements: the exchange of scholars and experts would help each nation learn something about the other and that in itself was a worthy goal.

From the American point of view, an exchange program does indeed provide the opportunity to learn more about the USSR and its people, its system of government, and its many cultures.⁵ Americans actually living in the Soviet Union give the Soviet people among whom they work and live a chance to see and talk with an American. When they return home, these Americans can relate the experiences they have had to their own American acquaintances.

Exchanges also establish points of contact between Americans and Soviets, both informal and formal. In a closed society such as the USSR, such points of contact would be even more difficult to establish without exchanges. In fact, over time, the number of places Americans can work in the USSR has expanded and the range of subjects that are researched, studied, and addressed has increased. According to researcher Alexander Dallin, "If initially the exchanges were essentially limited to Moscow and Leningrad, some have recently been assigned to Kiev, Erevan, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Vilnius, Dushanbe, Voronezh, Rostov, and elsewhere."⁶ American scholars have traveled extensively in the USSR and have visited Siberia, the Far East, and Soviet Central Asia. Both sides believe that good impressions are important. American sponsors try to ensure that their Soviet guests have positive experiences, and the Soviet visitors certainly are concerned with representing their country in a positive way. On this personal level, removed from the arenas of politics and propaganda, there is a chance that greater understanding will result. Such understanding can be called upon by both sides later on.

For the Soviet Union there are also a number of advantages that enter into consideration when evaluating the start of and continuance of scientific, academic, and research exchanges with the United States. In the late 1950s, the then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev promised that the Soviet Union would *bury* the United States.* In order to best the United States, however, Khrushchev first had to catch up with the Americans. The exchange program was the one way to gain access to the latest American thinking and science and, equally important, to see how it was put into practice.⁷ Certainly this is still one goal of the Soviets today, but the Americans also have the opportunity to find out where the Soviets are in many fields of research.⁸ The Soviets want equality with the Americans. What better way to achieve equal status and recognition than through an exchange program? In exchanging academics, researchers, and scientists, the Soviets see that their own science and academic establishment is on a level with that of the United States.⁹ Although this examination is limited to US-USSR programs, the Soviets have exchanges in which European, Japanese, and Third World scientists also participate. The Soviet Union and the United States have an interest in continuing exchange programs not only with each other but also with the rest of the countries of the world. This international aspect of exchanges colors the bilateral considerations involving only the US and USSR, considerably widening the scope of the exchange programs.

WHO BENEFITS?

While emphasizing the pluses of the exchanges, both countries work to ensure that the results, especially the practical results of scientific endeavors, are not one-sided. Officials who deal with exchanges on the working level are quick to point out the importance of seeing to a balanced result where exchanges are concerned. The State Department, United States Information Agency, and private officials who work in agencies established to administer the exchange programs are capable and experienced. Many have participated themselves in an exchange program and have had to deal with

*The English use of the word *bury* does not convey Khrushchev's exact meaning. The result has been a longstanding misinterpretation of a Russian proverb meaning, "in the long run, we will get the best of you."

the practical program work. The American officials are particularly interested in ensuring that reciprocal and equal benefits result from the exchange program. They also are concerned that fair treatment be given to their fellow Americans sent to the USSR.

There were problems, especially in the early days of exchange programs. There were difficulties involving not only living conditions but also working conditions and the ability to carry on the work or research that required residence in the Soviet Union in the first place. Dr. Robert F. Byrnes, a distinguished American historian directly involved with American and Soviet exchange students, noted that even acquiring adequate apartments and dormitory space presented difficulties.¹⁰ However, as the exchanges developed over the years, conditions for Americans in the USSR improved. Cases of harassment and provocation, as well as problems with the Soviet bureaucracy lessened in the 1970s. Certain limits on family members who can accompany the American in the Soviet Union were reduced.¹¹

Expulsions can still occur, for example, the expulsion of Norman J. Zabusky, a mathematical physicist from the University of Pittsburgh. Zabusky was told to leave the USSR on 4 November 1983. The US Embassy in Moscow received a phone call from a Soviet official on November 2d, complaining that Zabusky's conduct was inconsistent with his being a guest in the USSR. If he did not leave, his safety in the Soviet Union could not be guaranteed. The apparent difficulty that brought about Zabusky's expulsion was his planned meeting with some Soviet citizens who had been denied visas to leave the USSR and go to the West. Zabusky had to pack and get himself, his wife, and daughter out of the USSR on short notice. In Zabusky's words, the experience was "totally unexpected and wholly traumatic."¹²

The political situation between the two countries also affects exchanges. In August 1983, Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Sciences, gave Congress testimony to this effect:

Our scientific contacts are withering. The causes are manifold, including the concern of our government about technology transfer; a further desire by government to restrict cultural, educational and scientific contacts as a means of punishing the Soviets for their actions in Afghanistan and Poland; the continuing secretive nature of Soviet society and the bureaucratic impediments imposed by the Soviet government; the politicization of the Soviet process for selection of

exchange scientists; and, finally, the abhorrence on our part of the abrogation of human rights of Soviet scientists. Each of these impediments can alone seriously endanger the sensitive thread of communication that exists today between our scientific communities.¹³

The American diplomatic community continues to follow the situation closely. Reciprocity and balance reflect conditions Americans encounter in their work in the USSR.

Serious criticism of the exchange programs often targets substantive results (or lack thereof). A number of articles have appeared in news columns about Soviet participants who are like vacuum cleaners, scooping up all the information possible and returning to their home country leaving nothing for the US side. Visiting Soviets have been described as "spies on the US campuses." Congressional committees ask about the benefits and balance of the program as far as the interest of the US side is concerned. Regarding advanced technology, there is a great deal of concern about the flow of high tech to the Soviets through exchange programs.¹⁴ For example, the Soviets send highly trained nuclear physicists, chemists, and aerospace engineers to the United States, while the Americans send historians, political scientists, and students of 19th century Russian poetry to the USSR. However, the scales are not tipped completely in favor of the Soviets. America also sends scientists, physicists, chemists, medical researchers, and engineers to the Soviet Union. Commenting on pre-1979 exchanges, Dr. Loren R. Graham stated:

On both the American side and the Soviet side, the predominant interests among exchanges during the last five or six years have been technological and scientific problems; almost all Soviet exchanges are involved in these fields, and a majority of American exchanges have similar interests.¹⁵

A National Academy of Science 1977 study queried the American participants of exchange for their impressions. The American scientists' responses yielded mostly positive results:

75 percent rated their USSR experiences as outstanding or good:

60 percent agree that the US gained scientifically in the exchange;

74 percent felt that they had access to the best facilities the USSR had to offer;

84 percent felt that there should be more instigation of joint research between the US and USSR.¹⁶

According to Dr. Graham, although there may be individual Soviet researchers who fit the vacuum cleaner description, American scientists who participated in the program see the exchanges as a two-way street of mutual benefit to both countries. The problem of one-way flow to the Soviets and the issues of technology transfer "can be adequately handled by more insistence by the American administrators on reciprocity in exchange, particularly in fundamental science, where the potential for American benefit is the greatest."¹⁷

The National Academy of Sciences is also concerned about a one-way street which gives the advantage to the Soviet Union. The organization concludes that concern is justified, especially when it comes to possible Soviet military advantages gleaned from any unequal exchange. Their panel that looked into this problem recommends that at least 50 percent of the exchanges on both sides should be invited by the other side. Agreements between the two sides should also have a cancellation clause which would come into play if abuses occur in the area of intelligence collection.¹⁸ The National Academy panel noted some other practical steps that can help assess the behavior of Soviet scholars while in the United States. The time spent on the research project, the amount of time spent in the library, any evasions of itinerary and travel restrictions, and the observance of actual "intelligence drops" all might help to gauge any impropriety on the part of a Soviet scholar.¹⁹

Members of the US Congress keep informed about the exchange programs in general and the effort to maintain a balance in particular. The Department of State, in a 1982 report to Congress, concluded:

We are proceeding with activities of particular benefit to the United States, especially in the areas of health, environmental protection and safety. We have maintained the structure of scientific cooperation intact in most areas so that beneficial exchanges can be expanded if the political situation should warrant. Consistent with this view, since 1979 we have renewed specialized agreements on cooperation in oceanography, medicine and public health, artificial heart research and development, environmental protection and agriculture.²⁰

The State Department report also deals with short-term exchanges and exchanges which are of a periodic nature. The National Academy of Science has announced a 1985 study addressing this problem. Dr. Lew Allen, Jr. the former USAF Chief of Staff, heads

the study.²¹ Conferences, workshops, and discussions of the results of collaborative scientific research and studies often involve the exchange of Soviet and American delegations. Such meetings enable the members to give reports, attend panels, and participate in seminars and roundtable discussions where they present and analyze findings and results. However, whether short term or long term, the question of what the United States gets out of the exchange is certainly an important consideration for Government and private officials who work with the programs.

There are two additional concerns with the purpose and scope of exchanges: first, the political and ideological issues that separate the US and Soviet systems and, second, the problem of technology transfer. Just as trade issues between the two countries have been tied to emigration from the USSR, so also have exchange programs been linked to human rights conditions in the USSR. In Dr. Graham's opinion,

the more weighty question is whether Americans should support exchange programs which the Soviet government uses as reward systems for its politically orthodox scholars while suppressing dissent at home.²²

Dr. Graham points out that American scientists have cancelled their participation in scientific trips and meetings to the USSR to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the Soviets and the treatment of dissidents. The Soviet Union has not enjoyed normal ties with Western professional associations in the field of psychology and psychiatry for some time now. The key consideration, though, is the effectiveness of Western boycotts. Soviet scientists may become even more isolated from their colleagues in the West and in the United States, hardly an improvement in affairs. As with diplomatic contacts, a reduction in exchanges with the Soviet Union would deprive the West and the United States of what little information about the Soviet system that is now available.

The problem of technology transfer is a difficult one, although the situation is perhaps easier to handle in exchanges than in business, commercial, and research areas dealing with technology flows. According to a Department of State report to Congress:

Appropriate elements of the intelligence community routinely assess the risk of the transfer to the Soviet Union of militarily significant technology through research, exchanges, and other activities

conducted under these agreements. Inasmuch as the activities proposed and conducted generally are in basic research areas or involve scientific applications in the fields of health, safety, or environmental protection, the activities reviewed by the intelligence community rarely involve risk of the transfer of militarily significant technology. In those few instances where risk of technology transfer is identified, the activities are either cancelled or appropriately recast to minimize or eliminate such risk.²³

Problems involving national security and technology flow to the USSR have led to a number of agreements being cancelled. Technology transfer or national security was not necessarily involved in all of the cancellations but plays a significant role. A list of active agreements and those no longer in force with their histories follows:

US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture.

1. Signed at Washington, 19 June 1973 by Secretary Butz and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Automatically extended for 5 years on 19 June 1978.
3. Automatically extended for 5 years on 19 June 1983.
4. Extended until 19 June 1988 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

1. Signed at Washington, 21 June 1973 by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.
2. Extended for 3 years effective 21 June 1983.
3. Extended until 20 June 1986 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection.

1. Signed at Moscow, 23 May 1972 by President Nixon and Chairman Podgorny.
2. Automatically extended for 5 years on 23 May 1977.
3. Automatically extended for 5 years on 23 May 1982.
4. Extended until 23 May 1987 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health.

1. Signed at Moscow, 23 May 1972 by Secretary Rogers and Minister of Health Petrovsky.
2. Automatically extended for 5 years on 23 May 1977.
3. Automatically extended for 5 years on 23 May 1982.
4. Extended until 23 May 1987 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development.

1. Signed at Moscow, 28 June 1974 by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Automatically extended for 5 years on 28 June 1977.
3. Automatically extended for 5 years on 28 June 1982.
4. Extended until 28 June 1987 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Housing and Other Construction.

1. Signed at Moscow, 28 June 1974 by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin.
2. Automatically extended for 5 years on 28 June 1979.
3. Extended until 28 June 1989 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Oceans.

1. Signed at Washington, 19 June 1973 by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Extended for 6 months on 19 June 1978.
3. Amended and extended for 3 years on 15 December 1978.
4. Extended for 3 years on 15 December 1981.
5. Extended until 14 December 1987 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

Agreement on Scientific Exchange and Cooperation between the National Academy of Sciences of the USA and Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1979 and 1980.

1. Signed at Washington, 7 February 1979 by NAS President Handler and ANSSSR Vice President Ovchinnikov.

2. Entered into force effective 1 January 1979.
3. Agreement expired 1 January 1981 and has not been renewed.
4. Discussion continues on a new agreement; some exchanges are taking place. See appendix B, the text of a new 1985 agreement, article II, paragraph 2.

The Long Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation.

1. Signed at Moscow, on 29 June 1974.
2. Extended until 28 June 1994 by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation.

1. Signed at Washington, 19 June 1973 by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Amended and extended for 2 years (with a possible 3-year extension) on 19 June 1978.
3. Cancelled effective 19 June 1983 by President Reagan in response to Soviet downing of the KAL airliner.

US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Science and Technology.

1. Signed at Moscow, 24 May 1972 by Secretary Rogers and GKNT Chairman Kirillin.
2. Interim extension 24 May 1972.
3. Amended agreement signed 8 July 1977 by the President's Science Advisor Press and GKNT Chairman Kirillin.
4. Allowed to lapse 8 July 1982 in response to imposition of martial law in Poland.
5. Replaced in part by the 1985 agreement, article III (see appendix B).

US-USSR Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes.

1. Signed at Moscow, 24 May 1972 by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin.
2. Amended and signed at Geneva 18 May 1977 by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

3. Allowed to lapse on 18 May 1982 in response to imposition of martial law in Poland

US-USSR Agreement Cooperation in the Field of Energy.

1. Signed at Moscow, 28 June 1974 by President Nixon and Chairman Podgorny.
2. Automatically extended for 3 years 28 June 1979.
3. Allowed to lapse on 28 June 1982 in response to imposition of martial law in Poland.²⁴

The fact that a treaty has not been renewed does not rule out the possibilities of US-USSR collaboration in a particular area. Some cooperation continues in most areas. State Department officials repeatedly make the point that the framework for exchanges is and should be kept in place. Although political considerations might enter into a decision to reduce or increase the number of exchanges, both the United States and the USSR are maintaining the framework as a matter of policy.²⁵ While political considerations might expand or reduce the number of exchanges, both countries find the purpose of the exchanges useful and, in the case of joint projects, the results beneficial.

The framework for academic and scientific research exchanges goes back to 1958, but it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that both governments expanded the numbers of exchanges and established agencies to administer them. Consistent with the political structures and traditions of the United States, its agencies, (1) International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), (2) Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), and (3) the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), are funded from both the public and private sector. In the USSR, exchange programs are run by the Soviet Government.

On the American side, the International Research and Exchanges Board, established in 1968, "provides field access, support services, and development expertise to US academic, business, and governmental specialists."²⁶ The organization conducts research exchange programs with the USSR (and Eastern Europe), improves scholarly communications between East and West, and makes results of the exchanges available to the public. An IREX annual report listed some of the activities sponsored; for example:

Soviet and US Africanists met in California for the first time to discuss and share current research and views on sub-Saharan Africa and competing US and Soviet interests in the region.

Senior US and Soviet specialists on Latin America met in Moscow to plan a variety of joint projects.

American and Soviet economists worked on problems of regional planning in the two countries at a conference in Ithaca, New York.

The new IREX-initiated Polish-American Commission on the Social Sciences and Humanities met for the first time. The Commission, co-sponsored by the Polish Academy of Sciences, has produced a sophisticated and intellectually powerful binational research agenda for the coming two years, despite the grave difficulties in Poland and in US-Polish relations.

American and Soviet experts on the work of Walt Whitman met in Moscow, continuing . . . literary contacts between the two countries.²⁷

Through IREX, American scholars have worked on a number of projects with access to institutions in the USSR. For example:

Soviet theoretical and mathematical economics, at the Central Economic-Mathematics Institute, and the Institute of Economics, Novosibirsk;

The Soviet Union in the Pacific, at the Institute of the USA & Canada, the Institute of the Far East, the Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Scientific Center, Khabarovsk;

The development of the Soviet Uzbek literary community, at the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of Language & Literature, Uzbek Academy of Sciences, the Writers' Union of the Uzbek SSR, and the Museum of Literature, Tashkent.

[And some of the areas in which younger scholars worked:]

Agricultural land use in the eastern steppes of the Soviet Union, at Moscow State University;

The June 1980 USSR law on the protection of the atmosphere, at the Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences;

The role of satellite cities in Soviet urban development policy, at Moscow State University.²⁸

Scholars and researchers working under the auspices of IREX and the Department of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Higher and

Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR generally stay in the USSR for time periods of one semester to one academic year or approximately nine months. The period of time for Soviet scholars staying in the United States is about the same. Senior scholars stay from three to six months. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR also have an agreement administered by IREX. Periods of stay under this arrangement can range from 2 to 10 months. The United States has sent over 1,700 Americans to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has sent approximately the same number here under the agreement between the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, the American Council of Learned Societies, and IREX.

In addition to IREX exchanges, Soviet and American scholars spend time in each other's country under the auspices of the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES). The Council "is the principal private cooperating agency for the announcement and nomination of Fulbright senior scholar grants for university teaching and advanced research."²⁹ Americans and Soviets who participate in CIES exchanges are recognized scholars and specialists in their fields. They lecture and teach at their host institutions, rather than conduct research. Lecturers may stay for a four-month period in either country. During the period of the exchange, they address classes or work in special seminars with Soviet or American colleagues.³⁰ Those who have participated in this program have found that relationships and contacts continue after the exchange is completed. One area of general concern in exchanges is that the Soviets send specialists in the natural and physical sciences while the Americans send experts in the humanities. Thus, the Soviets have their experts here studying American work in nuclear physics, and the Americans have academics there studying the poetry and literature of 19th century Russia. However, exchanges under CIES had been relatively even as percentages tend to indicate:

	<i>Scientists</i>	<i>Humanists</i>
American*	22.7%	35.5%
Soviet*	25.1%	16.6%

*The 1984-85 CIES data are also representative of exchanges to date.

Through 1986 and since the first 1973 CIES Fulbright exchanges, 138 Americans have traveled to the USSR and 96 Soviets have traveled to the United States. The Soviets emphasize the hard sciences, but both countries are about equal in terms of all fields of sciences. Future CIES exchanges are based on the recent agreement outgrowth of the Geneva summit. The United States and the USSR have plans to exchange at least a minimum number of 15 each under CIES in 1986-87 and 1987-88.

The US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (ASUSSR) are the agencies principally involved in the exchanges in the physical sciences, medicine, and biology. See table 11. The first exchange between the NAS and the ASUSSR took place in 1959, with both long-term and short-term visits continuing in subsequent years since. Exchanges range from 1 month to 12 months depending on desires and circumstances. On the US side, the NAS arranges placement for Soviet scientists at American universities and research institutes, both public and private. The ASUSSR likewise places American scientists at the many institutes affiliated with the ASUSSR or with institutes affiliated with the republic academies, for example with the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science. Like IREX and CIES, the NAS is a private body, but through the National Science Foundation it receives Government funding. Administered by the National Research Council, this exchange program is run as a subordinate body to the NAS. Through 1985, under the NAS program 610 Americans have worked in the Soviet Union and 630 Soviets have worked in the United States. Membership in the NAS itself is also open. Andrei Sakharov, prominent Soviet physicist, Nobel Laureate, and dissident, is a member of the NAS.

Before his 1986 release, Andrei Sakharov was very much a part of the question of US participation in exchanges with the USSR, a matter of concern to the American physics community. A number of American physicists protested Sakharov's treatment and internal exile to Gorki, a city closed to foreigners, and the reduced contact between Sakharov and his supporters in the West. One American physicist working in the USSR found that there was a great deal of confusion on the part of his Soviet colleagues when they heard of American proposals to cut off exchange with the USSR. Timothy Toohig said he, "found no one who thought that a

TABLE 11.
 NAS Scientific US-USSR Exchange Visits Completed
 by Year & Field—Persons (Total Months)

	1983	1984	1985
<i>American scientists:</i>			
Biological sciences/ecology	8(10.75)	4(04.00)	3(05.00)
Chemistry	1(01.00)	2(02.00)	—
Earth/atmospheric sciences	4(04.50)	3(09.00)	3(05.50)
Engineering	1(01.00)	1(03.00)	—
Mathematics	4(12.00)	2(03.50)	2(09.00)
Oceanography	—	—	3(07.00)
Physics	3(03.00)	2(09.00)	1(03.00)
Social sciences	7(14.75)	2(04.50)	1(01.00)
Totals	28(47.00)	16(35.00)	13(30.50)
<i>Foreign scientists:</i>			
Biological sciences	4(15.50)	3(04.50)	1(04.00)
Chemistry	1(06.00)	2(03.50)	2(06.00)
Earth/atmospheric sciences	2(02.00)	1(03.00)	2(02.00)
Engineering	5(11.50)	1(03.00)	8(08.75)
Mathematics	—	1(02.00)	—
Oceanography	—	—	1(03.00)
Physics	4(12.00)	5(11.00)	9(21.00)
Social sciences	—	—	2(05.00)
Totals	16(47.00)	13(27.00)	25(49.75)

Source: National Academy of Sciences, February 1986

moratorium on research would be any help to Sakharov's civil rights." Commenting further, Toohig stated, "Many Soviet scientists resented being 'used' by American scientists for what they viewed as 'political purposes.' There is also some resentment over the arrogance implicit in the notion of 'punishing' them by not communicating with them."³¹

Some official contacts between the American and Soviet side have continued. Since 1958, under IREX, CIES, and NAS, many American and Soviet scholars have exchanged places briefly (see table 12). Professor Walter A. Rosenblith, NAS foreign secretary and chairman of the National Research Council Office of International Affairs, met in Moscow with A.P. Aleksandrov, the president of the ASUSSR, in September 1982. This meeting continued a

TABLE 12.
US-USSR Academic, Research, and Sciences Exchanges Since 1958

	IREX*		CIES*		NAS*	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
1958-1969	475	471	—	—	189	184
1969-70	(included above)		—	—	25	26
1970-71	76	66	—	—	24	27
1971-72	85	69	—	—	24	28
1972-73	95	88	—	—	30	41
1973-74	97	98	7	5	36	30
1974-75	113	109	8	7	24	33
1975-76	112	108	8	11	26	19
1976-77	109	109	7	6	38	46
1977-78	105	134	13	5	38	41
1978-79	103	99	19	14	17	25
1979-80	98	129	14	14	25	15
1980-81	51	57	16	15	21	27
1981-82	80	87	15	6	10	15
1982-83	77	87	9	3	26	19
1983-84	48	37	8	1	28	16
1984-85	52	46	8	5	16	13
1985-86	57	66	6	4	13	25

Source: Compiled by the author from data furnished by the agencies.

*International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).

discussion and review of "matters of mutual concern affecting US-Soviet scientific cooperation."³² Articles III and V of the 1985 agreement continue the academic exchanges between the two countries. If this agreement is successful, it will end the overall drop in exchanges from 1982 to 1985.

Exact figures for exchanges are difficult to calculate, not because of inadequate recordkeeping but rather because of the many kinds of exchanges that can take place between the United States and the USSR. For example, there are a number of exchanges in the form of conferences, meetings, ad hoc panels, and special study

groups. These meetings take place in either the United States or the Soviet Union or in other countries. The number of participants on both sides may also vary. The three agencies that administer exchanges, however, keep their records carefully.

From 1958 through 1986, about 2,500 scholars from the United States and 2,500 scholars from the USSR have been exchanged between the two countries, under the three formal exchange programs, IREX, CIES, and NAS. Thus, the US and Soviet Union have exchanged a grand total of about 5,000 scholars, researchers, academics, language teachers, and scientists. An important aspect of the programs is the selection process that chooses the individuals who go to the USSR and to the United States.

On the American side, all who believe they have the qualifications necessary for an exchange can apply. The agencies in the United States concerned with exchanges, IREX, NAS, and CIES, keep the scientific, academic, and research communities informed of the application process and deadlines. The staff members who work with the exchange programs at all three agencies, extremely well informed and very capable, help those applying and those making preparations to leave for the USSR after their applications have been approved. Those who have returned to the United States from an exchange also often assist. Many of the alumni give invaluable assistance to fellow researchers interested in going to the USSR.

An individual interested in an exchange to the USSR must match his own expertise and academic discipline with either IREX, CIES, or NAS. A graduate student in the humanities, for example, would apply under the auspices of IREX. A senior professor would apply under the CIES (Fulbright) or IREX senior scholar program. Physicists, chemists, or biologists would work with the NAS in arranging an exchange. Individuals begin the process to go to the USSR and work in their particular field at a Soviet institution or university.

The USSR too has individual-initiated applications. A Soviet scientist or academic can also apply for an exchange position through the ASUSSR or the Ministry of Secondary and Specialized Education in a process that begins at the individual's home institution. Because political reliability is one of the requirements on the Soviet side and Soviet authorities take a dim view of defections, institution-nominated scholars or researchers appear to be politically

stable and unlikely to decide to remain in the West. Still, 1980 Soviet instructions to their scientists traveling abroad spell out conduct. Translated, items 2 through 7 caution:

2. In conversations with foreign scientists propagate widely the achievements of Soviet science and the successes of socialist construction in the USSR, the peaceable policy of our government, and the resolutions of the XXV Congress of the CPSU.
3. Explain and popularize the ideas of the new Constitution of the USSR, and should the question of "human rights" be brought up, adhere to our policies as these are set forth in our central press organs.
4. In speeches and conversations abide only by those facts which have been published in our open press and have been authorized for publication abroad.
5. Inform the Soviet Embassy about your arrival in /country/ and about all subsequent movements within that country.
6. Should you be asked to appear on radio or television, or to write an article in the local press, you must coordinate with the Soviet Embassy.
7. Upon return home, within two weeks submit a report on your assignment to the UNSS [Office of International Scientific Relations] of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.*

Another way in which an exchange can be arranged is by invitation. The invitation could originate within an American or Soviet institution. For instance, a distinguished scientist could be invited to join a Soviet or American institution. In such cases, the individual concerned already has an established reputation and is a recognized authority or expert in his particular field. Now that the exchange programs have been underway for some time, such invitations are more common. An American scientist who has worked at an institute in the USSR and who has contacts with a number of Soviets working in his field might suggest the invitation of a particular Soviet. The reverse is also true. In this way, established scientists and researchers can get their colleagues positions at American or Soviet institutions or get them involved in joint study groups,

**Russkaya Mysl'*, 17 January 1980.

panels, or commissions. Over the years, increasing numbers of Americans and Soviets have been invited back to the United States or USSR. The more famous the individuals are in their field and the more their work is respected, the greater the likelihood of a return visit. Indeed, benefits of the exchange programs include the contacts established in each country that provide another communication link between the two societies.

In addition to by-name invitations, there are also institutional invitations. In this case, an American university might invite a Soviet researcher or scholar to work with a particular department or laboratory. American institutions may notify any one of the three US exchange agencies or contact a source in the Department of State or the United States Information Agency. In the United States, a Soviet researcher or scientist in residence adds to the prestige of the host institution. It is the same in the USSR; to have an American associated with the institution is a sign of importance. One mutual benefit for both sides is this confirmation of the other's eminence. Table 13 lists places where Soviets have studied and worked in the United States and where Americans have worked in the USSR. This list is by no means exhaustive. This is only a partial list of institutions at which Americans and Soviets have been situated. One of the benefits of the exchange for the American side has been the placement of US research scientists, academics, graduate students, and lecturers at places in the Soviet Union which are far from Moscow, Leningrad, and other larger cities. Joint expeditions have been conducted to areas of Siberia and Central Asia. This gradual opening up of areas to American visitors has greatly increased the knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union by the American academic community. Soviet exchange persons have resided in virtually every area of the United States.

The general areas of cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union also go beyond the academic and exchange arrangements just discussed because of the additional working groups and seminars which take place between the government agencies of both countries. In cooperative agreements that involve such government-to-government relationships, US Government agencies must submit reports on their activities. Until recent years, 11 cooperative agreements coordinated US-USSR efforts:

TABLE 13.
US-Soviet Exchange Participants

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Exchange participants</i>
American institutions, universities, and research facilities visited by Soviets	Boston University Brookhaven National Laboratory (University of Washington) Kansas State University Massachusetts Institute of Technology Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center National Institute of Health New York Botanical Garden Ohio State University Princeton University US Department of Agriculture, Western Regional Center US Library of Congress University of California-Irvine University of Colorado-Boulder University of Kansas University of Kentucky University of Maryland University of Missouri University of Southwestern Louisiana Utah State University Yale University School of Medicine
Soviet institutions, universities, and research facilities visited by Americans	Azerbaijan Polytechnic Institute Belorussian Polytechnic Institute, Minsk Byurakan Astrophysical Observatory Erevan State University Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow Institute of Evolutionary Morphology and Ecology of Animals Institute of Geography Institute of Geology and Geophysics Institute of History, Vilnius Institute of Linguistics, Tbilisi Institute of Physics, Tbilisi Institute of Problems of Information Transmission, Moscow Institute of Protein Research Institutes of Thermophysics, Novosibirsk Kiev Polytechnic Institute Kiev State University Lenin Library, Moscow Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute Moscow Gubkin Oil and Gas Institute Moscow Institute of Management

TABLE 13.
US-Soviet Exchange Participants—*Continued*

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Exchange participants</i>
American institutes, universities, and research facilities sending Americans to the USSR	Moscow State University Paleontological Institute Steklov Institute of Mathematic, Moscow Tallin Conference Vilnius Engineering and Construction Institute Amoco Production Co., Research Center Colorado State University Columbia University Dia Art Foundation Environmental Protection Agency George Mason University Indiana University Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Northwestern University Seattle Central Community College Southern Missionary College State University of New York at Binghamton US Department of Commerce University of Akron University of California, Berkeley University of Chicago University of Illinois University of North Carolina University of Texas System Cancer Center
Soviet institutes, universities, and research facilities sending Soviets to the United States	Chelyabinsk Polytechnic Institute Gor'kiy Institute of World Literature Institute of the Far East Institute of Genetics and Cytology Institute of History of the USSR Institute of Petrochemical Processes Institute of Physical Chemistry Institute of Sociological Research Institute of the USA & Canada Institute of Water Problems Institute of World Economy and International Relations Kazakh State University Lebedyev Physics Institute L'vov State University

TABLE 13.
US-Soviet Exchange Participants—*Continued*

Activity	Exchange participants
	Murmansk Higher School of Engineering Odessa State University Riga Medical Institute Tashkent Institute of Automobile and Road Construction Termez State Pedagogical Institute Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Urals State University, Sverdlovsk

1. *Agriculture*. Renewed for a five-year term on 19 June 1983 (Department of Agriculture).
2. *Heart research*. Extended until 28 June 1987 (National Institutes of Health).
3. *Public health*. Extended until 23 May 1987 (National Institutes of Health).
4. *Peaceful uses of atomic energy*. Expired 21 June 1983, a renewal decision pending (Department of Energy). See the new agreement in appendix B.
5. *Environmental protection*. Extended until 23 May 1987 (Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Fish and Wildlife Service).
6. *Use of outer space for peaceful purposes*. Expired on 18 May 1982, not renewed in accordance with a Presidential Directive, and not under discussion (National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
7. *Cooperation in the field of energy*. Expired 28 June 1982 and not renewed, in accordance with a Presidential Directive (Department of Energy). See the new agreement in appendix B.
8. *Housing and other construction*. Extended until 18 June 1984 (Department of Housing and Urban Development). See the new agreement in appendix B.
9. *Science and technology*. Expired 7 July 1982 and not renewed, in accordance with Presidential Directive (National Science Foundation, Bureau of Standards, US Forestry Service). Replaced in new agreement.

10. *Transportation*. Expired 19 June 1983, a renewal decision pending (Department of Transportation).
11. *Oceanography*. Extended until 14 December 1984 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). See the new agreement in appendix B.³³

Each agency evaluates the progress made in its area of cooperation. This evaluation specially notes the benefits the United States has gained from the joint US-USSR endeavors.


For example, NASA was very pleased with the joint work, especially a project measuring mineral changes in bones over long-duration space flights. The USSR is ahead of the United States in long-duration space flight. Other NASA agreements coordinated an exchange of data on planetary missions and results of space probes, rocket meteorology, space biology, and medicine. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet actions in Poland have sharply curtailed these joint activities. The agreement on cooperation in space expired in 1982.³⁴ Contacts have not been completely broken off, however, and cooperative events have taken place on a limited basis.



An artist's conception of the 1975 docking approach of Apollo and Soyuz. The section of Soyuz with solar panels extending is the cosmonauts' cabin. Illustration courtesy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

There may still be room for cooperation in the area of space rescue. The President of the United States made such a proposal during a 1985 conference on US-Soviet exchanges. The proposal amounted to both countries carrying out a simulated rescue mission aimed at developing the techniques needed for an actual space rescue. In 1984, the US Senate was also considering legislation urging the President to negotiate a space rescue treaty with the Soviets.³⁵ The precedent for cooperation in space is most visible in the Apollo-Soyuz mission of 1975, called Soyuz-Apollo in the Soviet Union. Both countries still have the full-sized mission space craft on public display. In Washington, DC, the craft can be seen at the Air & Space Museum.

The Soviets I talked with remembered the Apollo-Soyuz mission and seemed happy when I brought it up. They expressed



The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project crew (left to right): Americans Donald K. Slayton (docking module pilot), Thomas P. Stafford (commander of the US crew), and Vance D. Brand (command module pilot) and Soviets Aleksey A. Leonov (commander of the Soviet crew) and Valeriy N. Kubasov (engineer on the Soviet crew). Photograph courtesy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

satisfaction that their country and mine could achieve such cooperation, especially with the entire world as an audience. One Soviet proudly informed me that only our two countries could have done such a magnificent thing. But the Soviets have been cool to any new joint mission. They apparently are trying to use US interests in joint space missions in their attempt to stop the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets seem to be saying that greater cooperation in manned space missions can only come if SDI is halted. Some other areas have had US-USSR cooperation. The Soviets and NASA did cooperate on interplanetary missions, for example, the Soviet Vega 2 in June 1985.³⁶ There was also cooperation involved in the observation of Halley's Comet in 1986. A Soviet space craft that had a close encounter with the comet carried some American instruments on board. American mathematical calculations helped guide the space craft to the comet. Under a program called COSPAS-SARSAT, Canada and France as well as the United States and the Soviet Union are working together.* These countries have launched satellites that can receive emergency distress signals from aircraft, ships, or other vehicles and relay the signal to rescue forces through a mission control center. Over 500 lives have been saved in this program that deserves more publicity.³⁷

Other cooperative arrangements have continued, although at reduced levels. The Soviet side at one point stated that the suspension of Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) service to the United States would reduce or eliminate getting Soviet scientists and others working with the American side to and from the USSR. Three of the six working groups did not exchange people but did exchange correspondence through US State Department channels. Two joint publications, "Planning New Towns" and "Managing New Towns," emerged for publication in both English and Russian.³⁸ The two countries also have continued cooperation in heart and cancer research as well as in projects investigating health problems such as environmental health, arthritis, influenza, mental health, and eye diseases.

Anticancer drugs, studies on HDL cholesterol, the collection and analysis of data from Soviet and American patients, and blood transfusions in cardiovascular surgery are also under study and investigation. The reports and results of these cooperative efforts are

*COSPAS is from the Russian, meaning Space Project for the Searching of Vessels (ships) and Aircraft in Distress. SARSAT is from the English, Search and Rescue Satellite.

published and are available to the scientific communities of both nations as well as to the worldwide medical community. Thus, there is some beneficial result from the cooperative arrangements. In addition to the studies that result from joint efforts, scholars also individually publish papers, reports, and articles based on their own work. In a number of cases, these articles are authored jointly by the American and Soviet researchers. Such articles and papers may be found in virtually all areas that are involved in an exchange.

FROM A PERSONAL VIEWPOINT

The experience gained from participation in an exchange could fill a book. In the case of at least two Americans who were exchange students to the USSR, it did. The experiences of Logan Robinson, who as an exchange student studied law in the USSR, are the subject of *An American in Leningrad*. Andrea Lee also wrote of her experiences in the USSR in her book, *Russian Journal*. Ms. Lee, not an exchange student herself, was married to a doctoral candidate in Russian history who studied at Moscow State University.

There have been no publications readily accessible recounting the experiences of Soviet exchanges in the United States. Discussions with Soviets and some of their sponsors do provide some insights into their experiences. Like their American counterparts, Soviet exchange persons have experiences of a great deal of human interest, but it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions that would fit into any set category of responses. Each experience is affected by such factors as location, the length of the exchange, the time of year, the state of relations between the two countries at the time, and the particular field involved.

The consideration that neither side wants to put its exchanges in an embarrassing position enters in. More problems may be solved by working behind the scenes, rather than by publishing a complete and public account of any difficulties encountered. The tacit aim is to make it easier for subsequent exchanges, rather than complicating them by publishing a complete and public account of any difficulties encountered, raising more barriers. In general, good experiences usually balance bad experiences. As one might expect, senior professors, such as those under CIES sponsorship, generally have more positive experiences than graduate students trying to conduct research to support their dissertations. A senior lecturer gets better

treatment from his host institution and will be housed in an apartment, whereas an exchange student will be assigned a dormitory room. The lecturer will be in a position to provide data and information, the researcher to acquire data. Thus, the experiences of the participants will differ substantially. For both Soviets and Americans, however, language and cultural problems will be plentiful.

Most Americans have difficulty understanding Soviet society and most Soviets have difficulty understanding American society. Nowhere is this more evident than in the initial experiences of those on their first exchanges. The Soviets, like the Americans, provide their exchangees with an orientation program before departure. This program continues at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC. As in most cross-cultural exchanges, language is a more difficult and complicated factor than might be imagined. Words are very poor instruments to convey thoughts, feelings, and ideas. Behind every word is a whole host of connotations and denotations, all of which stem from the cultural experience of the native speaker. Such meanings of words often are not in a dictionary. Perhaps that is why the first American English-Russian dictionary has only lately been published.³⁹

People do not communicate with words alone. Voice inflection, common cultural experiences, body language, and shared educational development also enter into communication. Thus, rather than only a simple language barrier to be mastered, there is also a cultural-communication barrier to overcome. Compounding the whole problem is the fact that most Soviets (and Europeans for that matter) study British English rather than American English.

Americans have their difficulties with the Russian language. Logan Robinson, in recounting some of his experiences, notes the problems that can be caused by voice inflection and pitch of a sentence:

It is quite possible for an American to speak grammatically perfect and even accent-free Russian and still be regularly misunderstood. When a native speaker of American English wants to ask a question, he slightly raises the pitch of his voice on the last syllable of the sentence. "Are you going *home*?" For a Russian, this pattern would reflect a command or a state of excitation. In a normal polite question, the Russian speaker raises his pitch in the middle of the sentence and then lets it drop down to neutral. "Are *you going* home?" This can

lead to some confusing situations. For example, the buses in Leningrad were crowded beyond belief. If you did not begin pushing toward the door three stops before your own, you were carried a mile out of the way before finally wiggling free. In making your assault on the door anything was fair play: shoving, squirming, shouting, pleading, cajoling, or insulting. Anything, that is, except pushing your way past someone else who was also trying to get off the bus. Standard procedure was to ask in a courteous tone, "You're getting off the bus?" Unfortunately, in that hot, crowded, swirling black hole that is the back of a Russian bus, if the hapless American delivered this interrogative with an American stress pattern, the sentence would not be understood as a courteous request but as an insistent command: "You're getting off the bus!"

This simple problem afflicts Russians who are trying to communicate in English. The tendency of Russians to drop the pitch at the end of a declaratory sentence has the effect of making English-speaking Russians seem rude and bored. Many a Russian Beriozka (hard currency store) clerk or *Intourist* guide whose "What do you want!" or "Where are you going!" is meant to be solicitous is thought instead to be rude. In stressing her English sentence as she would stress its Russian equivalent, she sounds to the American like a drill sergeant.⁴⁰

To begin to overcome this language barrier takes months; to overcome the language-cultural barrier takes much longer.

Both Americans and Soviets on exchange run into difficulties from simple ignorance and misunderstanding of the other side. This is a problem that, unfortunately, is not at all helped by Soviet censorship. Because the Soviets do not permit their citizens to obtain information about the United States, almost everything a Soviet citizen knows about America is filtered by Soviet propaganda. Constantly bombarded by news reports that reflect only what the ruling Communist party wants citizens to see about the United States, Soviet citizens have no other reliable source of information on which to form conclusions. Western radio broadcasts reach Soviet citizens in spite of the jamming done by the Soviet Government, but these news reports are also suspect. After all, these are governmental pronouncements too. The Soviets mistrust their own government and the news reports issued, so they conclude that the American Government deserves the same. As a result, a Soviet citizen suspects that he is not getting a complete story or that the story is distorted, but he has no alternate source to test and evaluate the information he is getting.

An interesting encounter that took place in the USSR demonstrates how erroneous conclusions occur. Two Soviet women asked an American if US citizens were issued internal passports like Soviet citizens. The American replied that US citizens were not given such internal passports. The Soviet questioner immediately replied, "I knew it, Americans are not allowed to travel in their own country."⁴¹

Just as Soviets are ignorant of conditions in the United States, Americans are ignorant of the Soviet Union, albeit for different reasons. For example, one Soviet researcher whom I met at Washington University in St. Louis was shocked at this ignorance of Americans and even embarrassed by it. He recalled that once at a party, he met an American who was surprised to find that the Soviet researcher would soon be returning to the Soviet Union. The American could not understand how anyone who had spent almost seven months in the United States and had seen such a wonderful country could return to a place like Russia. The Soviet by this time had become used to this point of view. Feeling a *chasm* of misunderstanding could not easily be bridged the researcher simply replied, "Well, it is my home and I have my work and family there." The reason for American ignorance of the USSR is not, of course, the result of a deliberate program of misinformation and propaganda on the part of the American Government. Rather, American ignorance is self-imposed. American citizens simply will not take the time to learn about Soviet Russia although many fine works about the USSR are readily available in any public library. The Soviet citizen can be excused for his misunderstanding, but the American cannot.

Another sharp contrast between the two societies highlighted by the exchange program is the ever present difficulty with bureaucracy and administration. The key differences, however, are in the almost complete openness of the American system. Soviet visitors are shocked to find that they can simply walk into any office, whether at their university or at a local government or business in the community where they live. Federal offices such as the US State Department are easily accessible. For example, Soviet exchange scholars in the United States are restricted to a radius of 25 miles around the community in which they reside (because Americans in the USSR have a similar restriction). To go beyond this limit for sightseeing or for a conference or meeting at another university requires permission. In case of short notice, the Soviet's American

sponsor can telephone the State Department in Washington and usually get a waiver. At the local level, Soviets are astonished to find they can just walk into a state or city municipal building to find the right clerk or official who can deal with a problem, explain the difficulty, and not only that, even go over that official's head to the next supervisory level and "raise Cain."

The very openness and abundance of American society also present Soviets with a bewildering array of choices to make. A supermarket is simply overwhelming. I once took a member of the Communist party who was visiting America for the first time into a Kroger store in Kansas. He was overwhelmed with the quantity of food there, to say nothing of the variety of choice. He could not understand why there were so many brand items of the same thing. He asked me, "Why are there five different brands of tomatoes? Aren't tomatoes tomatoes?"

The content of the movies and daily television fare was also a source of amazement to one of the Soviets I met while he was in the United States. He wanted to know how such things could be seen on TV, especially by small children. While not agreeing with the Soviet system of censorship, I had to admit that the point he made about American television was certainly worth considering.

For Americans in the USSR, difficulties with the bureaucratic system are high on the list of irritations. This is especially true the farther away an American is from Moscow or Leningrad. Even in the large cities and universities, however, many Americans encounter access problems to libraries and research materials. For example, the few copying machines at Soviet universities and institutes are tightly controlled and inaccessible to ordinary students. Americans are also surprised to find that the restrictions of Soviet society, even though expected, are more disturbing than can be anticipated. Unfortunately, informers and the KGB are a part of the reality encountered by Americans in the USSR. Both Andrea Lee and Logan Robinson mention the restrictions and the suspicion that they were under surveillance. When combined with the imperiousness of Soviet officialdom, there is a constant feeling of repression to which Americans are not at all accustomed. Andrea Lee writes:

Living in Russia, however, made me more of a patriot than I ever, ever expected to be. What I like about America is amazingly simple: that I can talk there without stopping to censor my thoughts, and that

I can wander freely without passport or identification, without concern for entering a *zapretnaya zona* (forbidden zone). Minor-sounding things, but they bear on the most important liberations in life: from confinement and fear. It's impossible to imagine Huck Finn and Nigger Jim floating down the Neva, the Volga, or the Moskva—difficult to think of a great Russian work that so directly celebrates freedom. The Russian book that I find closest in spirit to *Huckleberry Finn* is Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* and, as everyone knows, the novel is banned in the Soviet Union.⁴²

Certainly there is also a good side to exchanges. Ms. Catherine Cosman, now of the Helsinki Commission in Washington, DC, was the first exchangee to go to the All Union Institute of Cinematography in Moscow and was in the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. She remembers *there were problems* (such as the lack of copying machines mentioned earlier) and the difficulty of dealing with the pervasive degree of state control in everyday life. But she also noted the friendliness of the Soviet people once one got to know them. Perhaps as a reaction to this pervasive control, friendships among ordinary Soviet people mean more and relationships are much deeper than mere acquaintance and a surface friendship. Ms. Cosman states that it was even possible for friends to drop in on one another without notice, because personal friendships were both developed and cherished and considered to be so important.⁴³

Soviets visiting the United States seem to have a different view of friendship, but one that still supports this observation. Soviet visitors talk of a "friendliness" on the part of the Americans they have met. Americans are described as easygoing, more open, and interesting to talk to. One Soviet studying at Saint Louis University told me that he had trouble concentrating on his own work, because he was having too much fun and going to too many parties. He felt he should have been studying more and spending more time in the library. I asked him why he didn't do just that. He responded that the situation was a bit more complicated, since he felt it his duty to be available to answer questions about his country. He said one thing he would remember about his stay in American was that the Americans were easy to talk with and to be around but that it was difficult to make lasting friendships. I might add that Soviet exchangees to the United States are generally older and have been in their fields longer than US exchangees. This certainly affects their experiences.

The big advantage of the exchange programs is this opportunity to find out more about each other, so that we can begin to understand the real cultural differences that separate the two societies and can begin to appreciate the vastly different histories that contribute to these differences. Sometimes Americans make the naive assumption that if only communications could be increased between the two sides, both countries would solve their differences and live in peace. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Sometimes increased communication accentuates differences, rather than similarities. Andrea Lee provides the following account of an outing with a Soviet friend. The conversation took place while visiting the grounds and environs of Tsarskoye Selo, a former imperial palace:

We joked and ate. There was a cold drizzle falling outside, and we felt happy and warm inside the carriage, with the wet blue plaster palace outside the window and piles of dirty snow and lumber nearby. Tolya told a story about some old carriages he had seen in a Leningrad square, where a film crew was shooting one of Tolstoy's short novels. "There were some old women nearby, and they started to cry when they saw the tsar's carriage with its gold crowns. One *babushka* muttered, 'Oh, those dear old days!'"

I knew that Tolya himself thought of them as "dear old days." He is fascinated by the photographs and relics of tsarist times, and often speaks of his drop of noble blood, from one of his great-grandfathers. In the carriage, he stroked the door handle dreamily and gazed out at the palace.

He changed, we both changed, when we began the political dialogue about China and Russia and the United States which I've had with so many of my Russian friends.

"What do you think?" I asked.

Tolya said, "What I think is what I teach in my study group."

"What is that?"

"That there will be war. Inevitably. In the next decade." Tolya took off his glasses and looked at me shyly but intensely. "We young Russians live with that assumption now. We have to attack China before China develops too much nuclear strength. That will mean war with America. But we believe we can win."

Note. The excerpt text is from Andrea Lee's *Russian Journal* (New York: Random House, 1981). Copyrighted. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

We were both silent for a minute. "Do you really believe that?" I asked.

Tolya began to talk faster. There was something rattling and rhetorical in the terms he used, but his tone was sincere. "What you Americans don't realize is that we'll win because we're not afraid to sacrifice everything for winning. We lost twenty million people in the Second World War, but we beat the Germans. And that spirit of sacrifice still exists—the government has made sure to keep it alive in all of us. Mention the war, and people still weep and shake their fists. They grieve, but they're ready to do it again. We are ready, too, in our economic life. Everything—everything goes into the military. That's why life is so bad here."

"And so you will win."

"Yes, we will win, because, if you don't mind my saying so, America is decadent. I'm not saying this because I've been taught to; I'm speaking from my own perceptions. Your dollar is low, your reputation is low, and you don't seem to believe in anything any more. You're soft. And so we'll win, and I think it's very sad, because you have such a wonderful culture." He looked at me owlshly, out of breath.

There was silence, and then it was too absurd, and we both started to laugh. "Who will sell jeans to Russian black marketeers after America falls?" I asked.

We climbed out of the carriage and walked into the muddy park.

A bit later, in a costume museum in the park, we strolled through room after room of clothing from households of the tsar and the nobility. There were hussars' uniforms; coronation robes; Chinese silk dressing gowns; morning, afternoon, and evening dresses in styles arranging from crinoline to the lily-shaped Poirret *moderne*; immense cavalry helmets bearing double-headed eagles. The museum is remarkable for an especially poignant atmosphere, which springs, I suspect, from a lack of funds. The clothes are not shiny and perfectly restored, but have a faintly rumpled appearance, as if their owners had just stepped out of them and were standing by, invisible. For atmosphere, some inspired curator has added a short, scratchy tape of heartbreaking waltz music that plays over and over again.

The dreamy look returned to Tolya's eyes as we wandered through the exhibits. He was especially taken by an ivory embroidery box with enameled spools and thimbles. I came up behind him as he

stood staring at it, and whispered, "So, do you think there will be American museums like this after the great victory?"

He turned and looked at me. "I'm sorry," he said earnestly, "I didn't mean to offend you. But I do believe that what I say is true. For me, Americans are like these people." He gestured at the exhibit. "They cast a spell—oh, a wonderful spell—and they must inevitably die out."⁴⁴

This chilling conversation is a reminder that although the purpose of exchanges is to promote "mutual understanding," the road to such mutual understanding will be long and difficult.⁴⁵ Perhaps the best we can hope for at present is that both the USSR and the United States do not mutually die out in the spasm of a nuclear war. If mutual annihilation can be avoided, I would place bets on the strengths of the American system, just as a Soviet might place his bets on his perception of the strengths of his own system. In any event, the insights gained from a balanced exchange program can contribute to the survival of both the Soviet and American societies in spite of the enormous differences between the two countries.

In sum, exchanges are important and serve their purpose. Balance must always be a criterion. Instead of always bemoaning the fact that the USSR might gain more than the United States from an exchange, however, it is useful to consider just what actions our American side can take in maintaining a balanced exchange. For example, IREX officials have repeatedly pointed out that the US side is not encouraging enough scholars to pursue studies in the Soviet and Eastern European areas. In the words of the executive director of IREX:

There is no denying that the closed nature of Soviet society creates genuine, and to some extent probably irreducible, problems for American and other foreign researchers—just as it does for diplomats, journalists, and businessmen. These problems are to some extent inherent in the very contrast between our societies. But the reality is more complicated. We are convinced that appropriately trained Americans equipped with excellent linguistic skills, a strong sense of mission, and thorough familiarity with their research topics could obtain dramatically better access under existing circumstances. The present gap results not only from the Soviet recalcitrance but also from American manpower deficiencies. Given our present manpower pools, we are simply unable to place in the field a sufficiently large number of specialists working on current topics even to test the

practical limits of Soviet (and East European) resistance to objective inquiry. Until a critical mass of US specialists on the contemporary USSR can provide a match for well-funded and well-trained cadres of Soviet Americanist, the question of reciprocity is likely to remain only a desideratum that cannot be fully implemented. The exchange mechanism is in place; the human resources are not. Unless there are dramatic manpower improvements in the United States we shall continue to waste precious opportunities.⁴⁶

There is something we can do ourselves to keep a balanced exchange program, and this is simply to encourage more Americans to enter into academic programs that lead to specialization in Soviet studies. Congress has noted the lack of Soviet specialists in the United States and action will be taken to increase the numbers of American scholars and experts engaged in the serious study of the Soviet Union. The first Reagan-Gorbachev summit did provide for an increase in scholarly exchanges. A series of agreements signed at the conclusion at the summit meetings in Geneva will mean new scholarships for exchange students, expansion of the IREX program, CIES exchanges, and increased study of the English and Russian languages. Cooperation was renewed, in some old areas such as cancer research.⁴⁷ As in the past, however, these programs will be affected by the political relations between the two countries. Nonetheless, there is a working framework that provides for such exchanges. See appendix B for the complete text of the 1985 agreement.

6

A NICE PLACE TO VISIT . . .

“IT’S A NICE PLACE TO VISIT, but I wouldn’t want to live there.” Judging from the experiences of tourists, athletes, artists, and others, the familiar saying might be spoken by an *American* or a Soviet, although each is visiting for quite different reasons. Indeed, Americans and Soviets visit each other’s country for many reasons other than official academic or scientific exchanges and trade.

Is the USSR an interesting place to visit? Yes. Do many Americans go to the Soviet Union on a tour? Yes. Is such a tour worthwhile? Yes. Almost any American can visit the USSR as a tourist, although there are exceptions, of course. In some cases the Soviets do not grant a certain individual a tourist visa, but this is only in unusual cases. Normally, any ordinary American who wants to see the Soviet Union and who decides to spend his vacation time and money on such a visit can go.

For the Soviet citizen, a visit to America as an ordinary tourist is not possible. His or her Government is very careful about granting permission for a Soviet citizen to leave the country. This attitude, like the need for internal passports, is completely outside the realm of American experience. In the United States only a criminal or convict on parole has restricted movement.

The US Government generally does not care what part of the world an American visits, once a passport is obtained and necessary

immunization accomplished.¹ To get a passport, an American simply applies and pays the necessary fee. After a minimum of administration (photos, application, and proof of citizenship) and waiting time, the passport arrives. When that is done, the main decisions for Americans are how much money to spend, where to travel, and for how long.

In the Soviet Union, however, trips out of the country are not matters of personal desire, finance, and scheduling. Soviet citizens leave their country only for a purpose, such as contributions to the prestige of the USSR. Soviets in the performing arts and in sports competition and specialists such as industrial experts can usually leave the country. For special circumstances, the Soviet citizen who has contributed in some way to his country sometimes is then rewarded with travel abroad. So, only certain Soviet citizens are allowed to travel to the West and to the United States. Such travel is always by group with tour guides and security men, who ensure that the Soviet citizens have the "proper" experiences when in a foreign country such as America.

Because the Soviets are especially concerned about defections, only those who are considered politically reliable are allowed to leave the USSR. Soviets who leave their country for official reasons, either diplomatic, mercantile, or military, or to represent the USSR at an international event, are also in a special category. Generally, Soviets who are traveling in America should not be thought of as ordinary tourists. Soviet citizens just do not have the opportunity to travel for recreation or pleasure.

AMERICAN TOURISTS IN THE USSR

The Soviet Union has two agencies that handle tourists, Intourist and Sputnik. Anyone visiting the USSR must travel under the auspices of one of these agencies. Sputnik and Intourist both function for the same purpose—to handle all details of tourist travel in the Soviet Union. Sputnik, established in 1958, deals with younger tourists and has the official title of the International Youth Travel Bureau of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. A Sputnik tour has two advantages over Intourist. First, the cost may be a bit cheaper. Second, Sputnik offers tours and facilities closer to the

everyday experience of the Soviet people. Hotels booked by Sputnik, for example, are not the upper class hotels operated by Intourist. They are more spartan and do not have the amenities offered by the Intourist hotels. Sputnik hotel locations may be in areas away from tourist centers and attractions although Sputnik will still offer guided tours to traditional tourist attractions. I took a Sputnik-sponsored tour and found it superior to Intourist since it seemed closer to actual Soviet experiences. Sputnik tours are particularly useful to university students studying the USSR whose primary purpose for traveling to the Soviet Union is educational. This type of exposure to the culture, everyday life, and language of the Soviets is essential.

Intourist, the USSR Company for Foreign Travel, handles visitors who travel for recreation, pleasure, and culture as well for education. Intourist, like so many other things Soviet, has no parallel counterpart in the United States. Intourist does everything for a tourist. There are no other companies, agencies, travel offices, information bureaus, ticket agencies, reservation offices, or anything else in the entire country to cater to tourists and their needs. In America, no government department does the same thing for foreign visitors. Rather, privately owned travel companies and agencies handle arrangements for tourists.

Because Intourist handles everything from hotel bookings to travel arrangements, its brochures provide comprehensive information. These brochures are available from any travel agency dealing with tours to the USSR or by writing Intourist's office in New York. The Intourist office in New York does not, however, actually handle travel arrangements but only provides informational brochures. Specific arrangements are handled by travel agencies authorized by Intourist. These agencies are listed in the information Intourist sends out. Maps sent with Intourist brochures highlight the many tourist and historical attractions in the Soviet Union. The most striking facts to emerge from these brochures, however, must be inferred.

It is very difficult if not impossible just to take off and fly to visit the USSR as an individual. Intourist gears all its operations to handle groups, not individual travelers. Individual travel is rare and generally difficult to arrange:

To illustrate the problems that face would-be do-it-yourselfers, take the hypothetical but realistic case of a couple who decide to go on

their own. They want simply to catch a plane to Moscow and spend the next two weeks simply roaming around. They apply to the Soviet Consulate in Washington or San Francisco for a visa, and instead they get a shock.

They learn, in brief, that personalized tourist travel to the Soviet Union doesn't work that way. Obtaining a visa, for example, is a secondary matter. First they must decide exactly when they want to arrive in Moscow, by what transportation, and exactly when, how and from what city they propose to leave the country. They have to present a detailed itinerary, listing what cities (among those open for tourism by Americans) they want to visit and what category of hotels (first-class or deluxe) they prefer. They give this information and a deposit, perhaps \$100 to \$150 a person, to a travel agent authorized to represent Intourist, and the information is telexed for a fee (\$20, say) to Moscow.

If the couple's plans are acceptable, Intourist will confirm the itinerary, assuming that space is available. As soon as confirmation is received the couple must pay the balance of an itemized invoice, which includes the cost of all the land arrangements they have requested (prearranged sightseeing is optional) plus transfers to and from airports or railroad stations in all cities to be visited. Only then will the Soviet Consulate consider applications for visas.

The Soviet system clearly favors group travel. An American tour operator, either directly with you or through your travel agent, will advise on advance planning and provide the application forms needed. The operator will arrange everything, including visas.²

The Soviet Government (as the czarist Government before it) simply does not like the idea of foreigners running around the country unattended. Unattended foreigners can get into difficulties, such as sickness or accidents. Tourists can also be a security risk and might wander into or photograph areas considered vital to Soviet national defense, such as a railroad bridge. Finally, tourists might find things the Soviet Government prefers them not to see. This could be almost anything which reflects badly on the Soviet system or which causes embarrassment to the party or Government, such as the standard of living in a country village or something more specific such as the state of repair of buildings and roads. In major cities, however, most travel itineraries do allow time which is free. Visitors may go anywhere a taxi or public transportation will take them.

There is another reason for the lack of accommodation to individual travelers, and it goes deeper into Soviet society. In Soviet

(especially Russian) society, there is much less emphasis on the individual and more emphasis on the "collective." The *collective* cannot be confused with the *group*, for the meaning is more complex. For the Soviets, the collective, or "togetherness," is an expression of both individual and social life.³ Individuals achieve recognition through their contribution to the collective to which they belong. From the early school years and on, the collective shapes a Soviet citizen's life, and loyalty to the group becomes very important. The group provides meaning to social existence. Furthermore, the Communist party uses the collective, whether in the school, university, professional association, or factory, as an instrument of control. Where Americans are proud of their individuality and independence and admire belief in "standing on your own two feet" and not being a "sheep," the Soviets see virtuous behavior in conformity and group solidarity. The Soviets reward behavior that puts the good of the collective ahead of an individual's own good.

Academic Travel Abroad, Inc., is a Washington, DC, travel agency with long experience in travel to the Soviet Union. Their travel memo summarizes impressions of the impact of the collective in Soviet society on the American traveler:

While our history and contemporary society are based on the rights of the individual and the importance of individualism, in the USSR the emphasis is on the importance of the "collective," the group, and society as a whole. The common good is much more highly valued than individual desires. Individualism as we know it is not considered a positive value, particularly if it conflicts with the good of the "collective."

This priority will be apparent in many situations that you will encounter in the Soviet Union, but you will encounter it most personally in the attitude of your Soviet hosts towards your group. The constant emphasis on the group may lead you to the erroneous conclusion that you are being treated as a herd. Sometimes uninformed foreigners are tempted to rebel by straggling behind, arriving late, talking while the guide is explaining something, not appearing at planned events, asking provocative or potentially embarrassing questions. This kind of behavior will be perceived as a personal insult to your hosts and guides.⁴

The Soviet concern for order, closely connected to the idea of the common good, is expressed in the concept of the collective:

Closely connected to the high value placed on the common good is the concept of *porjadok*, which loosely translates as "order." *Porjadok* is the socially acceptable way of behaving in a given situation. For example, you will always have to check your coat when entering museums, restaurants, and theaters. (Be sure that your coat has a strong loop sewn in the back of the collar for this purpose.) It is considered ill-bred for men to sit with their legs spread or with their ankle resting on their knee, or for anyone to walk around outdoors in winter with his coat unbuttoned or without a hat. (It should be mentioned that the latter is also extremely foolish in that harsh Northern climate!) At any rate, if you do violate the *porjadok* of Soviet society do not be taken back when complete strangers come up to you and explain how you should behave.⁵

The concept of *porjadok* is not necessarily punitive in nature but can be an expression of concern as well. While at the cultural exposition in Moscow, I hopped aboard a small motorized train which transports visitors from one exhibit hall to the next. I suddenly felt someone tapping on my knee. It was one of the famous Russian grandmothers. Sitting opposite me, she had noticed that I had removed my hat. It was late March in Moscow and relatively warm; the temperature was hovering around 32°F, with a steady freezing drizzle falling from the gray overcast sky. The grandmother then raised her finger and told me, "This weather is very dangerous, since it is easy to contract a sickness." (An American would say cold or flu.) Therefore, I should put my hat back on to make sure I kept my head dry and warm. This admonishment was administered with a kind smile but was firm nonetheless. I immediately put my hat back on and thanked this elderly woman for her concern. I also told her I would not forget to keep my hat on when outdoors in the weather. She replied, "Very good, very good." Here I was in the heart of the Soviet capital, obviously a foreigner and equally obviously an American, and a kind old lady expressed concern about my health. This concern arose out of the idea of *porjadok*, but the grandmother was also genuinely concerned about my health. I asked myself if both countries might be better off if the grandmothers were in charge of foreign policy.

Another way to account for travelers that satisfies the Soviet requirement for order is the hotel card issued to each guest on checking in. The card serves two purposes. The first is practical. If the tourist is lost, the card is to be presented to any taxi driver, and he will get you back to the hotel. The card has the hotel name and

address on it as well as the room number. Americans without a knowledge of Russian find the Cyrillic characters incomprehensible. Thus, the card can be very valuable. An additional reason for the hotel card is control and security, i.e., porjadok. The card must be shown to the doorman to gain entrance to the hotel or to another hotel if you want to visit its souvenir shop. In some cases it is also needed to get the room key, but this depends on the hotel procedures.

Ordinary Soviet citizens are not admitted to hotels for foreign tourists unless they have a reason. So, if a doorman in a Soviet hotel is in doubt, he simply asks to see the hotel card of the person entering. My American roommate, for example, who was visiting the Soviet Union with our group, looked very "Russian." He also taught Russian and was fluent in the language. After he purchased his fur hat, he was virtually undistinguishable from a Soviet citizen. On several occasions his appearance, demeanor, and language raised considerable doubt about his identity. He, of course, rather enjoyed playing this part, within the bounds of reason and good judgment. When challenged for his hotel card, he would reply that he had business in the hotel. This caused brief periods of consternation for the doormen. They were not sure of exactly what to do. To challenge him might mean that they were interrupting someone who was indeed on official business, and they had no desire to risk embarrassment or reprimand from higher officials. They were still required, however, to remove any doubt because they could not risk letting someone in who was not supposed to enter. When the hotel card was presented, thus avoiding discomfort, it also satisfied the requirements of propriety and courtesy.

Once out of the hotel, virtually every waking moment while in the Soviet Union is spent with the tour group and the tour guides. One guide is usually furnished by the travel agency and one guide is also furnished by Intourist. At this point, the personality and preference of the traveler enter in. Older people may like to be well taken care of and to have fewer decisions to make about what they will see, and how they will get there. After all, that is what they pay the guides for. The more adventurous, on the other hand, may feel such arrangements are too restrictive. They will chafe under the arrangements that seem excessively organized. Intourist has tried to accommodate such feelings by providing some free time, usually in the afternoon. A tour will be scheduled after breakfast and then an evening performance or supper at a nice restaurant arranged. On at least

one day, nothing will be scheduled between noon and 6 p.m. This gives those who want time to explore on their own. The usual ground rules are that a tourist can go anywhere the public transportation system runs. For those who are adventurous and who brave the language problem (remember to take the hotel card in case you get lost), this can be an excellent opportunity to get out and meet the Soviet people. While somewhat distant and uncomfortable when faced with an American stranger, the Soviet citizens I have met have always been helpful and kind, especially when it came to directions. One time, I was even escorted to the proper autobus stop just to be sure I got on the bus bound for my destination. Indeed, one of the best experiences on a visit to the USSR is to see as many ordinary Soviet citizens as possible and learn what can be learned in such brief encounters. Yet these experiences are difficult to come by because of the Intourist system of handling foreign travelers. The people-to-people meetings arranged by Intourist or Sputnik as part of the tour itinerary include Soviets used to meeting foreigners. American travelers find these Soviets very well versed on the "excess" of the American system and the evils that result, as well as on outstanding qualities of the Soviet system and the progressive policies of the Soviet Communist party:

Americans, by contrast, are wont in meetings with Russians to establish their candor and break the ice with a little self-criticism—showing how they disagree with President Reagan, recognize the faults of our system and oppose meddling in El Salvador. They're usually disappointed when the Russians blithely own up to no faults at all. There's a story about that, in which an American tries to characterize freedom. "I can criticize Reagan," he tells a Russian. The Russian replies, "We're free, too; we can also criticize Reagan."⁶

If you can speak even rudimentary Russian, there are several kinds of Soviet citizens who will talk to you. First, those who have official reasons to do so, such as guides, ticket agents, and others who deal with tourism, will talk to tourists. Next, there are the grandmothers and children (the latter with permission of the parents or grandmothers, of course). Delightful conversations are possible here. Third, there are the "authorities," whom most tourists will want to avoid. Fourth, those Soviets who have a specific purpose in meeting Americans—such as in the people-to-people encounters already mentioned. And, there are Soviet citizens an American tourist might meet in casual encounters on the street or in public areas.

For the ordinary Soviet citizen, meeting an American in other than a chance encounter poses a dilemma—to report or not to report. Soviet civil law requires citizens to report meetings with foreigners. To report a meeting immediately raises questions as to why and what was discussed. There is a natural hesitation to avoid the complications involved with reporting such a meeting to Soviet police. But not to report a meeting also means that there could be an equally complicated encounter with the police, who could ask why the meeting was not reported as required by law. Thus, a Soviet citizen might be caught either way—by reporting or by not reporting. This is why in encounters, ordinary Soviets may seem somewhat distant although in most cases not unfriendly. For a tourist who is in the USSR for a short period of time, the real warmth and depth of friendships possible with Soviet citizens have no time to develop.

Americans find it is easy to get to the USSR and need only set a time and select the itinerary that fits their vacation budgets. There are many agencies that work with Intourist or Sputnik and virtually all other travel agencies have access to agencies that specialize in travel to the Soviet Union.⁷ As in most things, the agencies that have long and direct experience and specialization are the best to work with. When visiting the Soviet Union, many things can cause inconvenience for first-time travelers (or repeat travelers, for that matter). For example, the visa form must be filled out very carefully, since the Soviet Embassy will reject a form improperly filled out. For this reason, many agencies fill out the form themselves to avoid delays in processing.

Rules for photographing while in the country, what to wear and bring, requirements for currency exchange, use of credit cards, health requirements, and general rules of behavior are all important to know before a trip to the Soviet Union. Much patience and understanding is required in visits to the Soviet Union. Indeed, if an American has not traveled abroad, a visit to the USSR can be a real culture shock. But having said this, virtually anyone who has been to the Soviet Union does not at all regret the effort needed to get there in the first place. The experiences, places seen, and even the inconveniences inevitably blend into a worthwhile trip. I have never talked to anyone who has returned from the USSR who has not benefited from the experience. For most, the reaction is something like, "Well, I had heard of this before, but I really did not fully realize or understand it; I actually saw it."

Regarding American tourists in the USSR, the problem of the black market and meetings with "refusniks" and dissidents must also be addressed. Indeed, these people can count as the sixth group of Soviet citizens who will talk with visiting Americans. Americans who travel in the Soviet Union are not likely to have difficulties with the authorities, especially if they stay with the tour group and behave according to the rules and recommendations of the experienced tour guides. However, to get involved with any black market dealings or with any Soviet citizens who might be in trouble with the Soviet Government is to invite problems. The black market is especially troublesome, because American tourists can be approached directly and asked to sell something, to exchange money, or to trade one item, such as a pair of blue jeans, for another item, such as a military insignia device. Most of the time minor transactions occur without difficulty. Many American tourists proudly show a Soviet Army or Navy cap insignia, for example, but to trade or exchange rubles for dollars with a stranger on the street is a clear-cut violation of Soviet law and consequences include arrest, spending time in jail, and even a criminal trial. Meeting with Soviet citizens who are considered dissidents and refusniks (a person who has been refused permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union) can also get an American into difficulty. Soviet authorities do not have to state reasons why a foreigner is being expelled. There is no "due process of law" there. In addition, the American Embassy's ability to intervene is limited. Two American tourists were expelled from the USSR in February 1984, for example. The Soviet press agency TASS said that the Americans had violated customs rules and the warnings of Soviet authorities. According to TASS:

The incident with the American tourists is bound to serve as a lesson to those who, on coming to the USSR, as guests, intended to carry out assignments for foreign Zionist centers.⁸

Most Americans are also surprised by surveillance in the USSR. Some of this is relatively benign. For example, the tour schedule itself can be a way to keep foreigners under control, and it ensures that the authorities know where the Americans are at most times. There are, however, other means of surveillance that are more direct. Tour groups will be shadowed, and rooms can always be bugged. If an American chooses to disregard advice and common sense or to engage in behavior that is risky, trouble will not be far behind. Soviet authorities are careful to point out that if someone

asks for trouble, he will surely get it.⁹ Most American tourists who visit the USSR, however, are never troubled by surveillance or get into any difficulty.

SOVIET VISITORS COMING TO THE UNITED STATES

Most Soviet visitors to the United States travel in groups and are members of a "delegation." Arrangements begin with obtaining permission from the Soviet Government to visit the United States. For higher ranking Soviet officials, the Soviet Government may ask them to be a part of the delegation. In fact, Soviet parliamentarians and American Congressmen have exchanged visits. The Soviet delegation that had to cut short its visit due to the death of Konstantin Chernenko was headed by Vladimir Shcherbitsky. House Speaker Tip O'Neill headed the US delegation. These visits took place in the first half of 1985.¹⁰ In this way, such Soviet visitors actually become representatives of their country. The Soviet Union makes its own arrangements for Soviets on Aeroflot. From 1982 to 1986, Aeroflot was not allowed to operate in the United States. However, Pan American and Aeroflot renegotiated an older agreement, and flights between Moscow, New York, and Washington resumed in April of 1986. Pan Am will also operate a connecting flight to Leningrad through Frankfurt. Aeroflot also flies into Montreal, Canada. Soviet visitors may get connecting flights to the United States through that city. The Soviets also have arrangements with Finnair and Scandinavian Airlines.

Intourist in New York contracts with travel agencies in the United States to make reservations and arrange tours for Soviet travelers in America. Since there is no equivalent of Intourist in the United States, the Soviets actually seek bids and arrange contracts with travel companies and agencies that provide the desired service at the right price. These companies offer standard services for tour groups, such as hotel bookings, travel arrangements, sightseeing tours, and so forth. Of course, time is worked into the travel schedule for visits to private manufacturing plants, peace groups, civic associations, women's organizations, sports associations, US Government agencies and offices, and various kinds of societies and special associations. The invitation to visit the United States is usually the result of some kind of reciprocal arrangement. An American

visiting the USSR may extend an invitation to a Soviet to visit the United States, for example. As a result, most Soviets in this country are not simply tourists.¹¹ There is a semi-official or official reason for the travel, but while in America, Soviet visitors and delegations engage in a lot of sightseeing that goes along with the official or semi-official business.

Soviet delegations may be frequently only four to six people. In contrast, Americans usually travel to the USSR in a group of 16 to 20 people and may join up with another group in the USSR to make a total of 30 to 40 or so. Travel in America is by air, except in the Boston-Washington corridor where Amtrak can be used. One difference between the United States and USSR is that the United States has very few long distance passenger trains, but a limited stay here is better served by air anyway because the travel is quicker. Travel in the USSR is also usually done by air, but train travel is more adventurous. A private US group called Friendship Force, based in Atlanta, Georgia, works to encourage visits to both countries. Their goal is to increase mutual understanding.¹²

For Soviet citizens, considerable prestige comes with permission to travel abroad, especially to America. Only trusted Soviet citizens are allowed such travel. Thus, any American who meets a Soviet traveler in the United States can be sure that he is not running into just "anyone" from the Soviet Union who has decided to take a vacation trip to America. That is a very important difference between the two countries. A Soviet citizen at home has a remote chance to see an ordinary American who has decided to visit the Soviet Union just to see what the place is really like. If an American citizen meets a Soviet citizen visiting the United States, he knows that the Soviets have screened and carefully selected that citizen to travel abroad. Perhaps this is part of why many more Americans visit the Soviet Union than Soviets visit the United States.

The peak year for US visitors to the Soviet Union was 1979, when about 57,000 Americans visited. In 1982, this number declined to 32,000 tourists and 6,000 businessmen. (Total foreign visitors to the USSR number about 5 million a year.)¹³ State Department Visa Office figures (table 14) show the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued to citizens of the USSR.

The figures in table 14 for nonimmigrant visas include those issued to all types of Soviet travelers to the United States, including

TABLE 14.
US Visas Issued to Citizens of the USSR

	<i>Immigrant</i>	<i>Nonimmigrant</i>
1970	497	5,877
1971	414	5,946
1972	451	6,344
1973	369	8,565
1974	539	10,301
1975	1,745	unavailable
1976	2,460	11,960
1977	1,288	8,347
1978	487	12,124
1979	474	13,836
1980	168	9,809
1981	385	8,323
1982	696	7,807
1983	352	8,018
1984	427	6,035
1985	413	7,611

Source: US, Department of State.

correspondents, members of delegations, UN personnel, diplomats, and athletes, not just "tourists."¹⁴ The peak year was 1979, but the 13,836 figure does not come near matching the peak of Americans visiting the Soviet Union—57,000 in 1979.

Assertions sometimes appear, stating that the American Government will not allow certain Soviet citizens into the United States and that is why the number of Soviet visitors is so low. This is not true. The main reason why more Soviets do not visit here is the policy of the Soviet Government, not the US Government. It is true, though, that the Department of State is required by law to withhold visas from certain Soviet citizens: trade union officials, members of the World Peace Committee, and members of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the USSR.¹⁵ The Department of State also denies visas to Soviets with ties to Soviet intelligence services. For example, the Department of State, for reasons of "internal security," denied a

visa to Mr. Oleg Yermishkin, a Soviet official working on the Olympic Committee for the 1984 games in Los Angeles.¹⁶ The public announcement came in March, but officials at the State Department earlier had told Soviet officials privately that Mr. Yermishkin would not get his visa. Soviet officials apparently decided to make the matter public knowledge. They went ahead with the nomination and made it a minor *cause celebre*, a decision calculated to generate criticism of State Department officials. In fact, members of the US Olympic Committee accused the State Department of trying to cause "difficulty" at the last minute. This was not the case at all, and the State Department quickly pointed out that it had been working with Soviet officials for some time to resolve the matter quietly. But this State Department announcement never was given prominence in the media, which provided only after-the-fact coverage. The Soviet Union took calculated advantage of this media lapse to make it appear that American officials were the ones causing last-minute difficulties. This incident also demonstrated that good communication and understanding are not always the goal in relations between states and that there are other motives which enter into consideration. This particular case preceded the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. In any event, the United States does not routinely turn down visa applications from Soviet citizens. In fact, a number of American officials would like to see more Soviet tourists, provided that these Soviet citizens really are tourists. The more the Soviet citizens learn of the American system and American society, the more opportunities they have to form a free opinion of the United States.

TOURISM, COMMUNICATION, AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

It would be easy to explain the Soviet-American communication difficulties in terms of a mirror image.¹⁷ That concept means projecting one's own values and behaviors onto the other party and expecting their reaction to mirror yours in similar situations. However, American and Soviet societies are too complex and too diverse for such a simplistic explanation. Soviets in the United States or Americans in the Soviet Union interpret what they see on the basis of their own experiences and educations, both acquired

within their own families, societies, and cultural settings. Americans in the USSR have difficulties, which at first do not seem so evident. With Soviets, especially those visiting the United States for the first time, there is obvious difficulty in trying to make sense of what they see. No valid statistical data support this assertion, but I make it after talking with Soviet visitors and with Americans who have escorted Soviet groups. The Soviets simply are not prepared for what they encounter in America. A partial explanation is that they have no chance really to become acquainted with America because their Government carefully manages the news and information about the United States. They are familiar with only the difficulties and problems of American society.

Soviets are also warned they could be "trapped" by American intelligence agents and should be very careful and not travel alone anywhere. Ironically, there is preparation for the material plenty of the United States because most Soviets who go to the West carry shopping lists of things to buy for their friends back home. What and how much is determined by availability and the exchange rate at the time. Some Japanese audio equipment might be cheaper to obtain in Moscow, for example, than in America. What sometimes is difficult for the Soviet first-time visitor is ordinary American life.

Automobile traffic and rush hour congestion are good examples. Traffic is also a problem in larger Soviet cities, but traffic there is mainly commercial traffic, streets jammed with trucks, delivery vehicles, public transportation vehicles (streetcars, buses, taxis, and trolley buses), as well as increasing numbers of private automobiles. But in the United States, however, the main problem is the private auto that dominates roads around shopping centers, downtown districts, and major arteries.

One particular incident demonstrates the problem of integrating what Soviet visitors observe into their own experience and expectations. While entering the grounds of a major automobile plant in Kansas City, members of a Soviet group could not help noticing the acres of parking lots filled with private cars. They wanted to know if the cars they saw were manufactured by the plant. The answer was, "No, these cars belong to the workers here at the plant. You will see the cars manufactured by the plant on the other side of the building." One senior member of the delegation did not accept this and responded that this answer was not true, because everyone

knows that workers in America are poorly paid and cannot afford automobiles. Upon hearing this, we Americans escorting the Soviet group told them that the plant would change shifts, and they could see for themselves who came out of the factory to drive the cars. Having said this, the plant tour representative was asked to arrange the tour so that the Soviet delegation could be outside to see the workers leaving for home.

Later the entire delegation assembled at a window overlooking the parking lot. What the Soviets saw was a huge traffic jam, with the typical traffic gridlock Americans have come to abhor. Also visible were a few buses. The same Soviet who earlier had said that the American workers could not afford private cars now said that such a situation was typical to all American factories. Traffic jams, he said, were the result of the neglect shown to the workers by the American Government. Mass transportation is not provided and, he continued, the workers are forced to drive their individual automobiles to and from work, wasting time in traffic jams such as the one being witnessed. Such a state of affairs was also damaging their health.

Almost immediately after the Soviet had said this to the members of his delegation, there was a minor accident on one of the expressway ramps resulting in the usual complement of police and fire vehicles, which only added to the congestion. This, too, the confused delegation witnessed. First they had been told that the workers could not afford to own automobiles. Then they learned that, in fact, the workers did own automobiles, but because of private ownership, mass transit was not available and traffic jams, inconvenience, and accidents were the result.

Some of the members asked us why Americans put up with these traffic jams. We told them that most Americans preferred to own their own cars because it gave them more mobility and freedom. The answer confused the delegation even more. Some felt that it was a good thing that Soviet citizens had to wait so long before they could purchase their own automobiles. Others said maybe so, but the Soviet Government was trying to keep up with the obvious consumer demand for more automobiles and that most Soviet citizens would probably prefer the state of affairs just witnessed to the long wait for a car in the USSR. This debate continued on and off throughout the rest of the tour.

The incident at the auto plant demonstrates the difficulty that Soviets have in trying to understand a very ordinary aspect of American life. It demonstrates how *difficult communication and understanding* between the two societies can be. Just sitting down and talking over problems does not bridge the tremendous sociological and cultural gap that separates the two countries. This Soviet group saw firsthand something an ordinary American takes for granted. Yet, to understand what they saw, the Soviets had no response in terms of their own experience and value system. They had to account for obvious inconsistencies in what they had been told, what they had expected, and what they had actually seen. The reaction of each, while different, at the same time was not all what we Americans traveling with them had hoped for or completely expected.

I brought up the incident in a later discussion. One Soviet told me that he simply did not know what to make of it. He now knew the workers in America were much better off than he had been led to believe, but he did not know whether the Soviet Government was misrepresenting the true conditions of American workers. He said perhaps his country and people were *not suited to private automobiles* and that such a system would never work in the USSR the way it does in the United States. He found it all very confusing.

Such problems in communication and understanding are the rule, not the exception. In 1983, five Soviet women were sponsored on a nine-day visit to the United States by an American organization called Women and Foundations Corporate Philanthropy. The Soviet women were members of the Soviet Government. Their tour took them from subways to meetings with academics and included a visit to a school. One of the 10-year-olds the women talked with said, "The Soviet Union to me means missiles." This upset Mrs. Natalia Yeliseyeva, the Deputy Mayor of Leningrad. Mrs. Yeliseyeva recalled, "It was upsetting to me because it seemed somebody was drilling into the heads of American children myths about the Soviet Union."¹⁸

She commented further that knowledge about the Soviet Union was not readily available and that American schools did not give enough attention to Soviet history, geography, and culture. During their visit, the Soviet women also had to deal with questions about the downing of the Korean airliner by Soviet interceptors. This caused even more difficulties. Mrs. Yeliseyeva, who became ill

during the trip, said that the journey was difficult. The visit of Mrs. Yeliseyeva and her reaction indicate that problems of communication and understanding are far more difficult to overcome than most people believe. The hope on the part of some Americans that if we could only "communicate better with the Soviets, everything would work out" is naive.

Mrs. Yeliseyeva was right in pointing out that Americans are not well informed about the USSR. She would also have been right if she had pointed out how little Soviet citizens know about the United States.¹⁹ Perhaps the benefit of trips to each country is the demonstration of how far apart we are in even beginning to understand each other. Even once some understanding is achieved, however, there is no guarantee that the countries will get along better. Along with improved understanding might come the realization of how far apart and how contentious US-USSR foreign policy goals are. At least, better understanding might help both countries to manage their differences and reduce the chances for a nuclear exchange. To this end, tourism may help both the Soviet and American people; however in addition to tourism, there are other means available to a nation to display its culture.

ART AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES

On 11 April 1972, in Moscow, the United States and the USSR signed an agreement on cultural exchange. This agreement expired in 1979 and was not renewed, though a number of its provisions have continued. For example, academic and research exchanges, discussed in chapter 5, have continued although at a drastically slower pace. There also have been exchanges in science and technology, education, irrigation, and public health. However, the area most affected by the lack of any renewal agreement has been the performing arts. In the words of the original agreement:

The parties agree to encourage and support, on a reciprocal basis, appearances of theatrical, musical, choral and choreographic groups, orchestras and individual performers.

[The language of the agreement gets more specific:]

The parties agree to provide for reciprocal exchanges and visits of writers, composers, musicologists, playwrights, theater directors.

artists, architects, art historians, museum specialists in various fields of law and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with their respective fields and to participate in meetings and symposia.²⁰

Also included were representatives of municipal and State governments and members of civic and social organizations, including youth and women's organizations. Again, some of these latter kinds of exchanges have continued but only at a reduced level. A new exchange initiative was signed in November 1985. (See appendix B.) Article III deals with arts and culture.

The Soviets have difficulties with the exchange of performing groups and individuals. Within the USSR, for example, American performances are not open to just any Soviet citizen. The distribution of tickets is carefully controlled. The Soviets allowed in are usually members of the ruling elite or their children because in order to get a ticket, a Soviet citizen has to have the right connections. As for performance of Soviet groups in America, the Soviets have a serious problem—defections. There is a joke told in the USSR, also widely known in the United States. Its versions are numerous, but the basic one is as follows:

Question: "What is a Soviet musical quartet?"

Answer: "Three musicians who have returned from the West."

While this story may be amusing to ordinary members of Soviet society, Soviet officials are not chuckling. In fact, defections by individual artists are a public problem because such defections gain prominence in the American media and because the defectors, who are talented artists, continue their work in the public limelight. In the United States alone, a number of defectors are now "superstars" and are known to the American general public. There are many more artists who, while not known to the general public, are well known in their particular fields.²¹ These former Soviet citizens are a continuing embarrassment to the Soviet Union. The desire to avoid any more defections and the embarrassment that goes with a Soviet artist taking up residence in the United States are part of the reason why the cultural agreement has not been renewed. The Soviets have tried to get a provision in a new agreement that would provide for the return of any artist or performer who defects. Predictably, such a provision has not been acceptable to the United States. The Americans have refused to agree to any exchange that would

contain such a clause or provision. The 1986 summit between Reagan and Gorbachev did, however, result in a new agreement which will renew the cultural exchanges. The Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet will tour select US cities, and American groups will go the USSR. The performance of Vladimir Horowitz in the Soviet Union was televised worldwide in April of 1986.

One advantage held by Soviet performers is that Soviet groups can be invited to perform in America by a private American society or organization. With such sponsorship, there have been Soviet groups entering the United States and performing on a limited basis. Once the performer or the performing group has received its private invitation, the State Department issues a visa and the group comes over under the auspices of the private American sponsor. Such was the case in mid-1985, when Soviet poets Yevgeni Yevtushenke and Andrei Voznesensky visited.²² The Moscow Circus performed here also under private sponsorship. When Aeroflot service was suspended, the US press ran stories about how the Soviet circus might be "stranded" in America. This certainly was not the case; the performers could have departed in any number of ways if they wished. As it was, the circus group went up to Montreal (Aeroflot service to Canada was suspended only two weeks) and got a flight home on their country's airline.

The situation in the Soviet Union is far different, however. There are no private Soviet groups that can, on their own, reach out and arrange for American performers to visit the Soviet Union. As a result few American artists have recently visited the USSR to perform. Occasionally, the US Ambassador sponsors American performers. Performances then take place at the Embassy or the Ambassador's Moscow residence, with special invitations issued. Because the total numbers of people who can attend is limited, such events are mainly symbolic. Recently, however, even these performances have come under official Soviet review. In mid-1985, the Soviet Government refused to grant a visa to some American artists who were to have been guests of the Ambassador. The action signals Soviet irritation over the practice.²³ American artists have no alternative way to perform in the USSR, except with the approval of the Soviet Government.

PRIVATE CONTACTS

The Soviets are also at an advantage in terms of other private contacts. Americans on their own can initiate contact with the Soviet Government, and private and local governmental groups can contact the Soviet Embassy or write an organization in the USSR without ever going to the State Department. Soviet groups do not have the freedom to bypass their Foreign Ministry. Americans who establish contact with Soviets along private channels generally do so in a spirit of good will and intend to do something to improve US-USSR relations. Altruistically motivated, these Americans feel that if there were more of an attempt to reach out to the Soviet people, the Soviets could not help but respond. After all, they reason, the Soviets are people too and something must be done to make the world safer for the citizens of both countries.

The Ground Zero Pairing Project headquartered in Portland, Oregon, an example of a group initiating its own channels, encourages contact between American and Soviet cities. This project has sent invitational brochures from hundreds of US cities to a "sister city" in the USSR. Under the auspices of the project, representatives from the American city of Gainesville, Florida, delivered their informational packet in person during a visit to the Soviet Union. The town of Knoxville, Iowa, sent its package to the Soviet city of Cherkassk. Manassas, Virginia, also has sent a package. A number of groups, including the American Association of University Women, have opened contact with the Soviet Women's Committee and have discussed areas of common concern, such as the status of women in the work force, day care and child care centers for working mothers, and the overall status of women in society.²⁴

Many members of antinuclear war groups, religious groups, and peace groups can also, by their own contacts, work with Soviet officials. These groups are by no means subversive or disloyal American citizens; they feel strongly about their efforts to bring about a reduction of tension between the United States and the USSR. Prestigious organizations are among those involved in such efforts. The Carnegie Foundation, for instance, has searched for ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war and has approved a multi-million dollar program to get talented experts in a wide range of fields to study this problem.

One aspect of the Carnegie effort promotes visits, exchanges, or articles between Soviet and American experts. In 1983, the Carnegie Board agreed to devote five to seven million dollars in funds. Of this, a major grant of \$494,000 was made to Harvard University for research and education to avoid nuclear war. Harvard scheduled an exchange of visits with Soviet experts.²⁵ Unlike counterpart officials in educational institutions in the Soviet Union, Harvard officials working under this grant can contact Soviet organizations directly, such as the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. Harvard officials can also apply for a Soviet visa and arrange a visit through the travel service of their choice. The US State Department does not have to be involved.

The Soviets have become increasingly responsive to overtures from nongovernmental American groups. Dr. Yevgeny Chazov is a member of the Soviet Communist party (and a member of the Central Committee, winner of multiple Lenin prizes, and a recognized cardiologist, as well as a Hero of Socialist Labor). He also serves as co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a Boston-based organization with affiliates in 37 countries.²⁶ Chazov, like other Soviets abroad, does not deviate from the official Soviet line on any issues, but he is typical of the younger officials the Soviet Union has educated to deal with Americans in particular and the West in general:

[Chazov is] one of the highest-ranking Soviet officials to be involved in antinuclear effort. . . . he is primarily a physician rather than a propagandist, and thus carries more credibility in the West. (He was former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's personal physician, and is believed to have been on the team of physicians that cared for the late Yuri Andropov.) He refrains from the invective that characterizes so many of Moscow's comments about Washington.²⁷

Soviets like Chazov are well prepared for meetings with American counterparts. Their American English is excellent, their knowledge of America is far better than that of the average Soviet visitor. They easily mingle with Americans without any apprehension or misgivings about how their performance will be interpreted back home. Being members of the Soviet ruling elite, they are in very good positions to represent the views of their country. Americans who meet with them believe that ruling elite membership also means that Soviets like Chazov can influence Soviet decisions about relations with the United States and help contribute to reducing the risk of a

nuclear exchange between the two countries. For whatever purpose, Chazov has pointed out in roundtable discussion of the effects and dangers of a nuclear exchange that US private citizens can have access to Soviet TV without censorship from Soviet authorities. There is some truth to his statement. Regarding Chazov's statements, the Soviet authorities probably had no fear that there would be any undue influence on the Soviet population and probably wanted to have the Soviet population exposed to the very points the Americans were making. The impact of the 1986 Soviet nuclear disaster at Chernobyl will affect future televised discussions. The Soviets did not do themselves any favor with their initial handling of the incident. Later, the Soviets were remarkably open about the disaster, even admitting human error was a major factor. Such openness (*glasnost*) appears to be an important aspect in Gorbachev's leadership style.



Dr. Yevgeny Chazov, articulate and active, typifies the younger Soviet officials. Above, Chazov (left) and Dr. Bernard Lown, leaders of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, receive a Nobel Peace Prize for their Boston-based organization in 1985. Copyrighted, AP/Wide World Photos.

The process of getting permission to enter or leave the USSR engages one with Soviet bureaucracy. A Soviet citizen obtains his visa to the United States through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The staff of the Ministry then sends the necessary forms to the American Embassy located on Tchaikovsky Street. The US Consulate staff then processes the visa applications and returns them to the Foreign Ministry. Sometimes the Ministry bureaucracy will delay in sending the visa application over to the American Consulate or delay sending the notice back to the Soviets who will be visiting the United States. This causes US sponsors to complain. The State Department bears the brunt of any dissatisfaction from Americans wondering why their Soviet guest "is having trouble" in getting his visit to the United States arranged. Normally, once a visa application gets into US channels, it takes only 24 hours to get approval, and approval can even come by telephone if there is a problem with short notice. The Soviet Foreign Ministry usually does not work by phone on short notice and takes more time to process applications. Sometimes the Ministry does run behind, a situation not unknown in American bureaucracy, but there is also the opportunity for manipulation. The Ministry can delay applications by design in order to suit its own purposes.

ON THE PLAYING FIELD

By far, the exchange program most Americans are familiar with is the exchange of American and Soviet athletes and teams. Hockey is probably the most well known of the sports exchanges. Thousands of Americans have seen games between the Soviet hockey team and various National Hockey League (NHL) teams. The games usually engender debate over whether the Soviets are capable of playing in the NHL beside the pros. The record suggests that the Russian team is capable. The Soviet hockey team has visited American cities, playing many exhibition games with NHL teams, and has an impressive overall win-loss record. After hockey, basketball is the next best known sport. The Soviets have sent their basketball team to play American teams from colleges and universities. In addition to hockey and basketball, the Soviets send their athletes to participate in other sports events:

acrobatics	gymnastics
boxing	judo
canoeing	skating
chess	skiing
equestrian events	soccer
fencing	swimming

If there was one area that could be said to be not affected by events in Poland and Afghanistan or by the downing of the Korean airliner, it would be sports. Just prior to the Soviet announcement that USSR athletes would have been in too great danger while at the Olympic Games to participate, there were over 200 Soviet athletes competing without incident in various events in the United States

Soviet athletes can be invited by private groups and tournament officials in the United States and do not have to be invited by the US Government. Many amateur and professional associations invite Soviet athletes because it usually adds to the event's prestige to have Soviet and other international athletes competing. For example, Soviet athletes have been invited to the *Virginia Slims Tournament*, the *Bud Light Invitational*, and to many track and field events sponsored by American track and field associations and athletic congresses. Major world-level events and invitationals held in the United States also have Soviet participation.

Soviet Olympic world-class athletes are well treated by their American hosts who try to provide for the Soviet team members' needs. Occasionally, there are problems. The problems do not result from any animosity nor do they arise out of political tensions between the two countries, but rather, they come from poor planning and misdirection. At Lake Placid, for example, a number of complaints emanated from the Soviet team, that their rooms were too small. This complaint was legitimate; the facilities were designed that way. In another case, at the US Olympic Invitational held in the New Jersey Meadowlands, four of seven Soviet contestants were not able to compete because transportation failed to pick them up in Manhattan. The American meet director Ray Lumpp said, "I can't believe that we can bring these athletes halfway around the world but we can't get them to the arena on time. I apologize. . . ." ²⁸ Buses to transport the Soviet team did not show up. Only one Soviet spoke English, and he had trouble arranging cabs, so the Soviet delegation

arrived late. Americans also have had such problems in the Soviet Union. Neither country is immune from "confusion and misdirection."

Some differences in American and Soviet society are reflected in sports. To the Soviet Union, sports are one way to demonstrate the superiority of the Socialist system, and the Soviets make no "bones" about it. To them, winning competitions demonstrates the superiority of their society under the leadership of its Communist party. Soviet teams are very closely attended by security men. This is as much for external disruptions as anything else. In the USSR, athletes are very well treated, and athletic competition is not as susceptible to the defections that worry Soviet authorities about the performing arts. The goal of the Soviet athlete is the same as the goal of his own country—to win. There is no problem with artistic expression and individual creative needs coming in conflict with the needs of the Soviet State, and they do win. At the 1984 winter Olympic Games, the Soviet team dominated the events and won the most medals, with their only real competition coming from the East Germans. The emphasis on winning is also reflected in the attitude of Soviet coaches, who keep their team members apart from other contestants and concentrate on training, practice, and strategy. Distractions are simply not allowed.* Americans, of course, like to win, but the level of determination, resources, and singular organizational effort of the Soviets has yet to be seen on the US side. American world competitors work very hard as individuals and enjoy the fun of competing and winning in international competition, but most do not live the spartan lives of Soviet athletes who train year around under the tutelage of a system run by their own government. American triumphs are celebrated as triumphs of individual young Americans who demonstrated talent and who earned a medal as the fruit of hard work and determination to succeed. Soviet triumphs are celebrated as victories of and for the Socialist system.²⁹ Sports events and competition can be relatively free of the ideological and political trappings of the two countries at least on the

*Because of this desire to compete and win in world events, the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics surprised many American officials and Sovietologists. The boycott demonstrated the degree to which the Soviets were offended by President Carter's Olympic boycott.

playing field and as competition occurs between individual athletes, but frequently the contrary is also true. American and Soviet boycotts of each other's Olympic Games are examples of the dominance of politics.³⁰

MILITARY EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS

Although not the subject of very much public discussion, American and Soviet military personnel have had years of experience with exchanges. During World War II, Soviet soldiers and officers trained in the United States, for example, in Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. American officers also went to the Soviet Union to serve as liaison officers to the Soviet forces. Though the post-World War II occupation of Germany is formally over everywhere except in Berlin, the Soviets and the Americans still have military liaison missions in both Germanies. The members of these military missions have the right to travel throughout either country. An organizational headquarters near Strasbourg, France, is the coordinating agency for the Allied powers and still has American and Soviet (as well as British and French) participation. The long-standing mutual coordination has not prevented grave incidents, however.

Maj. Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., was killed by a Soviet guard in East Germany; his shooting death has been called inexcusable.³¹ At the time, the US Government had begun making a series of proposals trying to improve relations with the USSR. These proposals built upon overtures and agreements and included a joint manned space mission, increasing the number of observers at military field exercises, and a military hotline between the two countries. Then a Soviet guard shot and killed Major Nicholson, a liaison officer to the Commander of the Soviet Forces in Germany.

There were the usual excuses for such Soviet behavior, some given by Westerners. A few said it was an accident. Others said that such behavior is to be expected of the Soviets and their system and dismissed the incident. Still others, not knowing of the situation and arrangements that have existed since the end of World War II among the occupying powers, thought that Major Nicholson was a spy. All of these explanations are wrong or ring hollow. Even more tragic is the fact that Soviet military officers prevented Major Nicholson from receiving emergency medical care that might have

saved his life. Because of training and a background that uniquely qualified him to serve in the capacity of an exchange officer, Major Nicholson would have been an excellent choice to serve on a joint American-Soviet team seeking ways to lessen the tension between the two countries. His shooting death underscores the difficulty of dealing with the Soviets and should be remembered by those who constantly blame only the American side for the poor state of relations between the nations.

There is a source of officers who might serve on joint teams aimed at finding ways of lessening tensions, those who have served as military attachés for their respective countries. They have acquired a unique set of skills while working in their embassies. They have outstanding operational backgrounds in their military specialties. Their duties include making arrangements for visits by a diversity of their fellow citizens who have business in either the United States or the USSR.

Military contacts also occur through special flights made by American and Soviet aircraft into each other's territory. The flights are a part of reciprocal diplomatic agreements to support the embassies of each country or are the result of special arrangements, for example, a USAF C-5 aircraft delivering a piece of heavy equipment to one of Moscow's airports. When these flights occur, flight deck crews have representatives from the host country on board. Host crew members are familiar with their own country's navigational systems, air traffic control, and language.

The most famous instance of Soviet-American cooperation was the Apollo-Soyuz orbital flight, mentioned in chapter 5. The flight enlisted the cooperation of military and civilian experts from both countries. American and Soviet military units also coordinate responding to distress calls at sea.³² Such rescue responses are a requirement of international law and a commonly accepted international principle but, nonetheless, are also examples of normal contacts.

American and Soviet officers also serve in UN operations and as liaison members of UN forces. Such service receives little publicity and is lost in the daily barrage of news coming from the Middle East and other sources. One officer in the US Army with whom I talked stated that at the time he served on a liaison force, the Soviets and Americans got along well on a personal basis. The US

Army officer described sauna contests in which the Americans and Soviets would try to outlast each other in the high heat and humidity of a sauna, brought to the Middle East by Swedish troops. The Soviets and Americans would also visit each other's areas and sometimes eat meals together.

The UN context in which the Americans and Soviets were working helped to insulate them from superpower rivalries. Their respective duties were not that much different—to observe what was going on and report through channels. This sometimes led to cooperation and to the exchange of information. The military liaison teams also had a common enemy. The dangers of terrorist attacks, of being caught in a cross-fire between warring factions, and of hitting land mines long buried and forgotten were real. No one forgot that the Americans and Soviets were rivals and might have to fight each other some day (or may have already met across certain battlefields). This aspect, however, seemed to heighten mutual respect for each other, rather than interfere with duties. The Americans and their Soviet counterparts were captains and majors. In a sense thus, at lower levels, Soviet and American officers have "served together." The American officer I talked with was a Middle East expert, and he suspected that his Soviet counterpart also specialized in Middle-Eastern affairs. Professionally, the officers from both countries appeared to have been well prepared for their duties in the Middle East and for service with the UN forces. Military personnel such as these form a pool of officers with a variety of experiences who could serve in the initial cadre of officers for a Soviet-American military exchange on each other's soil. The potential for such assignments hinges on many factors, however. For one, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to accept on-site inspections, a welcome development. This would be an area where exchange officers could serve.³³

The real question is how to begin such an exchange. Previous proposals have been made. During the mid-1970s, one such effort proposed an exchange of military bands. One of the US military bands in Europe would visit the USSR and play in a series of concerts.³⁴ The Red Army Chorus would, in turn, be invited to perform before American audiences. Indeed, earlier proposals called for the Red Army Chorus to visit the United States, but Americans worried about demonstrations which might disrupt the performances. On the Soviet side, there is a real concern for military security and a fear

that spies in uniform might violate the homeland's security. Such paranoia was reflected in the shooting death of Major Nicholson.

Another possible amicable military contact is an exchange of officers at professional military schools and academies of the United States and USSR. Small Soviet delegations have already visited the USAF Academy, and groups of USAF Academy cadets have visited the USSR. Soviet Embassy officials have spoken at the National War College located at Ft. McNair in Washington, DC. Members of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada have visited and spoken with students and faculty of the National War College. These are all meetings that provide the opportunity for a dialogue. Neither side really convinces the other of the purity of its point of view, but each side does have the opportunity to explain and discuss its position.

The US Army Russian Institute located in Garmisch, West Germany, has also sent its students into the Soviet Union as tourists. Russian Institute students are US military officers, specializing in Soviet studies. They have toured Moscow and Leningrad and have visited the Black Sea area, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus region. Students at the National War College have been to the USSR. Arranging such exchanges is not an easy matter. For example, in 1984, the National War College requested visas for a trip to the USSR. The US Embassy tried to arrange receptions at which the Americans could meet and talk with Soviet officials from the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and with officials from the Soviet Government in Moscow and in Leningrad. The US Embassy was also trying to arrange a visit to a Soviet military school as well. The Soviets would not approve the visas and allow the Americans into the Soviet Union.³⁵

The Soviet action was never officially explained. The ranking American who was to accompany the group was a US Ambassador, and the members of the National War College group were in the military grades of colonels and lieutenant colonels. The Soviets by denying the visas were sending a signal: the overall political relationship between the two countries was not good enough. The next year, the planned visit of War College students and faculty in 1985 was cancelled because of the shooting death of Major Nicholson.

As you might imagine, an exchange of military officers, even initially, is not something which can proceed on its own. Which

comes first: good relations or actions designed to improve relations? Had the National War College group been allowed into the USSR, their acceptance might have been a sign that relations were on the upswing or at least not any worse. The discussions about a risk reduction center agreed to at the Geneva summit constitute a positive sign. President Reagan and First Secretary Gorbachev agreed to discuss the establishment of "centers" which would help reduce the chances for an accidental nuclear exchange. The particulars have not been worked out, but such centers could be manned by a joint US-USSR staff. The idea of a risk reduction center has been advocated by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner.³⁶ The centers would be very useful to both countries, no matter what the state of relations between the two.

An upswing in relations must happen for other possibilities to be realized, for example, on-site inspection and the exchange of observers at military exercises. Both of these subjects are being discussed in continuing arms control negotiations. Such inspections and exchanges of observers can help reduce tension and contribute to improved relations and are not beyond the realm of possibility. Soviet officers have been invited and have observed some military maneuvers in the United States, but actually beginning an exchange per se will be difficult. Some officers on both sides, excellent candidates to participate in such an exchange, would represent their own countries in a splendid manner. The key issue is whether or not an exchange can be started given the level of political tension.

In sum, in exchanges other than in academic, scientific, and research fields, tourism is perhaps the most successful area of exchanges. American citizens have the opportunity to visit the USSR if they have the desire to do so. Soviet citizens lack that opportunity, though mid-ranking members of the Soviet elite can visit if their own government selects them to be members of Soviet delegations. In recent years performing artists of both countries have had only limited opportunities to entertain in the United States or the Soviet Union. Problems here circle around Soviet concern for defections that embarrass them in a most public way. The Cultural Agreement that expired in 1979 has not been renewed because of Soviet demands for the return of an artist who defected while in the United States. Only a few US artists have been invited to the Soviet Union since the lapse of this agreement, and any Soviet artists who

have performed here have done so under the auspices of a private American group.

Sports is another story, however; except for the 1984 Olympic Games, Soviet athletes and contestants have continued to enter the United States to perform in events in virtually every kind of sport and in all regions of the country.

Limited military contacts between the two countries have taken place, and expanded military exchanges between the professional military institutions of each country could signal the desire to improve relations or be used to begin an improvement in relations. A number of experienced officers in the Soviet and American forces are available to participate in military exchanges. Future requirements in arms control could place an increased demand on Soviet and American officers who have such experience. Observers at military exercises and those who might participate in arms control verification measures could also be drawn from this experienced group.

Once a framework for a military exchange is established, such as is the case with academic and research exchange programs, the United States and Soviet Union would have another useful communications link between them, a link useful in keeping the rivalry between the two countries from becoming even more dangerous.

7

SINCE DÉTENTE

ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES AND USSR are adversaries on a global scale, the two countries nonetheless carry on a number of activities that bind them together in peaceful relationships or at least relationships which might help to limit competition and avoid violent confrontation. An important area of the US-USSR relationship is that of the working-level contacts maintained by the Foreign Service officers of the United States and their Soviet counterparts in the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. At this level, the two countries are in daily contact with each other. The contact of the Foreign Service officer with his counterpart is not by any means free of conflict or difficulty. The higher level political and ideological tension between the United States and USSR certainly affects the work at lower levels and also establishes the parameters within which the middle-level officers must work with each other. At the same time, the very fact that these middle-level relationships are maintained provides the basis for both countries to continue a difficult relationship and also serves as the basis for an expansion of activities, should relations improve.

Neither country, in fact, has found it useful to restrict contacts at the working diplomatic level to a point where such contact becomes impossible. Indeed, if such contact were reduced, it would be a signal that the relations between the United States and USSR had in fact become even more strained. On the other hand, if the

restrictions on higher level contact between the two countries were erased, this would be a signal that relations were on the upswing.

Political pronouncements in themselves do not really indicate the degree of tension or relaxation in the US-USSR diplomatic relationship. In this sense, the Soviets are right when they say that the diplomatic and overall relationship between the two countries cannot be improved by words. However, words are important in signaling intentions. The tone of Soviet propaganda and the harsh treatment of the United States by TASS and other journalistic outlets simply are not helpful. The Soviets respond with anger to what is described as increased US rhetoric. The action rings hollow, however, for any to criticize the relatively harsh recent rhetorical tone of the United States without also criticizing the harsh and at times vicious Soviet criticism directed for so many years at this country.

Regarding rhetoric, there is evidence of a double standard in the United States. A double standard is in place when we say that the pronouncements on the part of the USSR are to be expected, but the actions of the United States, standing and defending its own interests, in the face of Soviet pronouncements are somehow not proper. The United States has every right to defend its own interests. Critics who fault the United States for responding in a way that they claim is not conducive to improved relationships should equally criticize the Soviet side.

Judging by actions, serious problems have obviously affected the US-Soviet relationship. The "golden age" of détente between the Americans and the Soviets, the middle 1970s, came from the contacts made by the Nixon administration. Richard Nixon is often credited with the rapprochement between the United States and China, but he and his administration are also responsible for bringing about a significant improvement in American-Soviet relations. From the initial work done in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet-American contacts reached their zenith in the mid-1970s. It was the pragmatism of Nixon in this area that enabled such a policy not only to emerge but also to be successful. Nixon was sure of himself, as exemplified in his famous "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev. The Nixon administration knew its own position and saw itself on a firm ideological footing. On such a firm ground, pragmatic policies could be established. There were no illusions on either the Soviet or

American side about the other's intentions, goals, or policy. Without the burdens imposed by such illusions, specific policies free of unreasonable expectations could be worked out. As a result, not only diplomatic relations but also trade, exchanges of all kinds, and the overall relationship of the two countries improved. We have only to look at the illustrations of the preceding chapters to substantiate the increased level of contact between American and Soviet businessmen, academics, researchers, and tourists at that time. These contacts did not begin to drop off until the late 1970s.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in November 1979 began the deterioration of the ties between the United States and USSR established in the mid-1970s. President Carter and his administration were keenly disappointed by the Soviet invasion. Carter himself admitted this publicly. The earlier pragmatism of the Nixon administration, which prevented unreasonable hopes from entering into calculation about Soviet behavior, was replaced by a naive idealism. The desire to improve Soviet-American relations was sincere but was untempered by realistic considerations of what was practically possible.

The Soviet Union was then and is still a state moved by its own historical and ideological interests. The mistake of the Carter administration may have been to project a set of uniquely American values onto the Soviet leadership. When the Soviets did not live up to standards set and projected by the Carter administration, the result was an extreme disappointment and even a feeling of personal betrayal. "How could the Soviets do such a thing?" was a question frequently asked. "Didn't they know that we were trying to improve the relationship between us? We were trying to be reasonable," was another plaint. The simple fact was that the Soviets were acting in what they perceived to be their best interests and were not trying to live up to the expectations imposed upon them by an idealistic American President.

Following Afghanistan, the situation in Poland led to a worsening situation between the Soviets and the United States. Soon after, the alleged Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope moved the United States and Soviet Union even further apart. After the downing of the Korean airliner, a further low point in relations was reached with the Soviet decision to boycott the 1984 Olympic Games. The incapacity and death of Yuri Andropov during

this period did not help chances for any improvement. There is considerable speculation about what will happen under the Gorbachev regime. Will the emergence of a younger Soviet ruling class improve the chances for a better relationship or will it not? This is a serious concern for the future. In the meantime, relations between the United States and the USSR remain at a point which may even be lower than that of the cold war period of the 1940s and 1950s. The Geneva Summit optimism has been erased by events of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Iceland. However, a framework of relationships has been established which have survived the swings in the US-USSR political climate.

The framework that was established in the early 1970s is still intact and can be combined with an essentially pragmatic approach to the American-Soviet relationship. The arrangements that are made within the framework can be expanded or contracted, depending on the particular interests of the United States and the state of relations between the United States and USSR. Certainly no one can persuasively argue that the United States should not respond to heinous acts such as the destruction of an international airliner or the shooting death of an American military officer. Such behavior cannot be explained away by saying, "Such behavior is typical of the Soviet Union." There must be a response, and the Soviets know it. The great difficulty is in formulating the correct response. To be morally outraged is not enough. To excuse or rationalize such acts is also inappropriate.

When KAL 007 was shot down, the United States took the matter to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and this international body condemned the Soviet action. The United States also banned Aeroflot flights and closed down the Aeroflot offices in New York and Washington. More important, both the ICAO and the United States suggested that the Soviet Union itself could take actions which would prevent recurrence. Measures could be taken in the Soviet Far East that are already being followed in the European part of the USSR, where there is international air traffic between the Western European capitals and the Soviet cities of Moscow and Leningrad.

The Soviet Union and the United States also proved that the framework now in place can work to reduce any miscalculations that might lead to nuclear war. The two countries successfully negotiated an improvement in the "hotline" between Moscow and

Washington. The agreement was signed and celebrated in a low-key ceremony.*

The situation in trade and technology can be similarly approached. It is naive to think that the USSR will acquire technology for peaceful purposes only. The evidence is simply overwhelming that the Soviets will use any advanced technology they acquire for both peaceful purposes and for the improvement of their military establishment. The tremendous effort of the Soviet Union to acquire such technology supports this conclusion. Evidence of this effort presented by present and past administrations is overwhelming. The United States can and is taking some actions to help limit the dangerous aspects. Our actions will require the cooperation of all agencies in the executive department, the business community, and the Congress. The last thing that is needed is another joint agency, but the present arrangements can be streamlined and made to work better. Officials working in the Commerce and Defense Departments are very capable and are sincere in their desire to protect their country, but the bureaucratic structures in which they work, plus the divergent interests expressed in Congress, make their job more difficult. We need less bureaucracy and more consensus within the Congress, executive branch, and business community on this issue of technology flow.

Some areas of US-Soviet contact have successful arrangements established, such as the Marine Resources Company. Both the American and the Soviet side profit. Another example is the Belarus Corporation, offering an alternative to American farmers looking for a tractor with a specific performance level and price. As for strategic raw materials, perhaps the US effort can be directed at satisfying particular needs. The proposal of exchange of American grain for Soviet natural gas or other raw materials is a reasonable one. Both sides can profit and such an arrangement makes good economic sense. There is no good reason why such commercial transactions can't be beneficial to the United States as well as the USSR.

In strategic technology, there are real problems, and it is reasonable for us to try to restrict certain items. First, advanced

*The communications hook-up will consist of two satellite circuits plus a telegraph circuit and an earth station in each country. High-speed printer terminals have also been added.

technology should be identified. Second, a specific list of products should be formulated. Such a list does no good, however, if it becomes all inclusive, so it will be necessary to restrict items on the list to those that are clearly a danger. Difficult choices have to be made in this regard. Many of these items can also be acquired in Japan and Europe. Unfortunately, the Japanese and Europeans simply do not share American concerns in this vital area. Only so much cooperation can be expected from them. The United States must, therefore, get agreements on technology that is being developed, rather than trying to stop items that have been on the international market for some time. Some items will inevitably get to the USSR.

Technology cannot be stopped. Some of these items will help the Soviets, but others will be a danger to them. How, for example, will personal computers affect Soviet citizens? What will happen when various types of programs become available on the black market in the USSR? The Soviets already see dangers these machines pose to their system and are restricting them.* But, if they really are going to advance, they have to integrate technology into their society or else they will remain behind. Informational technology and satellite communications, as well as personal computers, pose a real threat and a dilemma to the Soviet leadership. Their response to this dilemma will probably be to ensure the Soviet military has the computers, but the Soviet citizen does not.

The United States must take the necessary measures that will strengthen American research and development. Efforts that are designed to strengthen the development of American technological know-how are needed in the face of the Japanese and Western European challenge, regardless of US security concerns. The best way to keep advanced technology from the Soviets may be to step up and expand the pace of development in the United States.

Greater American efforts must come in the area of academic exchange. It does no good to bemoan the fact that the Soviets can

*The Soviet video recorder is called the Elektronika and is not compatible with Beta or VHS systems. The Elektronika also does not come with a video camera. A Soviet who wants an Elektronika must save for about two years and put his name on a waiting list. Another alternative is the black market, but it has risks.

send more scientists to the United States than America can send to the USSR. American academicians and scientists are every bit as capable as their Soviet counterparts or more so. But are there enough American scientists and academics who can be sent on an exchange program to the USSR? What can the United States do to encourage a greater interest in the study of the USSR? Is another National Defense Education Act (NDEA) needed to encourage scholars to enter the Soviet studies field? Certainly, more can be done. One provision of the NDEA loans of the past was that if a graduate stayed in a certain field after the award of his degree, up to 50 percent of the loan could be forgiven, depending on the years an individual worked or taught. Perhaps a similar program is needed now in the fields of Soviet and Eastern European studies. Outright grants are also possible, but a loan with a reduced payback arrangement is more practical. In this way the number of American scholars and experts in Soviet affairs might be increased. These Americans are a strategic resource in themselves and are in critical shortage. The Soviets have increased the number of their own experts who study America. Not only are these Soviets capable, they also speak excellent American English. The United States needs experts who can speak an almost flawless Russian as well.

Nowhere is the lack of American language ability more visible than in televised interviews. Although the American media can hook up directly with a Soviet journalist, the language spoken is inevitably English. Interviews are conducted in English, and commentary by Soviets is delivered in the same language. This is to the Soviet's advantage; they have a corps of American-English-speaking journalists ready to appear on US television, either by means of a hook-up from Moscow or in an interview in an American studio. The United States has few Russian-speaking journalists appearing regularly on TV or writing in the newspapers. At present, of course, the Soviets impose strict limits on Americans on TV in the Soviet Union. The fact remains, however, that if these limits were eased, the interviews of Americans on Russian TV would probably be conducted in English rather than Russian. The same is also true with many of the business and private contacts Americans have with Soviets. American peace groups conduct virtually all their exchanges with Soviets in English. If we ever hope to reach the ordinary Soviet people, as is absolutely necessary, we will have to learn Russian. The language barrier is real and has not been overcome. The

cultural barrier is even more formidable but cannot be dealt with until the language is learned.

Americans have a long way to go to appreciate the differences between their own and the Soviet culture. Cultural and sports exchanges can be the beginning, but only that. Real understanding must result from a concentrated effort on both sides, and there is no room for unwarranted optimism. Hard work, long hours of study, and a sense of what is realistically possible to achieve are needed. Increased understanding does not mean less tension. A better understanding of the Soviet side may even show how wide the gap between the two countries and societies really is. The Soviet Union has its own set of values that are far different from those of the United States. The two countries are far apart and have set goals that are bound to conflict. The problem is to try to limit that conflict to a level that does not threaten the existence of both countries.

APPENDIX A

AGREED REPORT OF THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

THE EIGHTH SESSION of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, established by a joint communique in May 1972, was held in Moscow on May 20-21, 1985. N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., headed the Soviet delegation and presided over the session. The U.S. delegation was headed by Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of the United States Department of Commerce.

During the work of the Commission, Secretary Baldrige was received by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mr. M.S. Gorbachev, and had talks with Ministers A.A. Yezevskiy and V.P. Lein.

In opening the session, Minister N.S. Patolichev said that definite prospects exist for developing equitable and mutually beneficial Soviet-American trade. Secretary Baldrige stated that the United States wants to develop a more constructive working relationship with the U.S.S.R. The U.S. side is of the opinion that an expansion of trade can be part of such a relationship and believes that both sides should take concrete steps to expand trade where that is now possible.

The U.S. side stated its belief that while useful steps to improve trade could be taken now, a fundamental change in trade relations could not take place without parallel improvements in other aspects of the bilateral relationship.

The Soviet side stated that it is opposed to tying trade to aspects of bilateral relations which in its view have no bearing on trade. It believes that the development of trade between the two countries can contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations as a whole.

The Commission adopted the following agenda:

1. Status and Prospects for Trade
2. Report of the Working Group of Experts
3. Trade Expansion Including Projects
4. Business Facilitation

Continued

STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR TRADE

Assessing the status of U.S.-Soviet trade, the Commission noted that although bilateral trade grew sharply in 1984 to \$3.8 billion (3.1 billion rubles), the range of products traded continued to be limited.

The Commission agreed that an expansion in trade of mutual interest was desirable and possible and that it was the policy of each side to take steps to support such expansion.

The Commission noted that the potential for bilateral trade was not being fully utilized: Soviet exports to the United States remained at a low level, and U.S. manufactured goods exports were continuing to fall.

Both sides agreed that the main task of the Commission is to work toward elimination of obstacles to mutually-beneficial trade. They intend to provide assistance and support to the business communities of both countries in identifying areas of possible cooperation and concrete projects, and in restoring a climate of mutual confidence.

The Commission also discussed the current state of maritime and civil aviation relations. It agreed that progress toward the resolution of outstanding differences in these areas would contribute to further development of bilateral economic and trade relations. Both sides welcomed the resumption of bilateral exchanges of views on maritime and civil aviation questions and hoped that these would achieve concrete results.

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS

The Commission approved the reports of the heads of delegations to the fourth meeting of the Working Group of Experts held in Moscow Jan. 8-9, 1985, in accordance with the provisions of the long-term Agreement on Facilitation of Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, which was extended for 10 years on June 29, 1984.

The Commission noted that it was the Working Group's frank exchange of views on the obstacles to trade, the steps each side sought for their resolution, and the prospects for expanding trade in various sectors, which laid the groundwork for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission.

Continued

The Commission agreed that the fifth meeting of the Experts Working Group would take place in Washington, D.C., in 1986, at a time to be agreed upon between the Cochairmen of the Commission before the end of 1985.

TRADE EXPANSION, INCLUDING PROJECTS

To aid trade expansion and the conclusion of mutually beneficial contracts, both sides agreed to assist in identifying appropriate sectors and projects which would be of interest both to U.S. firms and Soviet organizations.¹

The Commission analyzed the course of negotiations between U.S. firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations on a number of commercial projects and noted the interest of both sides in bringing them to a positive conclusion.

The Soviet side noted the absence of progress on questions of normalizing the conditions of mutual trade and providing export credits for the sale of American machinery and equipment to the U.S.S.R. It stated that U.S. firms had lost the reputation of being reliable suppliers in the Soviet market, and this had resulted in a reduction of orders for supplying machinery and equipment. The Soviet side believes that restoring this reputation is important for normalizing trade, and it will welcome appropriate steps by the Administration, Congress and the U.S. business community.

The U.S. side expressed its continued recognition of the importance of maintaining the reliability of our supplier relationship. It cited the Administration's support for new legislation which would provide a high degree of contract certainty to American firms and their foreign trade partners. With regard to normalizing conditions for trade, the U.S. side noted that official credits and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment for Soviet goods were dependent upon progress in other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The U.S. side stated that it hoped to see such progress soon.

The Commission believes that the process of improving conditions for trade expansion can be started by a gradual elimination of obstacles, where that is now possible. This would demonstrate to the business communities of both countries the intention of each side to contribute to strengthening mutually-beneficial economic cooperation.

In this spirit of cooperation, the U.S. side announced that it would introduce legislation in the Congress to eliminate the 34-year-

Continued

old import embargo on seven types of furskins from the Soviet Union. It also stated that, to the extent consistent with present trade laws and the federal-state relationships in the United States, the U.S. side would attempt to see that Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations were not discriminated against in their efforts to sell in the United States.

In this same spirit of cooperation, the Soviet side stated that it would inform Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations of the Soviet side's interest in expanding trade with the United States, and that Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations would address bid inquiries to interested U.S. firms. It also stated that the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations would consider U.S. proposals fully on their economic merits, taking into account foreign trade laws and regulations existing in the United States.

The U.S. side stated it was pleased that an increasing number of U.S. firms had received invitations to bid from Soviet firms since January 1985 and that several contracts totaling over \$400 million had been signed. The U.S. side expressed its interest in having American firms serve as suppliers for appropriate Soviet projects under the upcoming 12th Five-Year Plan.

The Commission discussed the U.S. analysis of over 30 projects which the Ministry of Foreign Trade had indicated as having potential for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The U.S. side also identified over 20 other projects it believed to be of mutual interest. The U.S. side pointed out that most of the items related to these projects may currently be exported without a specific license and that, where required, a validated license would generally be approved for appropriate equipment associated with the projects listed.

In order to continue the efforts begun at this session of the Commission, both sides agreed to establish the practice of regular meetings between their representatives in Washington and Moscow for the specific purpose of attempting to identify and eliminate, where possible, obstacles to the completion of mutually-beneficial projects.

The Commission took note of the important role the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) has played in identifying areas for trade expansion and agreed that its efforts have been a useful starting point for concentrating attention on projects. The Commission agreed to continue to work closely with USTEC and to encourage it to develop additional detailed proposals.

Continued

BUSINESS FACILITATION

The Commission noted the importance of working conditions for firms and organizations engaged in bilateral commerce, and discussed the problems currently faced by firms and organizations of each country.

In order to expand commercial contacts and assist in the identification of concrete business opportunities, the U.S. side announced that the U.S. Department of Commerce will initiate a modest program of export promotion events in the Soviet Union beginning in 1985. These events may include trade missions, sales seminars and mini-exhibits at the U.S. Commercial Office, as well as American participation in appropriate Soviet trade exhibits and fairs. The Soviet side agreed to furnish the necessary support for U.S. Government-supported events at the U.S. Commercial Office. These events will contribute to the development of trade and economic cooperation.

The Commission noted the importance of the business facilitation mechanism which had been utilized until 1980. Recognizing that business facilitation questions have accumulated since that time, both sides agreed to resume the practice of regular business facilitation meetings between their representatives in Moscow and in Washington.

Recognizing that the participation of small and medium-sized U.S. firms in bilateral trade requires special attention and assistance, the Commission asked the business facilitation group and the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council to consider possibilities on how to overcome the difficulties such firms encounter in trying to sell in the Soviet Union.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Summing up the results of the present session, the Commission believes that mutually-beneficial trade can contribute to the development of more constructive relations between the two countries. It also recognizes the economic benefits of this trade and supports its expansion.

Both sides recognize that in order to enhance the role of trade, it is necessary to respect the interests of the other side. Each side will consider possible steps toward improving conditions for a more complete trade relationship and will consult with the other.

Both sides agree that there are possibilities for the expansion of mutually-beneficial trade and economic cooperation. Noting the

Continued

positive results and anticipated further benefits from trade in agricultural products, the two sides will take steps to expand trade in those industrial goods and services identified as being of mutual interest.

These steps will include the removal of obstacles to trade expansion where possible and consistent with the laws and regulations of each country. Both sides welcome the efforts of firms and organizations to explore prospects for expanding trade. Each government will encourage officials and buyers to visit the trade exhibitions sponsored by the other.

The U.S. Government is interested in American companies serving as suppliers for appropriate Soviet projects under the upcoming 12th Five-Year Plan. The Soviet side states that interested U.S. firms will receive bid inquiries, will have full opportunity to participate in Soviet projects and purchases open to foreign participation, and will have access to Soviet trade and purchasing officials. Within U.S. law and practice, the U.S. side will use its best offices to prevent discrimination against Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations.

Each side intends to expand trade and economic cooperation in accordance with its own laws, national security interests, and market demands. Accordingly, both sides agree to concentrate their activities in areas where concern due to these reasons will be minimal.

The head of the U.S. delegation announced that he would publicize the contents of the Agreed Minutes in the official magazine of the Department of Commerce, along with a message encouraging U.S. businesses to explore trading opportunities in the U.S.S.R. and mentioning President Reagan's desire for a more constructive working relationship with the Soviet Union.

The head of the Soviet delegation announced that he would send a letter to the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations enclosing the contents of the Agreed Minutes. He stated his letter would inform foreign trade organizations of the Soviet side's desire to: see commercial cooperation with the United States increase by providing bid inquiries to interested U.S. firms; consider U.S. proposals fully on their economic merit; and provide U.S. firms with access to Soviet trade and purchasing officials, always taking into account foreign trade laws and regulations existing in the United States.

ON THE NINTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission decided to hold its next (ninth) session in Washington in 1986. The date and agenda will be agreed upon by the

Continued

Chairman of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sections of the Commission in accordance with its Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.

Done in Moscow, May 21, 1985, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Malcolm Baldrige

Nikolai S. Patolichev

Head of the U.S.
Delegation to the
Eighth Session of the
Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission

Head of the Soviet
Delegation to the
Eighth Session of the
Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission

APPENDIX B

**THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CONTACTS,
EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION IN SCIENTIFIC,
TECHNICAL, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND
OTHER FIELDS.**

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the relevant principles, provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Consistent with the relevant provisions of the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972;

Believing that the further expansion of reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the cultural, educational, scientific and technical fields, and in other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Parties will encourage and develop contacts, exchanges and cooperation in the fields of the natural sciences, technology, the humanities and social sciences, education, culture, and in other fields of mutual interest on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and reciprocity.

Continued

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges and cooperation under it shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable conditions for such contacts, exchanges and cooperation, and the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in American-Soviet exchanges.

ARTICLE II

1. The Parties take note of the following specialized agreements on cooperation in various fields and reaffirm their commitments to achieve their fulfillment and to encourage the renewal or extension of them, when it is considered mutually beneficial:

a. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972 and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

b. The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

c. The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until June 19, 1988, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

d. The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until December 14, 1987, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

e. The Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washington on June 21, 1973, and extended until June 20, 1986, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

Continued

f. The Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Housing and Other Construction, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1989, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes.

g. The Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1987, by means of an exchange of Diplomatic Notes;

h. The Long Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, signed at Moscow on June 29, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1994, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes.

2. When it is considered mutually beneficial, the Parties will encourage within the framework of this Agreement conclusion of specialized agreements, including renewal and mutually agreed amendments, between:

a. The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

b. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

c. Institutions of higher education of both countries.

3. The Parties will encourage the conclusion, when it is considered mutually beneficial, of agreements on cooperation in the field of science and technology, and also additional agreements in other specific fields, including the humanities and social sciences, within the framework of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, contacts, exchanges and cooperation between organizations of the two countries in the fields of the humanities and social sciences, natural sciences, technology, education, and in other related fields of mutual interest which are not being carried out under specialized agreements concluded between the Parties. These activities may include:

Continued

1. The exchange of experts, delegations, scholarly and technical information, the organization of lectures, seminars and symposia for such experts;

2. The participation of scholars and other specialists in professional congresses, conferences and similar meetings being held in the two countries, and the conducting of specialized exhibits and of joint research work;

3. Other forms of contacts, exchanges and cooperation which may be mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, contacts, exchanges and cooperation between organizations of the two countries in various fields of education. These activities may include:

a. The exchange of students, graduate students, researchers and faculty members for study and research; the exchange of professors and teachers to lecture, offer instruction, and conduct research; the exchange of specialists and delegations in various fields of education; and, as possible, the organization of lectures, seminars and symposia for such specialists;

b. The exchange of more young researchers preparing dissertations, as well as of young teachers, taking into account the desirability of proper representation of the social sciences, the humanities, and the natural and applied sciences in these exchanges;

c. Making available to students, researchers and teachers appropriate educational, research and open archive materials which are relevant to the agreed topic of research based, as a minimum, upon the agreed preliminary plan of study and, as possible, other resources which may come to light during the course of the researcher's stay;

d. The facilitation of the exchange, by appropriate organizations, of educational and teaching materials (including textbooks, syllabi and curricula), materials on methodology, samples of teaching instruments and audiovisual aids.

2. The Parties will also encourage the study of each other's languages through the development of the exchanges and cooperation listed above and through other mutually agreed measures.

Continued

ARTICLE V

1. In order to promote better acquaintance with the cultural achievements of each country, the Parties will facilitate the reciprocal development of contacts, exchanges and artistic cooperation in the field of the performing arts. To these ends the Parties will assist exchanges of theatrical, musical, and choreographic ensembles, orchestras, and other performing and artistic groups, as well as individual directors and performers.

ARTICLE VI

1. The Parties will encourage the film industries of both countries, as appropriate, to consider means of further expanding the purchase and distribution on a commercial basis of films produced in each country; the joint production of feature, documentary, popular-science, and educational films; and the rendering, upon request, of production and creative assistance by each side for films produced by the other.

2. The Parties will encourage, as appropriate, the exchange and exhibition of documentary films dealing with science, technology, culture, education and other fields.

3. The Parties will render assistance to the exchange of delegations of creative workers and technical experts in various aspects of film-making.

4. The Parties also agree to consider, at the request of organizations or individuals of their own countries, other proposals for the expansion of mutually acceptable exchanges in this field, including holding film premieres and film weeks, and participating in international film festivals held in each country.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Parties will, on a mutually acceptable basis, assist contacts and encourage exchanges between organizations of both countries in the field of radio and television, including exchanges of radio programs and television films, both for educational purposes and for transmission to local audiences, and in addition exchanges of delegations of creative workers and technical specialists in various fields of

Continued

radio and television broadcasting. Appearances of representatives of each country on television of the other country can take place in accordance with the existing practices and regulations of each country.

2. The Parties further agree, upon the request of organizations and individuals of their own countries, to consider other proposals in the field of radio and television, including joint production of television films and rendering services in the production of radio and television programs. Each Party, as possible and in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the receiving country, will render assistance to the other in the preparation of such programs.

ARTICLE VIII

The Parties note that in the pursuit of better mutual understanding, a desirable goal is the greater familiarity of each country's people with the literature and other publications of the other. To this end, the Parties will encourage:

1. The exchange of book exhibits, literary works, magazines, newspapers and other publications devoted to scholarly, technical, cultural, and general educational subjects between libraries, universities and other organizations of each country, as well as the reciprocal distribution of the magazines *Amerika* and *Soviet Life*;

2. Exchanges and visits of journalists, editors and publishers, translators of literary works, as well as their participation in appropriate professional meetings and conferences;

3. Further development of cooperation between publishing houses of the two countries, when such expansion is seen as useful to it by individual publishing houses of their professional organizations.

ARTICLE IX

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate the exchange of exhibitions on various topics of mutual interest. The Parties agree to accord each other the opportunity for two to four circulating exhibitions during the six-year period of this Agreement.

Continued

2. The Parties will encourage and facilitate appropriate participation by one Party in exhibitions which may take place in the other's country.

3. The Parties will also render assistance for the exchange of exhibitions between the museums of the two countries.

ARTICLE X

The Parties will provide for mutually acceptable exchanges, cooperation and visits of architects, art historians, artists, composers, musicologists, museum specialists, playwrights, theater directors, writers, specialists in various fields of law, including public law and government, and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with matters of interest to them in their respective fields and to participate in meetings, conferences and symposia.

ARTICLE XI

1. The parties will render assistance to members of the Congress of the United States of America and Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to officials of the National Government of both countries making visits to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, respectively. Arrangements for such assistance will be agreed upon in advance through diplomatic channels.

2. The Parties will encourage exchanges of representatives of municipal, local and state governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to study various functions of government at these levels.

ARTICLE XII

The Parties will encourage joint undertakings and exchanges between appropriate organizations active in civic and social life, including youth and women's organizations, recognizing that the decision to implement such joint undertakings and exchanges remains a concern of the organizations themselves.

Continued

ARTICLE XIII

The Parties will encourage the development of contacts in sports through organizing competitions, exchanging delegations, teams, athletes and coaches in the field of physical culture and sports upon agreement between the appropriate sports organizations of both countries.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties will encourage the expansion of tourism between the two countries with the aim of more fully satisfying the requests of tourists to become acquainted with the life, work and culture of the people of each country. In this connection the Parties will encourage, on a mutually acceptable basis, tourist trips, on a group and individual basis, thus to facilitate exchanges between young people, workers, farmers and representatives of other vocations.

ARTICLE XV

The Parties will encourage the further development of contacts and cooperation between archival organizations of the two countries. Initial program proposals on these contacts and cooperation will be made through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE XVI

The Parties note that commemorative activities may take place in their countries in connection with the celebration of anniversaries recognized by major international bodies.

ARTICLE XVII

The Parties agree that, as necessary, they will hold meetings of their representatives for the general review of the implementation of contacts, exchanges and cooperation in various fields and to consider the possibility of exchanges which are not carried out under specialized agreements between the two Parties. These reviews, which

Continued

may be requested by either side, will take place usually annually but at least once during the period of each three-year Program.

ARTICLE XVIII

The Parties agree that:

1. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, dates of arrival, size of delegations, financial and transportation arrangements and other details of exchanges and visits, except as otherwise determined, shall be agreed upon, as a rule, not less than thirty days in advance, through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations requested by the Parties to carry out these exchanges;

2. Applications for visas for visitors participating in exchanges and cooperative activities shall be submitted, as a rule, at least ten working days before the estimated time of departure;

3. Unless otherwise provided for in specialized agreements between the Parties, and except where other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, participants in exchanges and cooperative activities will pay their own expenses, including international travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in the receiving country.

ARTICLE XIX

1. In implementation of various provisions of this Agreement, the Parties have established a program of Cooperation and Exchanges for 1986-88, which is attached and is an integral part of this Agreement. The terms of that Program shall be in force from January 1, 1986, to December 31, 1988, and thereafter, unless and until amended by agreement of the Parties, will provide the basic guidelines for the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges for 1989-1991.

2. The Parties agree that their representatives will meet prior to the end of 1988 to develop the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges for the succeeding three years.

Continued

ARTICLE XX

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until December 31, 1991. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice other agreements concluded between the two Parties.

DONE at Geneva, this day of November, 1985, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
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PROGRAM OF COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
FOR 1986-1988

In implementation of various provisions of the General Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields signed at Geneva on November 10, 1985, the Parties have agreed on the following Program of Exchanges.

ARTICLE I

HIGHER EDUCATION

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side:

a. For long-term advanced research: At least 40 advanced researchers, instructors and professors for study and scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and applied sciences for periods of from one semester to one academic year. For the purposes of accounting, two stays of one semester each shall be equivalent to one stay of one academic year.

b. For short-term advanced research: At least ten professors, instructors and advanced researchers to conduct scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and applied sciences for periods of between two and five months.

c. At least 30 language teachers and two leaders from universities and other institutions of higher learning to participate in summer courses of two months to improve their competence in the language of the receiving side.

d. Parallel to the exchanges specified under paragraphs a and b above, the Parties note and encourage the exchange of scholars between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which involves advanced research for up to 60 person-months from each side each academic year.

e. The Parties affirm the reciprocal nature of these programs in which the sending side chooses, at its own discretion, candidates

Continued

for participation in the exchanges, and the receiving side, at its discretion, agrees to the placement of these candidates.

In this connection, the Parties note that, in the carrying out of the exchanges specified under paragraphs 1a, b and d above, and following the existing practice of mutually acceptable participation in the exchanges of representatives in the humanities, social sciences, and natural and technical sciences, they will strive, as in the past, for such mutually acceptable participation of scholars in the above-mentioned fields.

f. In the practical implementation of these programs, the Parties will strive to maintain the levels of exchange already achieved, where the existing levels exceed the minimum levels given above.

2. In accordance with the wishes of the sending and receiving sides, the Parties will exchange annually at least 15 professors and specialists from universities or other institutions of higher learning from each side. Both sides will attempt to include four lecturers on the languages and literatures of the sending side. The exchanges will be for periods of one to ten months, normally corresponding to the receiving side's academic calendar, to lecture and, as time permits, to teach and conduct research at universities and other institutions of higher learning.

The Parties note that this exchange has involved lecturers from a broad range of fields, corresponding to the needs of both sending and receiving sides. In this connection, the Parties will strive to maintain the mutually beneficial exchange in the various fields of the natural and technical sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences.

3. The Parties will exchange during the period of this Program at least two delegations of specialists in higher education consisting of up to five persons from each side for periods of two to three weeks each, including two to three days of seminars with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

4. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of arrangements for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning of the two countries for the purpose of study, research, lecturing, and participating in seminars. These exchanges would take place outside the exchange quotas mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above. They will be the subject of direct separate agreements concluded between the universities or institutes concerned, and the conditions for the exchanges listed above will not necessarily apply to them.

Continued

5. The sides agree that the United States will continue to take measures to encourage the study of the Russian language in the United States of America, and the Soviet Union will continue its practice of teaching the English language in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In order to realize the above goals, the Parties will encourage the expansion of exchange programs for language study whereby American and Soviet undergraduates can study Russian and English respectively, obtaining academic credits for that study.

6. The Parties agree to continue to exchange information and to conduct appropriate consultations regarding the equivalency of diplomas and scholarly degrees. The parties expect that the Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees Concerning Higher Education in the States Belonging to the Europe Region, in the elaboration of which the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have taken part, will lead to closer cooperation in this field.

ARTICLE II

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THE PEDAGOGICAL SCIENCES

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side, groups of language teachers, up to a total of 15 persons, from secondary schools in the United States of America, and from secondary schools or pedagogical institutes in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to participate in summer courses of six weeks duration, including up to two weeks of travel, to improve their competence in the teaching of the Russian and English languages and their knowledge of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Each group of language teachers may be accompanied by a leader.

2. The Parties will exchange one delegation annually of specialists in primary and secondary education of up to five persons from each side for a period of two to three weeks each, including a seminar of normally two to three days with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars, their duration and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

3. The Parties will encourage the exchange of primary and secondary school textbooks and other teaching materials, and, as is deemed appropriate, the conducting of joint studies on textbooks.

Continued

between appropriate organizations in the United States of America and the Ministry of Education of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. The Parties will encourage the annual exchange of six teachers for periods of three months to conduct practical instruction classes in the English and Russian languages at secondary schools, colleges, universities and pedagogical training institutions of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE III

ARTS AND CULTURE

1. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at least 10 major performing arts groups from each side during the period of this Program. If one Party sends more than 10 major performing arts groups, the other Party will be accorded the opportunity to send a like number of additional groups. The detailed arrangements for tours of these groups will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for tours of American groups, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the groups, and concert organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for tours of Soviet groups, between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States of America and concert organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The receiving side, taking into consideration realistic possibilities, will seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending side concerning the timing and the duration of tours and the number of cities visited. The sending side shall provide timely notice in making proposals for performing arts groups to travel to the other country. The receiving side will make every effort to take a decision on each proposal by the sending side as soon as possible.

2. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at least 10 individual performers from each side during the period of this Program. If one Party sends more than 10 individual performers, the other Party will be accorded the opportunity to send a like number of additional individual performers. The detailed arrangements for these tours will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for tours of American performers, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the performers, and concert organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for tours of Soviet performers, between appropriate

Continued

organizations or impresarios of the United States of America and concert organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Parties will take all appropriate measures, to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations, to ensure favorable conditions of these performances and tours, and the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in them.

4. The Parties will render assistance for the exchange of art exhibitions of equal quality or other exhibitions between museums of the two countries, on the basis of reciprocity where possible, and will encourage the establishment and development of direct contacts between these museums with the aim of exchanging informative materials, albums, art monographs and other publications of mutual interest. In the case of art exhibitions, their content and the conditions for conducting them, including questions of financial responsibility of governments in the event of loss or damage, guarantees of appropriate safety precautions and timely return, and immunity from seizure on the part of possible previous owners will be the subject of negotiation between appropriate museums or interested organizations of the United States of America and the Ministry of Culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and special agreements between them will be signed in each specific case. Within this process, the possible need for added safety precautions to include additional guards at the exhibit sites, will be addressed, as required: in the United States of America by the Indemnity Advisory Panel reporting to the Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities, and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by comparable organizations responsible for the safety of foreign exhibits.

5. The Parties will encourage exchanges of delegations and individual specialists in various fields of art and culture, including, among others, such fields as libraries, museums, music, theater, fine arts, architecture and historic preservation and restoration.

6. The Parties will encourage and facilitate exchanges of theater directors, composers, choreographers, stage designers, performers, musicians and other creative artists for productions and participation in performances, with due concern for, and encouragement of, the production of works of the sending country. The conditions of these exchanges will be agreed upon on a case-by-case basis. Both sides will strive to maintain mutually acceptable exchanges over the course of this Program.

Continued

ARTICLE IV

PUBLICATIONS

The Parties agree to render practical assistance for the distribution of the magazines *Amerika* in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and *Soviet Life* in the United States of America on the basis of reciprocity and to consult as necessary in order to find ways to increase the distribution of these magazines. Upon reaching full distribution of the 62,000 copies of each magazine as currently provided for, the Parties will examine the possibility of expanding the reciprocal distribution of the magazines to 82,000. The Parties will distribute free of charge unsold copies of the magazines among visitors to mutually arranged exhibitions.

ARTICLE V

EXHIBITIONS

1. The Parties agree to accord each other the opportunity for 1 to 2 circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. Each Party will accord the other the opportunity to show its exhibition or exhibitions in 6 to 9 cities in all, with up to 28 showing days in each city. The number of cities and number of showing days, up to the maxima noted above, will be determined by the sending side. The subjects of the exhibitions will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Parties will discuss in a preliminary fashion the nature and general content of each exhibition and will acquaint each other with the exhibitions before their official opening, in particular through the exchange of catalogues, prospectuses and other information pertinent to the exhibitions. Other conditions for conducting the exhibitions (precise opening and closing dates, size and character of premises, number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be subject to agreement by the Parties. Arrangements for conducting the exhibitions will be concluded no later than five months before their opening.

2. The Parties will agree through diplomatic channels on arrangements for other exhibitions and on participation in national exhibitions which may take place in either country.

Continued

ARTICLE VI

OTHER EXCHANGES

1. The Parties will encourage cooperation between organizations of both countries in the field of radio and television, including exchanges of radio and television programs, the joint production of films and broadcasts, the exchange of delegations and specialists, and, in addition, at the request of organizations and individuals, will consider other types of activities provided for in Article VII of the General Agreement.

2. The Parties will encourage invitations to journalists for familiarization with the print and broadcast media in the receiving country. To this end the parties will facilitate the exchange of at least three journalists annually from each side.

3. The Parties will encourage exchanges and contacts in the field of book publishing and translation. Among the desired goals of such exchanges would be mutually acceptable programs which would expand the scope of one country's literature and publications available in translation in the other. Such program decisions would be taken by the appropriate organizations or publishing houses of the two countries.

4. The Parties will encourage the mutually acceptable exchange of films and film specialists, the joint production of films, the rendering of production and creative assistance for films produced by each country and the holding of film premieres, film weeks, seminars and other film events on an annual basis. The Parties will also consider additional proposals aimed at expanding cooperation, as referred to in Article VI of the General Agreement. Conditions for implementing exchanges in this field will be determined by mutual agreement.

5. The Parties recognize the value of visits by other specialists in addition to those noted elsewhere in this Program, for lectures and participation in seminars, meetings and discussions which contribute to better understanding between the peoples of the two countries.

6. In accordance with Article XV of the General Agreement, the Parties will facilitate the development of contacts and cooperation between the archival institutions of the two countries, and will encourage the conclusion of mutually beneficial exchange agreements. In particular, the parties will encourage the reestablishment of close contacts between the Main Archival Administration under the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the National Archives of the United States of America.

Continued

7. The Parties will encourage, on a mutually acceptable basis, the expansion of exchanges between young people, workers, farmers and representatives of other vocations.

8. The parties will encourage continuing contacts between the organizations referred to in Article XII of the General Agreement. Terms of these exchanges will be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. This Program and the exchanges and visits provided for herein shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries. Within this framework, both Parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable conditions for such cooperation, exchanges and visits, and the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges in accordance with the provisions and objectives of this Program and the General Agreement.

2. The Parties agree to hold periodic meetings of their representatives to discuss the implementation of the Program. The implementation reviews will be held at times and places to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

3. Each of the Parties shall have the right to include in delegations interpreters or members of its Embassy, who would be considered as within the agreed total membership of such delegations. The number of such persons shall in each specific case be decided by mutual agreement.

4. This Program is valid from January 1, 1986 through December 31, 1988.

DONE at Geneva, this day of November, 1985, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Continued

ANNEX TO THE PROGRAM OF COOPERATION AND
EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR
1986-1988

HIGHER EDUCATION (Article I)

A. *Long Term Advanced Research (Article I, paragraph 1A), Short-Term Advanced Research (Article I, paragraph 1B), and Language Teachers and Leaders (Article I, paragraph 1C):*

1. These exchanges will be conducted between the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) of the United States of America and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Ministry).

2. The receiving side will provide for participants in these programs:

a. Necessary fees for study and research in universities and other institutions of higher learning;

b. Appropriate research conditions necessary for conducting their scholarly research programs;

c. Suitable living quarters;

d. A monthly stipend;

e. Medical costs, including dental care for the emergency alleviation of pain and for dental work (except for dentures) necessitated by injury, as well as hospital expenses as agreed between the two sides in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a participant in the receiving country; and

f. For participants of one semester or longer, language instruction during their stay if it is deemed necessary by both sides in the course of initial consultations.

3. IREX and the Ministry will cover all travel expenses of their exchanges to and from Moscow and New York respectively. IREX and the Ministry will cover travel expenses of the other side's exchangees from New York and Moscow respectively to their principal place of study and return. The Parties note that summer courses for language teachers and leaders during the course of this program will be conducted in Washington (or New York) and Moscow, and thus the need for internal transportation will not arise.

Continued

4. The receiving side will:

a. Render assistance in providing suitable accommodations for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join participants within the receiving country. To accomplish this goal, the receiving side will, to the extent possible, provide cost-free housing. When this is not possible, housing will be provided at preferential rates (in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at rates established for Soviet citizens in rubles);

b. Bear medical costs, including hospital expenses (except for dentures), as agreed between the two sides, in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a spouse or minor child in the receiving country. The sending side will bear all other costs, including travel, for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join the participants. Travel of family members of participants in summer language courses (Article I, paragraph 1c.) is not foreseen;

c. As necessary, promptly provide exchange participants and members of their families with appropriate documents related to their stay in the host country.

B. Long-Term Advanced Research (Article I, paragraph 1a):

1. IREX and the Ministry will exchange lists of candidates and essential information about each candidate and his or her program before February 10 for the following academic year. No additional candidates will be accepted after this basic exchange of documents. The information presented for each candidate will include full biographic data, previous and current study and professional experience, publications, details of the proposed research program, the names of the proposed host universities or other higher educational institutions, and in addition, institutions and archives for visits and the names of specialists with whom the candidate would like to consult. The order of these procedures will be agreed upon subsequently by an exchange of letters between IREX and the Ministry.

2. Representatives of IREX and the Ministry will meet in alternate years in New York and Moscow no later than May 15 to inform the sending side of their decisions concerning the acceptance of each nominee, the names of universities or other institutions where each nominee will be placed, and the names of advisors and the archives and other institutions named in the application, to which each nominee will have access. Costs for up to two persons for up to one week related to these meetings within each country will be borne by the receiving side. Each side may also make additional visits to the

Continued

other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit higher educational institutions.

3. The placements of candidates accepted by each side will be considered complete and final on July 1. The two sides retain the right to make appropriate adjustments at that time, including the use of substitutions, in order to achieve a balanced exchange. After July 1 there will be no substitutions for any withdrawals made by the sending side, and neither side will be forced to reduce its number of participants should the other side withdraw any candidates after that date. Thereafter, with the agreement of the two sides and on a reciprocal basis, a numerical increase in the participants exchanged will be possible only from candidates whose nominations are still pending. Details of the placement procedure will be agreed upon subsequently by an exchange of letters between IREX and the Ministry.

4. As agreed between IREX and the Ministry, participants accepted for the first semester of the academic year will arrive in the receiving country in September; participants accepted for the second semester will arrive in February. If a participant cannot arrive on the agreed date, the sending side will inform the receiving side as far in advance as possible, and a new date for the arrival will be agreed upon.

5. The period of study will normally be ten months. Applications for extension of agreed periods of study will be considered by the receiving side, and responses to these requests will be given within two months of receipt of each request by IREX and the Ministry. Any excess in total extension time utilized by the participants of a given side may be used by the other side in the next program year.

6. Both sides will facilitate scholarly travel by participants to other appropriate locations in the receiving country for study trips directly related to their research projects. Such research-related trips are crucial to the successful completion of the agreed program of study and will be arranged for the scholars after consultation with their advisors and the receiving institutions. IREX and the Ministry will exchange as much of this information as possible at their May placement talks. The Parties will confirm such essential research travel at the earliest possible date. Exchange participants will be encouraged to submit their requests as soon as possible and both sides agree to respond to these requests expeditiously. The receiving side will arrange and pay for accommodations during such trips, while costs of travel will be paid by the sending side.

Continued

7. The Parties will encourage travel of the exchange participants for the purpose of familiarization with the culture and traditions of the host country. To accomplish this end, exchange participants can, as their scholarly work permits, take familiarization trips within the host country (In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such trips will be taken through Intourist tours with payment in rubles). Host institutions will render assistance to exchange participants who wish to undertake local familiarization travel.

8. In order to carry out programs of scholarly research, the Parties will provide access to educational, scholarly, library and archival materials, to laboratory equipment, to the organization of consultations at the receiving institution, and also, where it is appropriate and possible, the same access as described above to institutions which are not a part of the system of higher educational establishments. Both Parties will, as possible, respond favorably to requests for access to additional resources (materials, consultations, etc.) which come to light during the course of the researcher's work in the host country.

9. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States of America—500 dollars a month.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—390 rubles a month.

The level of the stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of each program.

C. Short-Term Advanced Research (Article I, paragraph 1b): Provisions of Section B above will apply except that:

1. Participants will arrive in the receiving country as agreed between IREX and the Ministry.

2. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States of America—550 dollars a month.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—430 rubles a month.

The level of stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of each program.

D. Exchange of Language Teachers (Article I, paragraph 1c):

1. IREX and the Ministry will agree on the dates for the courses, will provide a daily course plan and will exchange biographic data on the participants by May 1 of each year.

Continued

2. The receiving side will provide participants and leaders the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States of America—300 dollars a month.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—235 rubles a month. The level of the stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of each program.

3. The receiving side, at its expense, will arrange excursions to at least one city, for a total duration of up to one week, to be included within the agreed duration (two months) of the exchange.

E. Lecturers (Article I, paragraph 2):

1. The Parties by January 15 (20 months prior to the start of the academic year in which the exchange will take place) will exchange priority requests and information on the disciplines in which they wish to receive lecturers.

2. The Parties by February 15 will exchange nominations of candidates for the following academic year including full biographic data, information on scholarly specialization and work experience, publications and program proposals in response to the priority request exchanged by January 15 (paragraph E1, above), as well as similar data for at-large nominations. In those exceptional cases when a change in candidates is planned, the sending side will present materials on the new candidate at least six months prior to his trip.

3. Representatives of the Parties will meet in alternate years in Washington and Moscow no later than May 15 to inform each other of their final decisions on acceptance of the nominations exchanged by February 15 (paragraph E2 above). Costs related to these meetings will be borne by the sending side. Each side may also make additional visits to the other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit educational institutions. The receiving side will facilitate appointments at institutions of higher learning outside Washington, D.C., and Moscow in accordance with the desires of the sending side.

4. The normal lecture terms will be for periods of four months (academic semester) to 10 months (academic year). However, in exceptional cases, shorter periods (no less than one month) may be considered for no more than four lecturers from each side.

Continued

5. Agreement on acceptance of a lecturer will include the exact dates and duration of the lecturer's stay in the receiving country, the name of the host institution, faculty host and details of the academic program, including information on the descriptive title of courses to be taught and the required course load.

6. In presenting its candidates, the sending side will take note of both the wishes of the receiving side regarding the subject matter of lectures and its requests for specific scholars, in accord with the procedures described above (paragraph E1). It would be desirable that, to the extent possible, lecturers exchanged would be scholars specifically requested by the receiving side or scholars equally qualified in the same disciplines.

7. The Parties will cover all travel expenses of their exchangees to and from Moscow and Washington respectively. Each side will cover travel expenses of the other side's exchangees from Washington and Moscow respectively to their principal place of study and return.

8. The receiving side will:

a. Render assistance in providing suitable accommodations for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join the participants within the receiving country. To accomplish this goal, the receiving side will, to the extent possible, provide cost-free housing. When this is not possible, housing will be provided at preferential rates (in the Soviet Union, at rates established for Soviet citizens in rubles).

b. Bear medical costs, including hospital expenses (except for dentures) in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a lecturer, his spouse or minor child in the receiving country, as agreed between the two sides. The sending side will bear all other costs, including travel, for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join the participants.

c. As necessary, will promptly provide exchange participants and members of their families with appropriate documents related to their stay in the host country.

9. Both sides will facilitate trips by exchange participants to other universities of the receiving country—scholarly trips for meetings with colleagues and for presenting lectures. Such scholarly trips, which are an integral part of the program, will be organized for exchange participants after consultation with the host institution and upon receiving the agreement of the university which the lecturer is

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interested in visiting. The timing of each trip will be mutually agreed between the lecturer and the host institution so as to be convenient to the lecturer but not interfere with the schedule of lectures and other academic obligations. Lecturers will be encouraged to submit their requests as early as possible, and both sides agree to respond to these requests expeditiously. The receiving side will organize and pay for accommodations during such trips, while the sending side will pay for costs of travel.

10. The receiving side will provide for lecturers:

a. A monthly stipend, the first allotment to be paid upon arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States of America—600 dollars a month.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—470 rubles a month. The level of the stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of each program.

b. An allowance of 200 dollars in the United States of America and 100 rubles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purchase of books, scholarly materials and payment for duplicating services.

11. The Parties will encourage travel of the exchange participants for the purpose of familiarization with the culture and traditions of the host country. To accomplish this end, exchange participants can, as their scholarly work permits, take familiarization trips within the host country (in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such trips will be taken through Intourist tours with payment in rubles). Host institutions will render assistance to participants who wish to undertake local familiarization travel.

F. Seminars (Article I, paragraph 3):

1. The Parties will agree in advance through diplomatic channels on the subjects, procedures, locations, dates and numbers of participants in seminars in higher education.

2. The receiving side will organize the seminars and prepare the programs for visiting delegations, taking into consideration the requests of the sending side.

3. The receiving side will cover the costs of seminars in its own country, including the costs of maintenance and internal travel for the visiting participants. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with rates currently in effect in each country.

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G. Exchanges between Universities (Article I, paragraph 4):

Conditions for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning will be determined by the participating institutions.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
AND THE PEDAGOGICAL SCIENCES (Article II)

A. Language Teachers (Article II, paragraph 1):

1. The Parties will agree on the dates and location of the courses for the current year by January 15, will exchange lists of nominations by March 15, and will inform each other of their acceptance of the nominations by May 15.

2. Each group of participants may be accompanied by a group leader.

3. The receiving side will cover tuition fees, living expenses, and internal travel expenses of the participants and the leader for up to 2 weeks. Monthly stipends for the period of study, to be paid on arrival in the host country, will be:

In the United States of America—300 dollars a month.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—325 rubles a month. The level of the stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of each program.

B. Seminars (Article II, paragraph 2):

1. The Parties will agree in advance through diplomatic channels on the subjects, procedures, places, durations, and numbers of seminar participants in the field of education.

2. The receiving side will organize the seminars and prepare programs for arriving delegations, taking into account the requests of the sending side.

3. The receiving side will bear the seminar expenses in the host country, including internal travel and living expenses the arriving participants. Living expenses will be paid in accord with the rates which exist in each country during the given time period.

C. Teachers (Article II, paragraph 4):

The receiving side will pay the expenses of exchange participants, including accommodations and internal travel, as provided for

Continued

by the work program. For the period of stay of this category of exchange participants, monthly stipends will be:

In the United States of America—400 dollars.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—310 rubles.

The level of stipends will be subject to revision by mutual agreement of the two sides during the course of the program.

ARTS AND CULTURE (Article III)

Exchanges of Delegations and specialists (Article III, paragraphs 5 and 6):

The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under this Program. Conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

OTHER EXCHANGES (Article VI)

Specialists in Radio or Television (Article VI, paragraph 1), Journalists (Article VI, paragraph 2), and Film Specialists (Article VI, paragraph 4):

The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under this Program. Conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947).
2. G. Arbatov, "Ideological Struggle and Political Conflict," in A. Z. Rubinstein, ed., *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 456.
3. Adam B. Ulam provides a concise discussion of the differences between the Soviet and American points of view in "Observations on Dealing with the Soviet Union," in *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, p. 451-52.
4. For a more detailed discussion see Kurt Von Schuschnigg, *International Law* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 240-49, and Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), pp. 560-70.
5. For an excellent description of the new compound on Tunlaw Road, see Kenneth Bredemeier, "Soviets Take the High Ground," *Washington Post*, 16 June 1985, p. B1.
6. Daniel Nossiter addressed the Soviet Missions in terms of espionage in "Missions From Moscow," *Washington Post Magazine*, 4 December 1983, p. 38. This edition has several other articles about Soviet KGB activities. Benjamin Weiser and Athelia Knight discuss the question of crime and diplomatic immunity in more detail in an article entitled "Crime by Those with Diplomatic Immunity Rises," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1984, p. 1. The issue of extraterritoriality is addressed by Margaret Engel in the same publication on p. A16.
7. *New York Times*, 13 September 1983, p. A12. One measure of the state of relations between the US and USSR is the way diplomats fare while stationed in the host country. See Dana Priest, "U.S., Soviets Step Up Moves Against Each Other's Envoys," *Washington Post*, 23 July 1984, p. A1.
8. Mary Thornton, *Washington Post*, 26 August 1983, with my emphasis added.
9. *Ibid.*, and *New York Times*, 26 August 1983, p. A6. The Glen Cove City Council lifted the prohibitions for the seven or eight Soviets living in Glen Cove but not

for Soviets visiting and residents elsewhere. See *New York Times*, 26 April 1984, p. A6.

10. *USA Today*, 2 September 1983, p. 3A.

11. For more about Mr. Dobrynin, see Madelene G. Kalb, "The Dobrynin Factor," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 May 1984, p. 24. See also "Dobrynin set to Leave USA after 24 years," *USA Today*, 8 April 1986, p. 2A.

12. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: Signet Books, 1969), pp. 65-66.

13. As shown on the program *NBC Reports*, "The Real Star Wars: Defense in Space," 8 September 1985.

14. This is not the only case involving a minor. The son of a Ukrainian couple also decided to remain in the United States and was allowed to by the US District Court in Chicago. Both of these instances have been grist for the Soviet propaganda mill which has portrayed the United States as a nation that "steals" children from their parents. The US Supreme Court refused to get involved in the dispute by letting the Supreme Court of Illinois decision stand. The Illinois Court invalidated an earlier decision. Technically, Walter Polovchak's parents (he was 16 in 1983) could have returned to the United States to retrieve their son. See *Washington Post*, 28 February 1984, p. A5. Another brief article on Polovchak appeared in the *Washington Post* on 30 July 1986, p. A6. When he reached 18, Walter Polovchak himself decided he would remain in the United States.

15. Schuschnigg, *International Law*, pp. 250-51.

16. *Washington Post*, 6 February 1984, p. B5.

17. Schuschnigg, *International Law*, pp. 253-54. See also *US News and World Report*, "The U.N.—Where All is Said," 3 October 1983, pp. 30-32. Note that Soviet citizens who work at the UN in the organization of the Office of the Secretary General do not have immunity. See also the *Los Angeles Times*, "200 Soviets on US Staff are Spies, Report to Say," 24 May 1985, p. 14, and Ruth Marcus, "Soviet Diplomat Cut Considered," *Washington Post*, 30 June 1985, p. 18.

18. Fenwick, *International Law*, p. 584. The Soviets have the most ticketed mission; when it had 2,159 citations, the unpaid fine total was \$1 million. See also *US News*, 3 October 1983, p. 32.

19. *New York Times*, 20 September 1983, p. 1A and *Washington Post*, 20 September 1983, p. A10.

20. See Shana Judge, "Navy Says 'Very Valuable' Data Given to Soviets," *Air Force Times*, 24 June 1986, p. 58.

21. "CBS Evening News," 21 September 1983.

22. Interview with US Foreign Service officer who deals with this problem of staffing the many international staff positions of the UN specialized agencies located in Geneva, Switzerland.

CHAPTER 2

1. Congress has granted special permission, however, in the case of the film dealing with the assassination and funeral of John F. Kennedy.
2. This system of discussion and review is formalized. Articles which are labeled "For Discussion" can be freely circulated. These are official articles and are permitted in cases where the party has not made up its mind, in cases where new research may shed light on problems and difficulties, and in cases where ideological considerations have not caught up or accounted for particular policies.
3. As cited in Antony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works* (London: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 169.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-70.
5. Many letters, received by both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, are very critical of conditions at factories and workplaces. Bombing incidents in the Metro have been reported. Indeed, a major criticism against a number of Soviet officials was lodged over Soviet ships being caught in an Arctic ice pack. See "Pravda Censures Soviet Ministries in Ship Disaster," *Washington Post*, 21 October 1983, p. A32. See also the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* which provides English translations of the major Soviet magazines and newspapers, including letters written by Soviet citizens.
6. *USSR Yearbook 1979* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing, 1979), p. 146.
7. Vadim Medish, *The Soviet Union* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 226.
8. *USSR Yearbook 1979*, p. 146.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 147. Note the figures given in the *Soviet Yearbook* vary from Western estimates.
10. Medish, *The Soviet Union*, p. 232.
11. The reverse is also true. Viewers in Helsinki can watch Soviet TV. Broadcasts can also be received in the TV sets in tourist hotels for anyone wishing to tune in. For information on receiving live Soviet TV in the US, see Kevin Anderson, "Inventor's satellite dish beams in live Soviet TV," *USA Today*, 15 January 1986, p. 4B.
12. ABC program, "Good Morning America," 28 October 1982.
13. See *Time*, 27 June 1983, p. 38, and the *Washington Post*, 13 June 1983, p. A10. After the Soviet nuclear reactor accident, Vitaly Churkin, a second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, appeared on the Cable News Network. He parried questions from members of a House committee. See *USA Today*, 2 May 86, p. 2A.
14. John S. Reshete, Jr., *The Soviet Polity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 32. George Will, a columnist, has noted there is no such thing as a "Soviet

journalist" and says this phrase is an oxymoron; John Weisman "What TV Isn't Telling Us About Those Soviet Spokesmen," *TV Guide*, 26 April 1986, pp. 2-5.

15. Vadim Medish, *The Soviet Union*, p. 234.

16. The "nomenklatura" is a special list of names of those who have been judged qualified to hold such important positions by higher party authorities. See Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*, trans. Eric Mosbacher (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1984) and Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 430-31.

17. Medish, *The Soviet Union*, p. 233.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

19. Theodore E. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 102-3. Also Dorothy Rabinowitz, "Soviet Thrives on American TV," *New York Post*, 6 September 1985, p. 41.

20. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, p. 104.

21. Taken from the Supplemental Statement for the six-month period ending 30 September 1983 and filed pursuant to section 2 of the Foreign Registration Act of 1938, as amended. This and previous statements, signed by the TASS Directors, is available to the general public at the FBI's Public Office at 315 9th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC. TASS Reports are transmitted by the Associated Press.

22. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, p. 104.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 170. Also see a three-part series by Robert Gillette, the first of which is called "Soviets Turn Up Heat on U.S. Image," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1984, p. 1.

25. Howard A. Tyner, "Andropov Sick. Soviets Report," *Chicago Tribune*, 31 October 1983, section 1, p. 20.

26. The address took place at the evening banquet of the Eighth National Security Affairs Conference held in October 1981 at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. It can be found in *The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1981).

27. Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, p. 197.

28. There are many such "public organizations" in the USSR. They range from hobby and hunting groups to groups which promote the interest of young people in the national defense. Such groups are carefully controlled and used to ensure that even hobbyists still have the benefits of the leadership of the Communist party and also to ensure the group is doing its duty in building communism.

29. See Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, p. 197, and Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 192.

30. Hopkins, *Ibid.*, pp. 292-93.
31. From the inside front cover of *Soviet Life*. When first word came of the disaster, photographs of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl which appeared on network TV came from the pages of *Soviet Life*.
32. Hundreds of Soviet publications and abstracts are available to US readers by subscription. Victor Kamkin, Inc., located at 1224 Parklawn Drive, Rockville, Maryland 20852, publishes a number of catalogues which list such Soviet publications. Most publications are in Russian language, but many are in English, French, and German. US libraries subscribe to Soviet newspapers, military journals, literary magazines, and scientific journals. Hardback books can be obtained from any large US bookstore. Moscow Publishing House also exhibits its materials at scholarly conventions such as those of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association.
33. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, pp. 293-95.
34. *Current Science*, 19 May 1982, p. 5; *Discover*, May 1982, p. 16; and *Science News*, 20 March 1982, p. 197.
35. The agent which handles these Soviet and other Eastern Bloc transactions is Leah Siegal, 25 West 43rd Street, Suite 1008, New York, NY 10036. Leah Siegal also provides six-month statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
36. *Business Week*, 28 June 1982, p. 905.
37. *New York Times Magazine*, 27 June 1982, p. 19.
38. *US News*, 22 March 1982, p. 41.
39. *Washington Times*, 10 November 1983, p. 6A.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 6A.
41. *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 November 1983, p. 4.
42. *Chicago Tribune*, 10 November 1982, p. 5.
43. See Elizabeth Tucker, "CNN, Soviets Negotiating TV Program Pact," *Washington Post*, 22 August 1984, p. A1; and *TV Guide*, 25-31 August 1984, p. A-1 of the Kansas City edition. The Turner Broadcasting System and the telecast of the Goodwill Games in Moscow in July 1986 is another example. See *USA Today*, 3 March 1986, p. 1B.
44. Steve Mallory, "It's Like Running an Obstacle Course," *TV Guide*, 25-31 August 1984, p. 4.
45. Kevin Klose, *Russia and the Russians* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984). Klose is under no illusions about the darker aspects of the Soviet system, which he criticizes. His criticisms of Soviet totalitarianism are well written and on the mark. This seems to have upset some of his more liberal American colleagues, who feel such criticism is "unfashionable." The accuracy of Klose's criticism can be judged by the Soviet reaction which is scathing, indicating Klose has hit the mark.
46. Robert Gillette describes how much the Soviet people desire news and information in "Soviets Hungry for News from the Outside World," *Los Angeles*

Times, 21 August 1984, p. 1. Gillette also discusses video tape recorders and the first personal computer to be manufactured in the USSR.

CHAPTER 3

1. See Robert K. Massie's, *Peter, the Great* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).
2. William Nelson Turpin, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1977), p. 10.
3. There are some allowances in the Soviet system for private transactions, but the party still holds the "commanding heights" of the revolution as far as economics is concerned.
4. As quoted in Turpin, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, p. 19.
5. H. Stephen Gardner, in *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhof Publishing, 1983).
6. In Soviet managerial texts and articles dealing with the relationship of the government official and the factory manager with their counterparts in the party, ambiguities are discussed and analyzed at some length. Soviet writers must balance the ideal world with the practical ramifications evident in day-to-day working relationships.
7. Gardner, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, p. 4. For an overview of trade between the United States and the Soviet Bloc, see US International Trade Commission, *Thirty-fourth Quarterly Report to the Congress and the Trade Policy Committee on Trade Between the United States and the Nonmarket Economy Countries*, USITC Publication 1399, June 1983.
8. *Ibid.*, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, p. 4.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
11. Marshall Shulman, "Foreign Policy and Trade" in *Doing Business with the Russians*, ed. Westshore, Inc. (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 3. For an overall review of the trade situation between the United States and USSR, see "Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States—USSR," December 1985. This report (FET 85-115) is prepared annually by the American Embassy in Moscow and can be obtained from the Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20230.
12. Gardner, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, p. 29.
13. Turpin, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, pp. 20-24.
14. See also Marshall Shulman, "Foreign Policy and Trade," in pp. 7-10, and Simon Chilewich, "Why Trade with the Russians," in Margaret Chapman and Carl Marcy (eds.), *Common Sense in US-Soviet Trade* (Washington, DC: The American

Committee on East-West Accord, 1979), pp. 49–50. Richard M. Nixon also addressed this issue of United States and USSR trade relations in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. See "The US and the Soviets," *Washington Post*, 13 May 1984, p. C8.

15. For a full account, see Robert J. Maddox, *The Unknown War With Russia* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977), p. 53.

16. Turpin, *Soviet Foreign Trade*. Chapter 2 provides a brief historical review.

17. As reported in a feature on CBS News, "Sunday Morning," 4 December 1983.

18. US, Department of Commerce, *United States Soviet Commercial Relations since 1972, Bureau of East-West Trade, Selected Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee*, by Hertha W. Heiss, Allen J. Lenz, and Jack Brougher, 31 December 1982, p. 190.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 190–91.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 193–94.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

22. Joseph Finder details the connection between America's powerful businessmen and the Kremlin in *Red Carpet* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983). One of the most famous American businessmen is Dr. Armand Hammer, who is discussed in Finder's book and who was featured in *Life*, October 1982, pp. 77–84. *Life* and Finder both point out that Hammer has been allowed a number of amenities by the Soviets, including permission to fly his privately owned 727 in the USSR. Finder also discusses the activities and views of Cyrus Eaton, Donald Kendall, and David Rockefeller, as well as the activities of such US companies as Chase-Manhattan Bank, Occidental Petroleum, Pepsico, and Ford.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 204. Amtrog is almost as old as the Soviet Union, having been founded in 1924, eight years after the revolution.

25. From the "Statement of Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth Joint Economic Committee," October 9, 1985. This statement is available from the Commerce Department, Washington, DC 20030.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9. See also *Business America*, 10 June 1986, pp. 10–15.

27. Jack Brougher, "Soviet Economy in the 1980s," Problems and Prospects," part 2. Selected Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 31 December 1982, pp. 420–21.

28. Simon Chilewich, in *Common Sense in US-Soviet Trade*, p. 47.

29. Brougher, "Soviet Economy in the 1980s," p. 420.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 443.

31. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Curb on Oil Gear For Soviet Barred," in the *New York Times*, 4 December 1983, p. 1, and *Newsweek*, 26 January 1987, p. 38.
32. For a more detailed discussion, refer to William Echikson, "Soldering the East-West Trade Links," in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 December 1983, p. 9.
33. The Soviet Union, however, is conducting intense weather research. They are reported to have seeded clouds on the outskirts of Moscow in order to prevent rain which might have interfered with a huge parade. Several of these operations have been considered successful. As for managerial problems, Gorbachev has publicly criticized leading officials in the agricultural sector and has demanded improvements.
34. *Washington Post*, 22 December 1983, p. A5.
35. Ward Sinclair, "Soviets Stepping Up US Grain Purchase to Counter Shortfall," *Washington Post*, p. A1.
36. From the prospectus of the Marine Resources Company available to the public, which can be obtained by writing to their headquarters, 129 Nickerson, Seattle, Wash. 98109.
37. See Treaties in Force, US Department of State, 1 January 1983, p. 175.
38. Finder, *Red Carpet*, chapter 12. "The Pepsi Generation," pp. 201-18. Especially interesting are those sections dealing with Armand Hammer, the chairman and chief executive officer of Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Pepsi may become more available. There are now 17 bottling plants in the USSR.
39. Brougher, "Soviet Economy in the 1980s" p. 439. I have altered Brougher's list but have also taken his formulation virtually intact.
40. Marshall Goldman, "How Things Work in Moscow" in *Doing Business With the Russians*, pp. 105-16.
41. See Constance Mitchell, "USA Trade with Soviets Still Suffers," in *USA Today*, 19 November 1985, p. 1B.

CHAPTER 4

1. Estimated by Rear Adm. E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN. "Soviet Industrial Espionage," *Signal*, March 1983, pp. 15-16.
2. To maintain a list completely open to all would provide the Soviets with what some would say is a convenient shopping list.
3. From "Operation Exodus," an informal flyer of the US Customs Service, August 1982. "Operation Exodus" continues and involves over 400 agents, according to Mary Thornton, "Customs Fights KGB on High-Tech Thefts," *Washington Post*, 5 February 1986, p. 17.
4. See the "Intelligence Digest" section of *World Report*, 1 November 1982.
5. "Excerpts from Academy's Report on Science Exchanges and US Security," *New York Times*, 1 October 1982, p. 11.

6. Ibid.
7. Philip M. Boffey, "Security of US Said to Be Hurt by Data Leaks," *New York Times*, 1 October 1983, p. 1.
8. Ibid., p. 11.
9. *World Report*, 1 November 1982.
10. See Gary Thatcher, "Soviet Refrigerators Leave Buyers Cold as Andropov Calls for Better Workmanship," in *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 January 1984, p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 30.
12. Dr. Francis Kapper, "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology" *Signal*, January 1983, p. 33.
13. Gerhard Mally, "Technology Transfers Controls," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall, 1982, p. 237. Also, Harry C. Blaney III, "The Soviet Goal is to Catch Up on Technology," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 9 March 1986, p. 7F.
14. The Soviet system itself, however, is the greatest obstacle the Soviets may face in adapting Western methods. The planned economy centrally directed from Moscow discourages innovation. Please consult Thane Gustafson, "Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy and US Export Controls," (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, April, 1981).
15. *World Report*, 1 November 1982, and Melissa Healy, "Soviet Shopping List," *Defense Week*, 20 May 1985, p. 12.
16. "Spying Saves Millions in Soviet R&D," *Flight International*, 19 October 1986, p. 10.
17. John W. Kiser III, "Tapping Eastern Bloc Technology," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1982, p. 85, and in *Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Trade*, eds. Margaret Chapman and Carl Marcy (Washington, DC: American Committee on East-West Accord, 1983) pp. 101-10. See also John W. Kiser, "Reverse Technology Flows," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1985, p. 21.
18. Gordon Young, "The Miracle Metal Platinum," *National Geographic*, November 1983, pp. 668-706. Please refer specifically to the map and accompanying narrative on p. 693. For a broader discussion of US imports, see Paul Van Slambrouck, "Where the US Gets Key Minerals," in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 December 1983, pp. 24-25.
19. Young, *National Geographic*, p. 704.
20. Of course, it can also be argued that the United States is independent on foreign sources for a supply of precious and strategic metals. The United States imports 64 strategic minerals and metals. See Paul Van Slambrouck, "Where the US gets key minerals," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 December 1983, pp. 24-25.
21. Philip M. Boffey, "What exactly Are the Russians Getting"?' *New York Times*, 5 October 1982, p. C1.

22. From Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Technology Transfer and Security" *Europe America Letter*, October 1982, p. 200. I have deleted from his list some of the illegal means listed such as espionage, intelligence, and capture of weapons.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 22. See also Amelia A. Newcomb, "US Firms Chafe Under Federal Curbs on High-Tech Exports," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 April 1983, p. 12.
24. For a more detailed discussion, see Barbara Bradley, "Stemming Flow of High-Tech to East," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 April 1983, p. 1; and Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Machine Tools Divide Cabinet," *New York Times*, 3 February 1986, p. D1.
25. A number of federal agencies have sent their people to work with the officials in these countries. The work of these American officials is overlooked. These Americans work long hours, are separated from their families for long periods, and encounter many frustrations in trying to stem the technology flow to the East. I was privileged to meet and talk to some of them in Europe. They deserve recognition for the important job they are doing. Some governments simply refuse to cooperate. Austrian officials have worked with the US Commerce Department's representatives, but real progress has been slow when it comes to an effective arrangement. See Frederick Kempe, "Losing Battle," the *Wall Street Journal*, 25 July 1984, p. 1.
26. Major General Doyle E. Larson, "The Technology Transfer," *Journal of Electronics Defense*, August, 1982, p. 42.
27. See the *Washington Times*, 1 December 1983, p. 8B, for a full discussion. Also E.A. Shackelford, "Government Policy Hamstrings Merchant Marine," *Washington Times*, 2 May 1985, p. 3, and Edward Neilan, "Exchange Program Fraught with Perils," *Washington Times*, 15 January 1986, p. 4D.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 8B, The United States ranks number 11. For problems the Western shippers face, see *The Economist*, 26 November 1983, pp. 88-89. The Soviet fleet also faces these problems to some extent, but being an agency of the Soviet Government, as opposed to a private company, the fleet is insulated from market pressure.
29. Robert E. Athay, *The Economics of Soviet Merchant-Shipping Policy* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 15. Sovfakht also charters cargoes for Soviet foreign trade organizations which operate under the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 14. There are a total of 15 shipping lines in the Soviet Union operating under the direction of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.
31. Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Developments* (Annapolis, Md.: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1981), pp. 61-62. The Soviets also have the world's largest fishing fleet and the largest fleet of research and surveying ships, see pp. 63-76.
32. David W. Lee, Rapporteur. *The Soviet Merchant Marine* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1979; distributed by Westview Press, Boulder, Colo.), p. 12. Also see a three-part series written by Evans Johnson in the *New York City Tribune*, especially "Merchant Marine Part of Moscow's

Geostrategy," 5 June 1985, p. 1, and "A Red Star Rises on the High Seas," *Time*, 23 September 1985, p. 74.

33. Lee, *The Soviet Merchant Marine*, pp. 12-13. Western ship owners have accused the Soviets of undercutting prices by 40 percent, but these same ship owners have been trying to get the Soviets to join the conference systems membership as well. See pp. 29-31.

34. Ernest G. Frankel, *Management and Operations of American Shipping* (Boston: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1982), p. 1.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 4. For a review of the US Merchant Marine, see *Report on the Activities of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries*, a House of Representatives Report, Serial 96-B, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979). Funding and pending legislative actions begin on document page 39.

38. Gerhard Mally, "Technology Transfer Control," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1982, p. 236.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 236. The United States and its COCOM allies agreed to impose export controls on the sale of small computers. These smaller machines must be considered "banned" for sale to the USSR not only because of their size but also because of their portability and ruggedness. Such computers can be installed in battlefield equipment. See Paul Lewis, "Allies Curb Computers For Soviets," *New York Times*, 17 July 1984, p. D7. See also *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, "COCOM Agrees on Export of Computers," 23 July 1984, pp. 21-22.

40. *Journal of Commerce*, 24 February 1986, p. 4.

41. An excellent reference source for books dealing with technology flow to the Soviet Union is *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct., 1980, p. 74, and May-June, 1983, p. 70. See also *Defense Week*, "Soviet Shopping List," by Melissa Healy, 20 May 1985, p. 12. Also Steve Twomey, "A Leaked Report Reveals How Western Technology is Exploited," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 10 April 1985, p. 1.

42. These efforts to achieve a workable policy continue. See James K. Gordon, "Three Agencies Will Cooperate to Cut Export License Delays," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 6 May 1985, pp. 106-11. Also Warren Richey, "Bill May End Commerce-Defense Rivalry Over High-Tech Exports," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 April 1985, p. 5. In addition, see "The Price of Technology Leaks," in the *Wall Street Journal*, 10 May 1985.

CHAPTER 5

1. US, Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, series 7343. "Cultural Relations, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and other Fields in 1972-1973," p. 2.

2. Ibid., series 8620, p. 2.
3. Ibid., series 7655, p. 2.
4. Ibid., see series 7349 and 7650.
5. The use of the word *cultures* is important because there are many different cultures in the USSR.
6. Alexander Dallin, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet-American Exchanges," in IREX Working Papers, *A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges*, 10-13 May 1979, p. 68. This publication is available from IREX, 655 Third Ave., New York, NY 10017.
7. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
8. See Review of US-USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, September 1977, p. 87. This review is available from the NAS, 2101 Constitution Ave., Washington, DC 20418.
9. Mr. Yale Richmond, now of the Helsinki Commission in Washington, DC, has had long experience with the exchange programs. He makes the points in his discussion of why the Soviets engage in exchanges in his forthcoming book, as yet untitled. He also believes that the most important reason for Soviet participation in exchanges is their need to catch up with the US to acquire technology.
10. See Robert F. Byrnes, *Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976) for a complete account.
11. Dallin, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet-American Exchanges," p. 67.
12. See "News," *Physics Today*, January 1984, pp. 75-76.
13. Ibid., p. 76.
14. US, Congress, Senate, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs*, United States Senate, 97th Cong. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 30 April 1981), p. 98, and David Burnham, "US Aide Opposes Exchange of Science With Soviet Union," *New York Times*, 4 May 1985, p. 10.
15. Loren R. Graham, "A Balance Sheet in Science and Technology," IREX Working Paper, 10-15 May 1979, *A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges*, p. 40. Also, see an editorial in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, "To Exchange Or Not Exchange?" 12 July 1985, p. 17.
16. Graham, IREX Working Paper, p. 41. The author cites two reports of the National Academy of Sciences: *Review of US-USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations* (Washington, DC, 1977), chaired by C. Kaysen, and *A Review of Cooperation in Science and Technology Between the US and USSR* (Washington, DC, 1977), chaired by R.L. Garwin.
17. Ibid., p. 43. See also *United States-Soviet Studies Research. Hearings before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2919*, 97th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 22

September 1982). S. 2919 is a bill to help ensure the US capacity for study and advanced research on the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries.

18. From the National Academy of Science *Scientific Communications and National Security*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1982). See vol. I, pp. 67-68. The Reagan administration has been working with the academic community. See Lee Dembart, "Administration Relents in Dispute Over 'Sensitive' Academic Research," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 October 1984, part IX, p. 3.

19. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 6.

20. US Department of State. *Report to Congress, Scientific Exchange Activities with Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1981 and Fiscal Year 1982*. Prepared in accordance with Department of State Authorization Act, sec. (a) and (b), p. 2.

21. David Burnham, "Study Set on Security and Scientific Exchange," *New York Times*, 3 May 1985, p. 17.

22. Graham, "A Balance Sheet in Science and Technology," in *A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges*, p. 44.

23. US, Department of State. *Report to Congress, Scientific Exchanges Activities with the Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1981 and Fiscal Year 1982*, p. 2. The 1981 Senate Hearing of the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy (note 14 above) also stated on p. 98.

About 120 Soviet students and researchers come to the United States each year. Approximately 25 of these are on direct, university to university programs. Of the remainder, 25 come under an exchange agreement between the Academics of Science of the USA and of the USSR and another 70 are on other government sponsored, but privately administered programs. All these latter exchanges are closely monitored by the US Government.

For other Warsaw Pact countries, State Department statistics indicate the number of persons who entered the United States on visas as exchange students, scholars, and researchers.

	1979	1980	1981 to 1984
Bulgaria	40	42	7
Czechoslovakia	68	59	12
German Democratic Republic	61	55	8
Hungary	212	188	71
Poland	890	982	330
Romania	116	99	22

24. Obtained from the US Department of State, January 1984.

25. In 1981, for example, eight Soviets were rejected and not allowed into the United States on the exchange program. The Soviets have also rejected American scholars. The United States generally objects to a scholar on security grounds. The USSR had objected on the basis of an exchangee's activities in the area of human rights.

26. See the *Annual Report 1981-1982*, International Research and Exchanges Board, available from IREX, 655 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 7. Please note I have deleted IREX exchanges involving Eastern European institutes and countries. Although outside our scope here, they are important programs and serve many American scholars whose specialties lie in the Eastern European area.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
29. From "Fulbright Senior Scholars Awards Abroad 84-85," p. 2. A pamphlet available from CIES, 11 Dupont Circle, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20036.
30. "National Academy of Sciences Soviet and East European Exchange Program of the National Academy of Sciences, January-December 1985," Brochure of National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
31. Timothy E. Toohig "View from the Volga—updated," *Physics Today*, January 1985, p. 107.
32. *Newsletter of the Soviet-East European Exchange Program of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 5, no. 7 (Winter 1982-83), p. 1.
33. US, Department of State, *Report to Congress, Scientific Exchange Activities with the Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1981 and Fiscal Year 1982*, pp. 3, 4.
34. *Ibid.*, tab 8.
35. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 9 July 1984, pp. 16 and 17. *Aviation Week* also noted cooperation on analysis of radar images from Venus, 20 August 1984, p. 13. See also Thomas O'Toole, "US Soviets Plan '85 Space Mission to Demonstrate Astronaut Rescue," *Washington Post*, 16 November 1984, p. 9, and Craig Covault, "US Plans Soviet Talks on Joint Manned Mission," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 7 January 1985, pp. 1-18.
36. Craig Covault, "Soviets in Houston Reveal New Lunar, Mars, Asteroid Flights," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 1 April 1985, pp. 18-20, and Michael A. Dornham, "Soviets' Vega 2 Balloon, Lander Transmit Data from Venus," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 24 June 1985, pp. 22-24.
37. To learn more about COSPAS-SARSAT, write to Chairman, SARSAT Steering Group Dept of National Defense 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2 or Vice-President v/o MORSVIAZSPUTNIK, 7/9 SHEBASHEVSKIY PER., Moscow, 125315, U.S.S.R.
38. US, Department of State, *Report to Congress on Scientific Exchange*, tab 6.
39. See Michael Kernon, "What's Russian for 'Motel'?" *Washington Post*, 6 February 1984, p. C1. This article describes the 18-year work of Kenneth Katzner in compiling a Russian-English dictionary based on American, rather than British, English.
40. Logan Robinson, *An American in Leningrad* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 125-26.

41. This is reported to have taken place at a US Trade Fair but also has been reported in other situations as well.
42. Andrea Lee, *Russian Journal* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 188.
43. Interview with Ms. Catherine Cosman in Washington, DC, 15 February 1984. Ms. Cosman also noted that she was surprised by the fact that Soviet society was so stratified. Some Soviet officials who were high up in the Institute even had maids.
44. Lee, *Russian Journal*, pp. 164-66.
45. This area of experiences of Americans who have returned from the USSR is an area fertile for research. Americans fill out questionnaires about their experiences. However, one IREX official noted only about 20 percent of the forms are ever turned in. Returned Americans also work with the agency that sponsored them (IREX, CIES, and NAS) to help provide information for those going to the USSR. There is more room for study and investigation.
46. "Annual Report 1981-82," International Research and Exchanges Board, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 8.
47. "Summit Ends with Exchange Agreements," *Science*, 6 December 1985, p. 1142.

CHAPTER 6

1. There are rare exceptions, such as Cuba. The State Department will also issue advisories that warn Americans about travel to foreign lands. Iran is one country which the State Department has advised Americans to avoid. The State Department also issued a warning to Americans visiting Leningrad in the USSR in August 1984. American travelers were advised the Soviet authorities have not allowed detained Americans to contact the US Consulate.
2. Paul Grimes, "For the Tourist Strength in Numbers," *New York Times*, 20 March 1983, sec. xx, p. 16.
3. See Ronald Hingley, "Group Consciousness," *The Russian Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977). There are exceptions, however, and some people have arranged individual travel. Colin Thubion's book, *Where Nights Are Longest*, is an account of his travel alone in the western part of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1984).
4. Taken from a travel memo distributed by Academic Travel Abroad, Inc., 1346 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036.
5. Ibid.
6. Serge Schmemmann "Tbilisi, the Volga and Siberia, Too" *New York Times*, 20 March 1983, sec. xx, p. 15.
7. American Express is the most well known, but there are many others. The Intourist guide lists over 95 agencies authorized by Intourist to arrange travel to the USSR. These agencies are located in 22 states and the District of Columbia.

8. *New York Times*, 23 February 1984, p. A4, and *USA Today*, 23 February 1984, 7A.
9. The authorities in the USSR are very experienced in keeping track of tourists. After all, this is one Intourist function. The hotel card is an example of an "accounting" procedure. There are maids on hotel floors who keep track of room keys. Meal times are scheduled and the staff and Intourist guides can easily get a head count. I was "shadowed" when I visited the Soviet Union, but not all the time. Most Americans visit the USSR as simple tourists and are interested only in seeing what the place is like. The Soviets know this and react accordingly, but if an American visits the USSR for any purpose beyond tourism, the Soviet authorities take notice and react.
10. The shooting death of Maj. Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., by a Soviet soldier in East Germany in March 1985 put a real damper on these discussions. The aim is to avoid another KAL-007-type incident. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "US and Russians are Holding Talks on Airline Safety," *New York Times*, 26 May 1985, p. 1.; *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 13 May 1985, p. 13; and the *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 June 1985, p. 2.
11. Vickie Creel, "A Tour de Force of Friendly Soviets," *USA Today*, 9 May 1985, p. 3A.
12. Thomas D. Brandt, "20 Soviet Officials Plan Early March Visit Here," *Washington Times*, 15 February 1985, p. 4.
13. Schmemmann, "Tbilisi, the Volga and Siberia, Too," p. 15.
14. The figures shown come from the Department of State, Visa Control Office. A nonimmigrant visa is issued to Soviet citizens who are temporarily staying in the United States.
15. *Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Baker-McGovern Amendment)*, *Statutes At Large* 91, sec. 112, 848 (1977). The Act entitled "An Act to Provide Certain Basic Authority for the Department of State," approved 1 August 1956, is amended as follows:
 - Sec. 21. For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975) and for purposes of encouraging other signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludable from the United States by reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to the United States, recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa to such alien unless the Secretary determines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the security interests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
16. *Washington Post*, 2 March 1984, p. A8, and *New York Times*, 3 March 1984, p. 4.

17. The term *mirror imaging* refers to the projection of one's own values, behavior patterns, and instincts onto another, assuming that the other will behave according to those values. In fact, the other side may not have the same values but has its own unique set of values, concerns, motivations, and goals. Americans seem especially disposed to see other countries, including the USSR, as being "just like us," when, in fact, the Soviets have a completely different history and cultural inheritance. The Soviet people do not share the American traditions and customs such as compromise, limited government, and freedom of thought and artistic expression.
18. *New York Times*, 18 December 1983, p. 59.
19. The topics of how the Soviet people hunger for news and their government's efforts to provide only a dark view of the United States are expertly addressed in a three-part series written by Robert Gillette, *Los Angeles Times*, 19-21 August 1984. Each part began on p. 1. See also Gillette on jamming, p. 18 of the 21 August *Los Angeles Times*.
20. US, Department of State, *Cultural Relations, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 7343*, US Government Printing Office, pp. 15, 19.
21. One such account is the interesting and readable autobiography written by Galina Vishnevskaya, *Galina*, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984). The work provides an interesting commentary on the status of the arts in the Soviet Union.
22. *Time*, 24 June 1985, p. 71.
23. Pearl Bailey on the other hand was allowed to perform as a guest of the American Ambassador. See also *USA Today*, 17 April 1986, p. 4D, for a listing of Soviet groups performing in the United States.
24. More information can be obtained from: The Ground Zero Pairing Project, Box 19049, Portland, Oregon 97219, and The American Association of University Women, 2401 Virginia Ave., N.W., Washington, DC.
25. See Kathleen Teltsch, "Foundation Plans Grants for Preventing War," *New York Times*, 18 December 1983, p. 3.
26. Gary Thatcher, "Senior Soviet Official is Rare Dove in Globe's and Anti-nuclear Dovecote," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 February 1984, p. 1.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
28. Byron Rosen, "Soviets Miss Bus on U.S. Track," *Washington Post*, 14 February 1984, p. E2.
29. On the other hand, Americans showed a renewed sense of patriotism at the 1984 Olympics with their repeated chant of "USA." With the Olympic training centers at Colorado Springs and Lake Placid, plus increased funding from the private sector, US athletes will receive better training.
30. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics was particularly contentious. The bad relations between the United States and USSR and President Carter's decision to boycott the Olympics held in Moscow in 1980 resulted in the 1984 Soviet boycott.

31. The shooting death of Maj. Nicholson affected other issues between the United States and USSR as well, including arms talks in Geneva, talks held in Stockholm on reducing tension between East and West, and the arms reduction negotiations being held in Vienna. Tom Diaz, in the *Washington Post*, 14 May 1985, p. 6, discussed the Stockholm situation. More detail on the US response is covered in an article by O'Leary and Andrews, in *Washington Times*, 29 March 1985, p. 1.

32. For example, a 1984 rescue took place in the North Atlantic. The July 1984 issue of *Airman*, p. 4, relates the pick-up of two Soviet seamen by helicopters of the 67th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron based at Keflavik Field, Iceland. The Soviet Embassy in Iceland's Capital, Reykjavik, alerted the Icelandic Life Saving Service which then passed on the notification. The two Soviet seamen were airlifted to a hospital in Reykjavik. One had appendicitis and the other was suffering from a brain tumor. Both sailors were from a Soviet fishing fleet in the area.

33. See Robert C. Toth, "Soviets Take Steps to Accept On-site Inspections," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 March 1985, p. 19. For an excellent analysis of the inherent difficulties of such inspections in a control verification context, see William F. Scott, "Asymmetries in Arms Control Verification" in *Armed Forces Journal*, February 1985, pp. 94-96. Dr. Scott is former senior attaché to Moscow. See also Allan S. Krass, *Verification: How Much is Enough?* (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis/Stockholm International Peace Research, 1985).

34. Mr. Yale Richmond, also cited elsewhere in this book, was assigned to the US Embassy. He said there was a real difficulty convincing the Russians that an exchange of military entertainment groups would be useful. The Soviets resisted the idea and simply could not bring themselves to allow a military unit, even a band, into the USSR. See in addition, Robert C. Toth "Soviets Take Steps to Accept On-Site Inspections," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 March 1985, p. 6.

35. Visas were denied to a group of cadets at West Point and a group of US Air Force Academy cadets who also were going to visit the Soviet Union in March and April of 1984. A USAF officer studying at a civilian university and traveling with a civilian group was also denied a visa.

36. "A Risk Reduction Center Gains U.S. Support," *Science*, 10 January 1986, p. 107, and "Nunn's Work Paying Off," *Atlanta Journal*, 25 November 1985, p. 27.

SUGGESTED READINGS

JOHN BARON has written two excellent works entitled *KGB* (Diana Books, 1979, and Bantam, 1974). Brian Freemantel also has authored an informative work, *KGB* (HR&W, 1982). *KGB: The Eyes of Russia* by H. Rositzke (Doubleday, 1981) also provides an excellent source of information. For instances of intelligence operations within a Soviet Embassy, consult *Inside A Soviet Embassy* by Aleksandr Kazanachiev (J.B. Lippincott Company, 1962). *The Penkovskiy Papers* by Oleg Penkovskiy (Doubleday, 1965) details the Soviet military intelligence service from an insider's point of view. For a historical overview, consult *Soviet Espionage* by David J. Dallin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

For a review of Soviet military doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s, see V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963). A more recent work dealing with Soviet strategy is by William J. Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy* (Cambridge, Mass.: An Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis/McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1982). A very comprehensive work on the Soviet military can be found in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979). Published under the auspices of the US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1984 (and subsequent annual issues), provides a detailed summary of Soviet defense organization, weapons, strategy, and global capabilities. *Soviet Military Power* is available from the US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. There are Soviet journals and newspapers available in both Russian and English in any large library. *Soviet Military Review* and *Red Star* are examples. Articles

dealing with politico-military affairs may be found in the journal *International Affairs*. The USSR journals are published by publishing houses and organizations in the USSR and may be obtained by subscription. Readers can subscribe by using instructions found in the journals themselves or by contacting any large bookstore that deals in international publications.

Numerous sources treat Soviet foreign policy. A reader that provides an excellent overview of Soviet foreign policy is by Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969). A discussion of détente can be found in Richard Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company 1976). As with military doctrine and affairs, Soviet journals provide the Soviet view of world events and can be obtained printed in English. *International Affairs* is one prominent journal. Soviet newspapers also provide commentary on the relations between the United States and the USSR. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* provides a source that can be consulted by those not fluent in the Russian language and can be found in any large public library or university library.

So many fine and detailed works deal with arms control that it is difficult to provide a listing. See David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Steven Rosefielde, *False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup: An Appraisal of the CIA's Directing Costing Effort, 1960-1980* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1982); and Richard A. Jelanson, ed., *Neither Cold War Nor Detente? Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1982).

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